In September 1923, failure to deliver a shipment of timber as part of their reparations payments gave France an incentive to occupy the Ruhr valley, one of Germany’s main industrial areas. The French intended to make Germans work for them in order to complete the payments. In response to the occupation, the Ruhr workers were encouraged to offer passive resistance to the French troops. To pay the striking workers a wage more marks were printed, however printing money whilst productivity levels remained low resulted in hyperinflation and hardship for many German people whose savings lost their value.
It is understandable then that the British would become more sympathetic towards the German people as a result of the Ruhr crisis. As the historian Alan White suggests, ‘it was clear that Germany’s reparations liability was beyond it’s capacity to pay.’ He also points out that France’s ‘aim in occupying the Ruhr was to strip Germany of it’s wealth and strength’ keeping Germany incapable of starting another war. Many British politicians who understood France’s intentions in occupying the Ruhr disapproved of the occupation. They felt that whilst Germany should be dissuaded from any future war, forcing Germany into economic crisis was not the way to do this.
Gustav Stressemann the newly appointed German chancellor, called an end to passive resistance in the Ruhr. His stabilising influence brought a new currency, the Rentenmark, and a new foreign which has been described as a, ‘policy of fulfilment’. This meant that Germany would be co-operative and complaint in future. Stressemann’s ‘policy of fulfilment’ helped convince some people in Britain that Germany did not want another war, thus making them more sympathetic to the opinion that the treaty of Versailles was too harsh.
Out of the economic crisis and Stressemann’s policy of fulfilment came the Dawes plan, a plan to link Germany’s reparation payments to productivity levels in order to ease their burden and gave Germany a longer time to pay. From this it can be assumed that as a result of the 1923 crisis, more British statesmen became more sympathetic to Keynes’ theory that the amount of reparations put intolerable pressure on the German economy and less sympathetic to the French idea that Germany needed to be kept weak.
In October 1929, the Wall Street Crash caused a wave of depression to spread across Europe. Germany’s weak economy was made weaker by the large amount of loaned money withdrawn by the U.S., leaving Germany facing economic peril. The chancellor at that time was Bruning, whose policies, such as cutting unemployment insurance by 60%, increasing taxes and decreasing expenditure in order to balance the country’s budget, have been criticised by historians such as _____. The number of people out of work rose to an estimated 9m during Bruning’s chancellorship. The only sector that Bruning had thought to support was agriculture, a tariff was implemented to prevent against cheaply foreign goods, and so food prices remained high whilst money scarce. Dropping birth rates and increasing suicide added to the impact of the depression. Witnessing the effects of the depression in Germany provoked a sympathetic reaction in Britain, particularly amongst the British middle classes who weren’t as affected by the depression as the German middle classes. The unsuccessful policies of Bruning contributed to the effects of the depression thus increasing the amount of sympathy felt. Similarly, Bruning’s unsuccessful policies made Hitler’s successes during the time of his chancellorship and presidency all the more impressive, causing some people in Britain to believe that Hitler was a good nationalist leader.
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party benefited from the depression as it turned support away from the dominant SPD and gave them the opportunity to prove themselves by reversing the effects of the depression. By ____ the Nazis had moved from their position of the ‘lunatic fringe’ of politics to become the largest party in the Reichstag. By 1933 Hitler was President.
After the economic depression, the Nazi Party’s most important aims were to restore economic strength to Germany and to lower unemployment levels. This they did with a great degree of success. By constructing 7000km of autobahn, by creating a Reich Labour Service, by beginning a process of rearmament and by re-introducing conscription the Nazi’s managed to bring employment levels down to 200,000 by 1939. The historian, W.L. Shirer commends the German Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schnact for his, ‘creation of credit in a country that had little liquid capital and no financial reserves’. As T.A.Morris writes, ‘Production and sales figures for consumer goods in the immediate pre-war years suggest a distinct rise in the standard of living.’ However it is not only in this respect that the Nazi Party could be seen to have improved the standard of living. By creating a one party state by outlawing parties such as the KPD and the SPD as well as introducing new measures such as, ‘The Law Against The Formation Of New Parties’, the Nazi’s were able to present their country as being free from the political violence, examples of which include the Spartacist uprising ( ), the Kapp Putsch ( ) and the Munich Beer Hall Putsch ( )which had plagued the early years of the Weimar Republic.
It is easy to see from these examples of success how the British public may have been sympathetic to the idea that Hitler was a good nationalist leader, particularly if they had nationalist leanings and approved of Hitler’s patriotic stance.
To conclude; people in Britain were sympathetic to the view that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany and that Hitler was a good nationalist leader because of a number of inter-dependent factors. The direct implications of the Treaty of Versailles were the war-guilt clause, the loss of land and, perhaps most importantly, the reparations payments. In 1923 the hostility of France, coupled with the burden of the reparations payments, caused France to invade the Ruhr. This crisis, and the resultant foreign ‘policy of fulfilment’ adopted by the German government, would appear to have acted as a catalyst for British sympathy resulting in the Dawes plan of 1925. The Dawes plan paved the way for U.S. loans which with withdrawn in 1929 after the Wall Street Crash thus causing Germany to plunge into depression. The effects of the depression were worsened by Bruning’s unsuccessful policies. Out of the depression emerged Hitler who brought stability and prosperity by implementing new policies and by ignoring the Terms of The Treaty of Versailles. Hitler’s success, in contrast to the severe hardship common to Germans in the inter-war years, provoked a sympathetic reaction in the Britain thus bringing the British round to the idea that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh and that Hitler had been a good Nationalist leader.
From this summary it is possible to see how all the events in Germany which increased sympathetic feeling in Britain, originated from the Treaty of Versailles. In this way, I will conclude by saying that the Treaty of Versailles itself was the most important factor in creating British sympathy towards the view that the Treaty was unfair and that Hitler was a good Nationalist leader.
T.A. Morris – The twenty years truce
- The Third Reich
J.M. Keynes – The economic consequences of peace
Alan White – The Weimar Republic
powerPaul Salmon – The closing years of the Weimar Republic