The Zollverein was another very strong card that Bizmarck was given in 1862 and the economic union of Germany from it. Due to its success it not only put the idea of union being successful in peoples minds it also increased German confidence in Prussia to lead (as they did with the Zollverein) with benefits for the German people, it was also a focal point for National fever. Although in 1866 when Prussia fought Austria, Prussia was opposed by every member of the Zollverein except those whose armies were already involved. So the relationship that the Zollverein had with the overall unification cannot be overestimated but the positive effects it had with both, bringing together the people in their feelings and in the how it helped in Germanys economic advancements are evident.
Countless times in History it has been proven that mass support is essential if change is possible and again it was necessary in Germany. If the people were completely opposed to unification then Bizmarck would have found it very much harder if not impossible to do what he did to complete the unification process. Fortunately for him the situation in Germany was quite favourable as well. Nationalism and Liberalism two beliefs quite closely related had been on the increase since 1815 after the successful economic union people were a lot less against union. Most Prussians and the king resented the defeat at Olmutz and so were not really opposed to Bismarck’s anti-Austrian policy. Also Prussian liberals in the Lantag were ready to trade in their liberal views in exchange for German unification, also the businessman of the powerful organisation the Nationalverin were for unification. The image that Bizmarck struggled alone to unite Germany is a false one he had the favourable situation both foreign and at home for which unification could take place.
The defeat of Austria in the 1866 war is clearly a very important, it gave Bizmarck the ability to dissolve the German confederation and exclude Austria from German affairs. This took Prussia a long way in following the Kleindeutsch plan and the reason for the victory was certainly not all down to Bizmarck but again to the years previous to 1862 and to the minister presidents before. Generations of Prussian leaders had pumped large amounts of money into the army e.g. in 1885, 91 million out of the 335 mil budget was spent on the army and the navy. Although it must be mentioned Bizmarck did push through some important army reforms much of the groundwork was already there. Also economic strength played a big part the more efficient railway system enabled troops to be mobilised better and the extra money meant that Bizmarck could fight the war and use the money necessary without putting to much extra pressure on the German people. Although Bleichroder must be mentioned, he was Bismarck’s accountant and so will have played a big part in making the money necessary for war available. There were many other factors that helped lead to unification not just that of Bizmarck input.
By 1862 the military and the intellectual foundations had already been laid Bizmarck just took the final step. Another point that must be mentioned is that there were originally two plans of which unification could follow either a Kleindeutsch (Prussian dominated Germany) or a Grossdeutsch (Unified Germany involving Austria) and it would seem by the time Bizmarck came to power only one plan was still feasible as Austrian isolation and decline had worsened over the years. Prussia was now by far the stronger state and so it seems obvious that they would be the ones that would lead Germany into unification.
When discussing how much of a role Bizmarck played it would be impossible to ignore the argument of whether he actually meant to do what he did, whether he had a master plan or whether he was just a great opportunist. There is an argument suggests that everything he did was part of a clever plan in which the end result would be unification. Some historians believe that he intervened in the Schleswig-Holstein crisis to trick Austria into declaring war on Prussia, that he ensured French neutrality so that he could fight Austria and then treated Austria leniently so that they would be neutral for when Prussia would fight France and that he got France to declare war so that the South German states would help thus unifying Germany. However as always there is also a strong argument against this belief, they believe his real aim was to preserve and extend Prussian control and that he followed the clever policy of “two irons in the fire” meaning that there were always possibilities. They believe he intervened in the Schleswig-Holstein affair because of his hatred of the poles, that he never ensured French neutrality, seen by how wary he was of it being a long war as France could intervene and take all their gains and that he actually hoped to unite Germany peacefully without war if possible.
‘The Master’ planner view is probably the most unlikely from letters and speeches at the time the idea that he was at heart just a Junker who wanted to keep the same strong society in Prussia is probably more realistic. However the fact of the matter is in 1862 Otto Von Bizmarck came to power and in a matter of years German Unification took place, how much of a part he actually played is part of an endless debate the situation and prospects for Prussia were so good, the analogy that he was given a great hand on his entry into power and all he had to do was play it with good timing is probably quite a good one.