The long-term conflict between the two religiously diverse communities of Ireland ultimately marks the true significance of the crisis. The national and religious polarisation between Catholics and Protestants was a principal feature of the tension, which remained prominent in the coming centuries. However things came to a head in 1912, when the Third Home Rule Bill was introduced. Politically the most significant weakness of the measure was, as argued by Watts, its failure to cater for the specific interests of the Ulster unionists. According to Watts the nine Northern counties of Ireland were both economically and socially isolated from the rest of Ireland. In comparison to the Southern counties the Northern region had a viable industry, an efficient agriculture and more importantly links to British markets. Subsequently, as maintained by Peaple “Ulster Unionists had a vested economic interest in preserving the Union while other parts of Ireland did not.” Judging by this, Ireland was clearly a divided country, with one section as Adelman explains, “looking outwards towards Britain.” and the other pushing for independence. Admittedly, the task of containing aggression was a difficult task, but Asquith’s "wait and see" tactics did not help the situation, his only chance of solving the matter was to either stick to his original plan of granting the whole of Ireland Home Rule or to separate the Ulster states from the rest of Ireland. Hence it can be said that the social and economic differences between the two religiously diverse communities has alone exemplified the seriousness of the crisis. More importantly, it further encouraged the process of segregation, which ultimately led to the formation of Ulster resistance.
With the introduction of the Home Rule Bill in 1912 the crisis had entered a new phase. The key factor at this particular stage, according to Peaple, “was the determination of the Ulster Unionists, not to accept Home Rule”, which they did effectively through the use of the Lord’s parliamentary affluence. The delay between the rejection of the Bill by the Lord’s and its passage into law provided the Ulster Unionists with the necessary time to mobilise. As part of the process of opposing the Home Rule Bill Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party, and James Craig, leader of the Ulster Unionists, were prepared to raise the political temperature in Ireland. Apart from organised mass meetings and demonstrations such as the ceremonial signing of the ‘Ulster Covenant’, according to Watts, “more militant steps were taken to form an army force, the UVF.” Judging by Carson’s course of action, it can be said that the Ulster Unionists were prepared to sanction armed resistance in order to bring the dispute to the brink of a civil conflict. Subsequently in January 1913 an Ulster paramilitary organisation was formed. The organisation was highly organised and increasingly popular in Ulster. In retaliation to this, the Irish set up the Irish Volunteers and the Sinn Fein, which was a more radical alternative. More importantly, despite the ban on importing arms both paramilitary organisations had gradual obtained viable supplies of weapons.
Although both organisations had the possession of small arsenals by contrast it was the UVF gunrunning as argued by Peaple that “provoked deep resentment amongst Nationalists.” On the 25th April 1914 the UVF had successfully completed a transaction of weapons during which, as Kee explains, “the police and the military were physically prevented from interfering.” In comparison the Nationalists attempt to seize a deal in July 1914 had met some difficulties, which as renounced by Peaple “infuriated the Nationalists and weakened the government.” Generally speaking the formation of the illegal paramilitary organisations and gunrunning was part of a chain reaction, which as argued by Peaple, “created a climate in which civil war seemed a distinct possibility.” This showed that it was a real crisis, as did the Curragh ‘mutiny’.
According to Peaple the Curragh mutiny was another example of the erratic nature of the situation in Ireland. Peaple argues that the incident “greatly weakened the government’s negotiating power and ensured that any plans to use the army… in Ulster were shelved.” In order to suppress the transaction of weapons and coerce Ulster into accepting Home Rule if the need arose Asquith’s administration would have had to ban paramilitary organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and mobilise the British army. This together with the failure to reach a compromise with Carson resulted in the war office’s decision to tighten up security and surveillance, which meant that the British troops at one stage would be forced to go into a combat stance against the UVF. In response to this order, fifty eight officers stationed in the military camp at Curragh informed general Sir Arthur Paget of their dismissal, which seemed reasonable considering the fact that many of them were in some way related to the Ulster community. In spite of this the incident was noted as a mutiny, which as maintained by Peaple “changed the balance of power in Ireland” and “ensured that there would be partition or no Home Rule.” In view of this it can be said that the crisis was a significant show of political crisis, since the incidents caused as a result of this crisis led to a gradual change of parliamentary leadership.
It can also be said that the Conservative position and attachment to the cause in Ireland was a fair reflection of how serious the crisis was. As proclaimed by Andrew Bonar Law there was “no length of resistance to which Ulster can go.” Judging by this statement it is evident that the Conservative party found armed resistance to Home Rule justifiable. More importantly it showed that the Conservatives were willing to broadcast such acute statements knowing that, as Peaple argues, “opposition to Home Rule would increase their popularity.” Secondly the fact that the Liberals had lost seats in the 1910 elections meant that they did not have the authorisation to legitimise Home Rule and that a strong Conservative opposition would produce a coherent attack that would further weaken the Liberal administration. More importantly the Conservative principles would be undermined if they failed to use this opportunity to attack the Liberals on behalf of the ‘British Empire’ and the ‘rights of property’. Hence the fact that the Conservatives were so eager to characterise themselves as a political counter-force to Home Rule meant that Ulster as Foster explains “was an appropriate area for exerting political energy.” This in tern shows that the question of Ireland was a real crisis.
In spite of this, it was the ‘Easter rising’ that appears to signify the true dimension of the crisis in Ireland. Watts sustains the belief that the majority of the Nationalists in Ireland were determined to attain independence before the war in Europe had begun. The fear of a potential civil conflict was replaced by the fear of an international war, which once again put the Home Rule issue at the back of the political agenda. As a result of this, in 1916 the Easter rebellion was launched, in which strategic points in Dublin, including the general post office, were seized. Overall the uprising was considered to be a failure as it was immediately suppressed by British troops. Nevertheless, as argued by Watt “the uprising had many repercussions… the issue of Home Rule was once again given the full attention.” The increase in the support for Sinn Fein and the IRA as a result of the uprising was an added problem. Watt maintains that Lloyd George tried to get Ulster to agree to the Home Rule scheme “thus detaching Home Rulers from Sinn Fein.” In general this added further pressure to the hectic situation. The Conservatives refused to accept the scheme and therefore as Watt argues “the last chance of settling the Irish problem was peacefully lost.”
In conclusion the crisis over Ireland in the period of 1909-1912 was, according to Foster “a tactic that left the government vulnerable”, but as argued by many historians, Asquith’s ‘wait and see’ strategy worsened the situation. Consequently, it can be argued that Asquith's weak leadership and inability to make a firm decision almost resulted in civil war and this disastrous event was probably only avoided due to even more worrying happenings on the continent. Moreover, the constitutional problem clearly highlighted the Liberal government’s weakness, which as highlighted by Daingerfield “had no real answer to the various problems”. Daingerfield continues by insisting that, “when faced with a pattern of violence…Liberalism was incapable of a decision.”
