Bismarck’s primary aims were to prevent a war in Europe to maintain Germany’s security, to keep France isolated and to prevent from socialist ideals that were then spreading through Europe and represented a threat to conservative regimes such as Germany’s. What could he then do? In order to guarantee all those he established an alliance with Russia and Austria-Hungary, the Dreikaiserbund (League of the Three Emperors), in 22 October 1873. It consisted of a series of military agreements promising aid to any party in case they were attacked by a fourth power. In part this agreement could be maintained: the parties involved were under conservative regimes and therefore had interest in fighting against leftist ideals such as socialism, liberalism and democracy. However, the alliance was harder to be maintained than Bismarck would imagine. In fact, the Balkan region – a region of the decaying Ottoman Empire – was a ripe for conquest between Russia and Austria-Hungary, in the case of Russia it was due to ethnic reasons and for Austria-Hungary it was simply because they represented a threat to the stability of the regime. Due to this reason, it would be impossible to avoid a conflict between these two powers. AJP Taylor emphasized precisely that reason of the existence of the Dreikaiserbund, considering “Its object insofar as it had one, was to prevent a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Eastern Question”. Despite his efforts, Bismarck would not succeed in maintaining this alliance and two specific crises contributed for it, one of them dealing with France and the other one dealing with the Eastern Question.
The first crisis, known as the ‘war in sight’ crisis, occurred in 1875 and was basically because of an article in the Berliner Post commenting the possibility of a ‘war in sight’ crisis due to Bismarck’s demands to increase the army budget from the Reichstag. He demanded that because as the French recovered quickly from the Franco-Prussian War, soon they rebuilt their army and it was becoming very powerful, which in some way might have scared Bismarck that he ordered the increase in army’s budget so that he would be prepared for everything that could happen. What he was not expecting was the reactions other European powers had to that article. Instead of moving away or asking for apologies, France appealed to other powers to help them in case of a German attack. The result was Russia and Britain standing on the side of France and protesting to Berlin because of the ‘war in sight’. This clearly shows the limits of Russia’s confidence in Germany even though they had an alliance and is an evidence of the weakness of it.
The second crisis, the Eastern crisis of 1875-78 arose from a Russian intervention in the Balkans in a war against Turkey not only because of ethnic reasons – as it was said above, the nationalities in the Balkans were ethnically Slavs and saw Russia as their mother country, therefore the existence of Pan-Slavic groups in that region – but also because Russia had political interests there: the Balkans provided assess to the Mediterranean Sea. The outcome of the was the Treaty of San Stefano signed in 3rd March 1878 which stipulated Turkey would loose the majority of its territories in the Balkans in favour of Russia by the creation of Russian client states. This new situation brought about a climate of tension with Austria-Hungary as they also had interests in the region and felt that Russia’s presence could represent a threat for the influence they had there. Bismarck found only one alternative to face the imminence of war: a conference of great powers, where they could discuss about the problems that arose and find a peaceful solution for them. The Congress of Berlin held in June-July 1878 marked a highpoint in Bismarck’s diplomatic career: not only he was able to maintain peace – probably his major aim concerning foreign policies – but he was also able to place Germany in the centre of European diplomacy. However, was he actually successful with his Congress? Or did it mark the beginning of the end of the Dreikaiserbund? In fact, he did prevent war by organising the Congress which was what he wanted above everything. Nevertheless, the Congress of Berlin limited Russia from her gains in the Turkish War and gave Austria-Hungary more rights over the Balkans, which deteriorated Russo-German relations and brought tension in the Balkans. This is well illustrated by Tsar Alexander II’s vision of the Congress of Berlin as a “European coalition against Russia under the leadership of Prince Bismarck”. The relations between Germany and Russia were worsened the following year with the establishment of protective tariffs by Bismarck against Russia, which made an anti-German feeling grow among them. There is a view from a historian – Morris – which summarizes perfectly the League of the Three Emperors “…gave a false air of stability to the politics of Eastern Europe. Behind its façade, a series of factors kept alive Russian resentment at rising German power and at Austria pretensions in the Balkans”. In other words, although the powers were allied, the climate of tension because of the Balkans region was inevitable specially after the Congress of Berlin, where Russia lost most of the rights she had achieved by the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano in favour of Austria-Hungary which was given the right to govern Bosnia-Herzegovina. What could be done then by Bismarck in order not to make Russia become more hostile?
The answer came in October 1979 with Germany establishing a Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary. It consisted of an agreement between the two powers where they committed themselves to aid each other in case one of them was attacked by Russia. However, they would remain neutral of attacked by a third power. What were Bismarck’s motives for signing such alliance at a time when there was an anti-German feeling among Russia which could get worse? Certainly one of them was to avoid diplomatic isolation and to frighten Russia by the perspective of being isolated herself. Furthermore, a commitment with Austria-Hungary would please southern Germans disillusioned with the Kulturkampf as well as it would guarantee the safety of the Empire’s southern borders. However, according to historian William Carr “the truth is that he acted once again on the spur of the moment to deal with an emergency situation – largely of his own making. The alliance was a temporary expedient to preserve the precarious balance of power in the Balkans by warning Russia off Austria. In no sense was Bismarck making a final choice between them” (quoted from W Carr “A History of Germany 1815-1985”). What is said in the excerpt is, in other words, that the Dual Alliance was a temporary solution Bismarck found in an attempt to solve the problem created by him – the growing hostility of Russia – in the Congress of Berlin, which could mean the beginning of a war he did not want. Three years later, in May 1882, Italy was added to the Dual Alliance, which become then the Triple Alliance. This new alliance would be of Bismarck’s liking and would bring new benefits as Italy was anti-French and in case Germany attacked France or vice-versa, Austria-Hungary would remain neutral as it was agreed previously when they first signed the Dual Alliance. Moreover, with Italian forces ranged against France, Austro-Hungarian troops could concentrate on a Russian attack with Germany if it was the case. Nevertheless, this new alliance did not bring only benefits. In fact, an alliance with Austria-Hungary made Germany get involved in affairs concerning the Balkans’ region, where she had no direct interests. As Bismarck said a few years before during the Eastern Crises, no Balkan issue was “worth the healthy bones of a Pomeranian musketeer”. So, although this alliance with Austria-Hungary and later with Italy brought some advantages to Bismarck of which I stress the fact Germany had at last an anti-French ally she could count on in case of an eventual attack as well as she also guaranteed she would not be diplomatically isolated, on the other hand, as it was said above, an alliance with Austria-Hungary implicated her enveloping in Balkan affairs.
What about Russia? What was her position now with the Dual Alliance, where she was not included? Bismarck’s expectations were in fact well founded as in June 1881 Russia agreed to renewal the Dreikaiserbund fearing diplomatic isolation. This renewal implied the three powers would remain neutral in case one of them went to war with a fourth power. In addition, the tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary over the Balkans was pacified by the establishment of each one’s spheres of influence. However, in the summer of 1866 a new crisis arose which drastically changed the order the system of alliances existing until then. After Russia had forced the abdication of the independent-minded Bulgarian King Alexander, a Russo-Austrian clash seemed more likely than ever – after all, they had made some agreements concerning the Balkans region and Russia was not following it. This crisis resulted in the collapse of the Dreikaiserbund, which could be dangerous as it made very likely the possibility of Russia getting closer to France to an eventual alliance, and that was a risk Bismarck did not want to take. What could he do in order to avoid that possibility? Bismarck’s solution was to make a secret agreement with Russia – the Reinsurance Treaty – in June 1887 where both powers agreed neutrality if attacked by a third power. Furthermore, in the treaty Germany recognised Russia had more interests over Bulgaria than Austria-Hungary, which had been the main reason for the Dreikaiserbund’s collapse a year before. Basically, this treaty provided Russia would not attack Austria-Hungary (in which case Germany would be tied to her ally). With the celebration of the Reinsurance Treaty – which could be renewed after three years – with Russia, it seemed Bismarck achieved everything he wanted concerning his foreign policies and in fact he did manage to prevent a war in Europe as well as he was able not to isolate himself and to keep France isolated. In order to achieve this he turned to a complex system of alliances: the Dreikaiserbund, the Dual Alliance and later on Triple Alliance and finally the Reinsurance Treaty. However, at this point a question arises: were these alliances compatible? It has been often suggested the Reinsurance Treaty was in fact incompatible with Germany’s promises to Austria given in the Dual Alliance. However, there was no real contradiction between the terms of the two agreements; actually they just gave Germany the power to arbitrate whom she should support in the event of a war. In addition, the Reinsurance Treaty made a French attack improbably, as she was isolated and therefore had no conditions to challenge Germany.
Up to now I have been explaining Bismarck’s foreign policies concerning European affairs. What about his colonial policies? What were his decisions at a time when European powers such as Britain had vast Empires spread all over the world? In fact, he only undertook a colonial policy in the 1880s, when he authorised his government to form a body of important German possessions. This would be considered a normal situation if we have in account Germany was a rising European power and certainly would want to show her greatness by having an Empire overseas. However, until then his view on colonial possessions was totally the opposite: the fact that in 1871 he refused to annex French colonial territories in the place of Alsace-Lorraine by saying “so long as I am Chancellor we shall pursue no colonial policy” is a clear evidence of his sudden change of opinion. Why did he change attitude then? Some historians would say he always wanted to pursue a colonial policy, but was just waiting for the right moment to go ahead; others consider he just had to conform to German peoples’ demandings. The main reasons were basically pressures coming from the different groups within German society, which although had different interests they all wanted the same: colonies. One of those groups was the industrialists who wanted to have new sources and raw materials so that they could raise their production levels. New groups such as the German Colonial Union and the Society for German Colonisation were formed in 1882 and 1884 respectively as a way to show the government Germans’ wills. Furthermore, nationalists felt Germany should impose as an Empire and therefore spread all over the world by establishing colonies. There was also a conservative view that considered that the pursuing of a colonial policy would distract people from domestic problems and that was good at a time when socialism was beginning to spread and gain more supporters. What were his main policies then? We can summarise them by saying he established colonies in areas where German trading interests had been developed by private firms previously. The first territory acquired was Angra Pequena and in 1884 it was governed by Franz Luderitz. Within the year a colony was established in South West Africa, an area of British interest. Later in July Gustav Nachtigal, who had already experience in the area, was appointed as responsible to govern Togoland and the Cameroons. A year later the area where is now Tanzania was acquired by Karl Peters through deals with native tribes in the region. New Guinea (1885) and the Samoan Islands in the Pacific (1899) completed German colonial empire. German people wanted territories so that they could get new resources and show Germany’s greatness, however most important than all that is if this policy was actually successful or not. Bismarck expected the colonisation would not bring any extra expenditure to the Empire, but it proved to be much worse than he could expect. Why did it fail then? Basically, the biggest motives for its failure were the lack of German population in the colonies, so not much investment could be made over the lands. Moreover, most of the German population on the colonies were officials so there were not actually many people to work on the lands except for the natives, who were extremely poor and could not afford any of German industrial output. In relation to the resources, only South West Africa fulfilled the hopes of German people as diamonds were discovered there which constituted a very precious and valuable resource. However, the worst consequence of Bismarck’s foreign policy was that it was a limited and bad experience concerning Imperialism and colonies, so in some way it led to German’s famous ‘world politic’ years later which would play an important role in the events before the outbreak of war.
In conclusion, Bismarck’s foreign policy consisted mainly in the make-up of a complex system of alliances in a way he could achieve what he wanted and thought was the best to preserve Germany’s interests: firstly, to keep France isolated; secondly, to avoid a war in Europe and thirdly, to guarantee the security of Germany. However, it was inevitable some day a clash between Russia and Austria-Hungary that would end up in war and that actually happened in 1914, what he managed to do while he was on power was to avoid it by delaying it for the most time possible. Along with that, another aim was to keep France isolated. Although he was able to achieve it for most of the time he was on power, in his final years Russia’s turn to France could not be avoided due to the lack of investment by German businessmen in Russia. In fact, he was successful in his foreign policies while Chancellor of Germany as he achieved all he aimed for. The problem just began right after his downfall - no other person in the government was able to orchestrate things the way he did and was not able to maintain the alliances or at least find another solution in order to keep peace and stability in Europe - with the biggest mistake being done still in 1890 when Wilhelm II refused the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, which dictated Russia’s definite turn to France and the start of Europe’s split in two alliances that years later led to World War I.