Is History a Science

The idea of whether history can be considered a science is one which is often disputed amongst historians. Richard Evans addresses the argument as to whether history can be depicted as a science or not in his writing ‘In Defence of History’. He states that theorists have argued that history is not a science because ‘while scientific knowledge is cumulative, historical knowledge is not’. Our knowledge of science is owed to the ‘foundations built by the scientific discoveries of the past’. These discoveries are facts. For instance we know that humans are mammals, this is a scientific fact. This however cannot be applied to history, because historians ‘advance a different interpretation from that of the previous historian studying the same subject’. Evans point is that historians question and argue against each other’s points, scientists don’t argue against Einstein’s theory of relativity. The opinion of one historian on a certain subject often differs from that of another. A perfect example of this playing out in history is the issue of the Hitler Myth. This is a subject that has been highly debated throughout history. It is the argument over whether Hitler really was this demigod, a strong and powerful mastermind behind the Third Reich, who had his henchmen trained to work towards his will. Or whether he was in truth a weak leader, a mere subject of the propaganda machine and the genius by Joseph Goebbels. This argument formulated by Ian Kersaw, and shared by historians such as Hans Mommsen. Evans puts forward the idea that history cannot be considered a science because science isn’t argued against, it doest have differing interpretations whereas history does.

Evan suggests that the most important challenge to the claims that history is scientific is the ‘belief that a true science can only exist if it is able to posit general laws’. One thing that a scientist strives to achieve that a historian cannot is laws. Scientists try, by analysing various hypotheses and through means of experimentation, to form general theories. For instance; Isaac Newton’s theories, allow scientists to predict a number of exchanges within physics. Similarly with Einstein’s theory of relativity, which can calculate the future of the sun’s gravity. By definition science should always provide a prediction of future events. When we look at science in this way, Evans is right, as this is not possible in history. E.H Carr however disputes this argument by suggesting that science doesn’t in every respect predict the future.  Carr uses Newton’s law of gravity in his argument, stating that Newton’s law could not predict that a certain apple will fall at a certain place at a certain time. The main crux of Carr’s argument is that historian’s cannot wholly predict the future, but neither can scientists. With this argument he is disputing the view that history cant be a science because it cant predict the future. Carr concludes his argument by claiming that historians could predict that a revolution might occur in a particular country if the conditions we the same as in similar countries where a revolution happened in past. With this view, Carr determined that history was the same as science.. Evans however disputes the argument initiated by Carr. Evans states that ‘Time and time again, history has proved a very bad predictor of future events’. Evans furthers his argument by concluding that people, especially politicians never learn lessons form history, no matter how much they try. He then goes on to say that ‘history never repeats itself…nothing ever happens twice under exactly the same conditions or in exactly the same way’. Evan suggests that because of this, history cannot be a science. He believes that because there are no laws in history, like there are in science this conclusion cannot be made. Evans makes the statement that ‘life, unlike science, is simply too full of surprises’ therefore historians can’t predict the future. This point made by Evans is very true, it is quite impossible for a historian to predict the exact time and place a revolution might occur. However it is important not to take Carr’s point too literally. What Carr possibly could be suggest with his argument is that a historian can make very vague assumptions. For instance, if a country has been taken over by a totalitarian government, who then proceeds to invade his surrounding countries successfully, a historian can then say that a war might break out like that of the second world war. When Carr made his point, it is doubtful that he meant that historians could predict future events in great detail, like an exact time or place, because that would be physically impossible. This argument corresponds with the one addressed by the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper, who maintains the standpoint that “There can be no prediction of the course of human history by scientific or any other rational methods”. Popper disputes the idea of historicism, which is the belief that historical events are like science in that they are governed by laws. Popper believes that history can never be science because science is concerned with the discovery and the testing of universal laws, whereas history takes ‘universal laws for granted and [is] mainly interested in finding and testing singular statements’. This statement proposed by Popper is similar to the one made by the English Rankean, James Anthony Froude. Frode coincides with this notion stating that history had to impound itself literally to ‘a presentation of facts, and not be used to spell out theories of a scientific nature.’ Historians have in the past tried to define laws, like in science. Evans discusses the case of Arnold Toynbee and his narrative, A Study of History, which tried to do exactly this. Toynbee’s book covers ‘twenty-one human civilisations and six thousand years of human history, drawing from them a series of general laws according to which civilisations rose, developed and collapsed’. Toynbee’s laws that were considered ‘an immortal masterpiece’ posited examples of four methods, which showed great men in history save civilisation in danger of collapse. He illustrated theses stages in a table.  However even this was disputed, particularly by Pieter Geyl, a modern historiography writer who was sceptical of Toynbee’s findings. Geyl stimulated that Toynbee minimally selected the evidence he wanted.

This idea postulated by Geyl highlights the issue of the historians, and his or her ability to maintain an attitude of objectivity when writing. Some believe that that impartiality and the idea of historical truth is impossible in history, others suggest otherwise. When we consider the scientists and his or her role, it is clear that it has hard for subjectivity to invade a scientist’s work. In science there is no room for personal opinion.

The historian was often considered as one, which gathered the facts and presented publicly. Marcus Tullius Cicero laid down this ideal of absolute impartiality in the 1 BC when he stated that: “the first law for the historian is that he shall never dare utter untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice.” Richard Evans agrees with this idea as he states that in order for a historian to carry out their role successfully they need to ‘shed all prejudices and preconceptions and approach the documents with a completely open mind’.

However it is fair to suggest that such neutrality is impossible for a number of reasons. To begin with, we need to address the fact that it is an absolute truth that history is based on the selection of facts. However the danger is that the evidence is historical narrative is almost always written from some kind of point of view. Collingwood argued that there is no such thing as an “objective viewpoint” in historical writing.  This idea is also shared by British historian A.J.P Taylor who suggested that: “historians seek to be detached, impassionate and impartial. In fact however, no historian starts with his mind a blank”. Taylor here assents with the notion that historians always address history with their own point of view in mind. Therefore the idea that all historians are impartial and unbiased is false.

David Thomas suggests that the bias in historians works is often occurs as it is ‘induced by nationalism and by the passion of patriotism’. An example of this is apparent in the historians approach to writing about the First World War. As stated by Thomas, few North American textbooks ‘acknowledge the achievements of the allies in standing up against the central powers for three years’ instead they coerce the reader into believing that ‘the war began in 1917 with the arrival of the American troops in 1917.’ David Thomas then forwards his argument by stating the English textbooks are offenders of the same crime as they cover the events leading up to 1917 in a great expense, and choose to ‘play down’ America’s contribution suggesting merely as ‘too negligible to deserve a mention’. This is a prime example of how historians miss out facts in order to provide support to further his or her argument, and thus the quest for historical truth is lost. This would never occur in science. Trial and experimentation is a vast part of scientific discovery. For example, a scientist might have a particular theory, in order to conclude whether his theory true, he would carry out a number of various experiments. If an experiment led to fact that would disprove the scientist’s theory, the scientist couldn’t change, or miss out that particular fact in order to make his theory true. This would not be possible in science. How the German textbooks portrayed the First World War would have been significantly different as to how the English textbooks accounted it. It is no secret that when Hitler came to power in 1933 he literally changed the history books, telling the young Germans how he saw what Germany in the First World War. This suggests to us that Thomas’ and Evans’ argument is correct, that it is impossible to achieve historical truth, because a historians writing is always tinged with their own personal standing point. This is very different with the study of science, as truth can be achieved. For example Einstein’s law of relativity is truth, whereas Ian Kershaw’s theory of the Hitler myth is not, it still catalyses debate.

Thomas suggests that it is impossible for historians to be objective, however science is almost always achieves this goal. However it is safe to suggest that historical dates are fairly accurate, therefore we can go as far as saying that historical dates are historical facts. This highlights the difference between a historical fact and a historical theory. Historians cannot argue against a historical fact, therefore a historical fact on its own is objective, it is when historians bring in their own theories and arguments that history begins to loose its impartiality. For example it is a fact that the First World War armistices was signed on the November 11th 1918, this fact is undisputable. However discrepancies occur with the events of the signing, the accounts of the actual event can be questioned because people, who have their own viewpoint, recorded them.

In the conclusions found in history, there are elements of judgements. In science, scientists strive to achieve an absolute truth; they set out to obtain something undisputable which they believe to be fact. Beverly Southgate argues that this achievement is impossible in history. She maintains the argument that is out of the question for anyone to claim their history as the supreme truth, because historians are all influenced by their own personal viewpoint and prejudices. She furthers this point by stating that historians are notorious for “mingling fact with fiction and notoriously denying realities that others well remember”.  This idea addressed by Southgate is shared by David Thomas, who in ‘The Aims if History’ states that the historians biggest stumbling block is his or her personal bias. Thomas implies the belief that “the possibility of a completely objective and impartial version is certainly a superstition.” Evans concurs with Thomas’ observation in ‘In Defence of History’ he states that the issue in history isn’t with the facts, instead the problem occurs when the facts are ‘converted into evidence’ and used to support the historians argument, and as a result ‘theory and interpretation’ eclipse the his or her subjectivity to the subject and hence making facts fiction. Edward Carr agrees with the idea that historians are unable to remain impartial. Carr goes as far to suggest that a historian’s interpretation of the facts is key to historical enquiry. Carr believes that history is incapable of making any progress without this. He posits that the facts meaningless if no interpretations are made from them. Carr furthers his argument by stating that historians opinions on the past are often shaped by their backgrounds, with this Carr suggests that a truly objective history is nonexistent. He goes further, stating: ‘Great history is written precisely when the historian’s vision of the past is illuminated by insights into the problems of the present’. Carr, Evans and Thomas all agree on the same point, that it is impossible for historians to remain completely impartial, however scientists manage to do this. How can history be a science is this is the case?

Evans’ argument is true to a certain extent. Science is objective in the fact that scientific facts are not influenced by a persons feelings or opinions. However when you consider scientists like Freud, Darwin or Lacan whose scientific discoveries were often made on personal judgements alone, it is safe to say that science is not always objective. Darwin was considered a geologist and Freud and Lacan were both psychoanalysts all these subgenres fit into concept of science as a whole. However, all these scientists’ theories have been subject to much debate and argument. In other words their theories haven’t always been considered as absolute.

There is the existence of scientific facts, but also of scientific theories. It is in these theories, as with history that the study of science becomes more partial, opposed to impartial. For example it is a scientific fact that photosynthesis is the process where plants gain energy from sunlight, whereas it is merely a theory, invented by Freud that all boys at a young age develop an unconscious sexual desire for the mother, and wish to take the place of their father, this theory also known as the Oedipus complex, is just a theory, an idea made up by a scientist used to justify an idea, or a course of action. This provides evidence to suggest that it is safe to say that science has elements of subjectivity too.

There are many arguments that disprove the concept of history being a science. When we examine history and science together there are also many notions that suggest similarities between the two studies, therefore suggesting that history can be defined as a science. For example, one aspect that historians and scientists both share is that both academics have to rely on whatever documents,

bystander statements, their own knowledge and any other pieces of evidence that is available to them and use that to make their conclusions. With both, perhaps more so with history, there will be contradictory gaps in the account, and other factors, which might add to the difficulty in determining the facts with absolute certainty.  Science is often regarded as absolute, when we think about aspects of science like photosynthesis, or gravity. These aspects of science are unquestionable. However we have seen in the past that scientists like historians have sometimes got it wrong, and that science, like history is always developing. Isaac Newton’s law of gravity is an example of a scientific theory that was later discovered not to be absolute. Scientists now consider the law of relativity as a more ample theory, as it includes the laws made my Newton and more. 

Another feature about historians and scientists that show similarities between the two academics is that they are both interested in the explanation of developments and past trends. Scientists like historians aren’t just satisfied with simply the facts. Instead they strive to understand why such thing might occur. The explanation of why earthquakes might happen is just as important to a scientist as the causes of World War One is to a historian.

However the historians and the scientist’s study of the explanation are quite different when compared. The theory of cause, as examined by historians is quite different to the position that the scientist endeavours to achieve. Historians often seek for multiple causes. They distinguish their argument by arranging their causes in to some extent a hierarchy.  Historians distinguish varying causes and separate them into short-term causes and long-term causes, and the immediate trigger. Scientists, however try to examine all the possible explanations then dispute them when they find one explanation, which they believe to be true. For a scientist, there can only be one possible explanation, historians however believe there can be many factors.  This is evident when we consider the varying arguments about the causes of the First World War. Some historians believe it was rooted early on during the scramble for Africa, whereas others believe that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was the catalyst. This is an example of an argument that is yet to be settled between historians.

There are obvious difference between historians and scientists and similarly with history and science as a whole. History and science do have some similarities, which furthers the argument that history can be considered a science. For example one of which being that

Historical knowledge grows and is developed over time, just as scientific knowledge.

An aspect of historical study which is similar to scientific study is the idea of psychologism; the tendency to interpret to events or arguments in subjective terms.  Paul Newel suggests in his article Philosophy of History (2005) that History, like science relies on ‘philosophical assumptions and concepts’. Historians often adopt psychologism as an attempt to identify the causes or to understand historical events through psychology. For instance, some historians have attempted to explain the holocaust by arguing that it is linked to the close relationship Hitler shared with his mother, and furthermore the fact that her sudden death was revealed to him by a Jewish doctor. This is an example of historians using science to explain or understand history. However is this evidence sufficient enough to define history as a science? Perhaps not.

Nevertheless, the answer to argument of whether history is science is simply no. Just because there are a few similarities between the two, it doesn’t mean to suggest that history is automatically a science. The fact that a football and apple are both round doesn’t mean that a football can then be called a fruit.  Yes, both of theses studies are an aspect of knowledge, of which the word science translates to. Both scientists and historians deal with evidence and try to arrive at casual features and outcomes; however there are too many differences between the two studies to suggest that history is a science. The historian’s key role isn’t simply to report the facts on what happened in past. The historian has to approach history in an analytic fashion. Historians aren’t just concerned with the ‘where’ and the ‘what’, but also the ‘why’. The historian’s quest for the ‘why’ often provides the basis of judgement and subjectivity in their writings. This indicates the vital difference between history and science. History tries to remain objective, however often fails. Science often remains true to the promise to be impartial, as the scientist’s role is to provide truth. Similarly the idea that Science is a study built on laws, and has the ability to predict future outcomes and history cannot is too big a difference to overlook.  

Bibliography

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What is History?

(Penguin, 1990)

R. G. COLINGWOOD.

The Idea of History

(Oxford University Press, 1994)

Geoffrey R. ELTON.

Return to Essentials: Some reflections on the present state of historical study

(Cambridge University Press, 1991)

Keith JENKINS:

On ‘What is History’: From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White

(Routledge, 1995)

Andrew DELAHUNT & Fred MACDONALD

‘Oxford English Dictionary’.

(Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2002)

Karl POPPER.

The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd Edition.

(New York, Routledge Classics. 1959)

Geoffrey R ELTON.

The Practice of History

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Richard J EVANS.

In Defence of History.

(Granta Publications: London 1997).

Beverley. SOUTHGATE

What is history for?

(Routledge: 2005)

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