- Military values stressed to create sense of national unity. Hitler did not focus on this aspect at all when trying to secure power. Realised that most people dreaded another war.
- Versailles must be reversed (most imagined this would be done peacefully).
Hitler had further ambitions:
- Lebensraum. He believed that in a world of limited resources, German people should have the right to occupy the living space they needed. He had in mind expansion eastwards into the lands of the Slavs and the settlement of German farmers on their soil. Most thought this a dream not a serious policy.
- Finally the race theory. Hitler played down the Lebensraum ideas and certainly the idea of war until he was very secure in power, but the race theory he never did because it mattered so much to him. His anti Semitism may have lost him votes rather than gained them among the respectable classes. He believed that mankind could be divided into a master race and a subject race. The first were the Aryans: ideally tall, blond and destined to rule the world. The nation had to be purified of non-Aryan elements: gypsies, Slavs and above all the Jews. The latter were an object of special hatred since Hitler believed that as parasites they were doing particular harm: there was a vast international conspiracy of Jewry seeking to destroy the German race.
To most Nazi voters, it meant German unity, strong leadership, prosperity and a reversal of the injustices of Versailles. The darker side came later, though many others from the outset condemned the militarism and racism inherent in his ideas.
• THE MUNICH PUTSCH, ITS FAILURE AND CONSEQUENCES.
Why was Hitler unable to gain power as a result of the economic crisis of 1923? (Yet did so in 1933)
Initially Hitler’s prospects looked good, attempting to seize power because of the widespread alarm resulting from the hyperinflation:
Reasons for the Putsch were:
1) Set up a right wing gov in Bavaria that would spearhead a national revolution and march to throw the French out of the Ruhr (who were much resented).
2) Bavaria right wing and largely anti democratic.
3) Hitler felt that Stresemann’s decision to restart the payment of reparations (to win international confidence) was a second ‘stab in the back’ for the German people.
4) Hitler hoped that the general unrest caused by the French Occupation of the Ruhr and then the hyperinflation (which hit farmers and rural banks especially hard as well as middle class savings) would generate support.
5) Hitler thought democracy was not widely supported: associated with the defeat of 1918, the stab in the back and Versailles - especially reparations imposed on a very weakened country.
6) Encouraged by the fact that Mussolini had successfully seized power in Italy with the march on Rome in 1922.
The Putsch failed though because:
a) Stresemann emerged as a strong moderate leader to end the crisis quickly: restarted reparations, set up Renten mark and helped prepare for the international rescue package in the Dawes plan 1924
b) No Army support. Von Seeckt (i/c of army) was well aware that ordinary people had not backed the similar Kapp Putsch in 1920 and had no desire to see the Army isolated and seen as associated with extremism.
c) The Putsch looked badly planned while Ludendorff (Hitler’s ally) was unpopular because he was blamed for the defeat of 1918.
d) The German people were not ready for this scale of extremism: respectable middle classes had done badly in the hyperinflation, but also remembered the war, did not want military right wing governments like the Kaiser’s.
The Consequences:
a) Hitler did gain some publicity but he also realised that he must never directly confront the Army again.
b) He drew the lesson that power had to be achieved from within: through the elections
c) He became more confident in his own leadership and never again relied on others such as Ludendorff.
d) He realised that he had to abandon left wing socialist ideas in the party and make much more of an appeal to the respectable middle classes and rural rather than industrial areas.
e) The Nazis though remained a fringe party: their fortunes were low because of the new prosperity of Germany between 1924 and 29
i) The prospect of industrial expansion under Allied supervision attracted much foreign investment- much of it American; some 25 billion marks were lent. Industrial production reached pre war levels, for many workers real wages did rise and the industrial boom was helped by improved management and mass production methods. The development of cartels though (combines which limited competition and kept prices high) was a factor and the general effect of the 1923 inflation had been to transfer wealth from the middle classes to industrialists and financiers.
ii) And because of the reasons why the putsch had failed Stresemann emerged as a strong moderate leader to end the crisis quickly: restarted reparations, set up Rentenmark and helped with the Dawes Plan.
f) Hitler did important work in restructuring the party so that when Germany next hit a crisis they would be ready. Arguably despite looking very bleak, their fortunes were bound to improve since behind the scenes Germany’s economy was anyway heading for trouble:
Above all there was the general dependence on American loans: when these were recalled in 1929, following the Wall Street Crash, the economy collapsed.
Meanwhile Hitler brought the Nazis together in a new national party (Strasser and Goebbels joining him, and he worked out the Gauleiter system (local party leaders) so that they could compete nationwide and worked hard with meting, local newspapers and above all a superb propaganda machine under Goebbels.
What best explains Hitler’s rise to Power 1929-33?
Nb You need to distinguish between 3 phases: 1923-9 when following the Munich Putsch, the Nazis remained an fringe party winning only 12 seats: essentially because in the years of prosperity the German electorate were mostly happy in voting for moderate democratic parties (the largest were the social democrats) rather than extremists; 1929-33 when the Wall Street Crash, plunging Germany too into Depression, transformed Nazi fortunes because of the economic chaos: voters began to feel that Weimar governments (weak coalitions) could not cope with the Depression and began to vote for the extremists (communists as well as Nazis); and 1933-4 when Hitler (due to a right wing deal between Hitler, Von Papen and von Schleicher) became Chancellor (prime minister) of a coalition between Nazis and Nationalists, but was able to consolidate his power and transform it into a dictatorship by 1934.
With a question like ‘What best’ or “is this the only reason” > you need to argue the comparative importance of a range of factors. Here:
1 growth in popularity of Nazis (but who voted for them and why)
2 Hitler’s own political abilities
3 failure of Weimar to win loyalty and confidence especially with the depression.
4 the disunity on the left
5 the intrigue of right wing politicians.
6 consolidation of power 1933-4 treat separately.
Key points are the Depression: transforming Hitler’s position and longstanding resentment with Versailles esp. the reparations and disarmament: WEIMAR was associated with BOTH: could not cope with the Depression while some blamed it for signing Versailles.
The Depression:
- The causes lay in overproduction and over speculation in America, but the effects in Germany were devastating: mass unemployment reaching 6 million (a third of the working population), many bankruptcies and failed banks amidst the collapsing internal and international trade. Between 1929 and 32 the value of exports fell from #630 million to #280 million. With little capital and shrinking markets, owners inevitably had to lay off workers.
- Above all the coalition between the liberals (the DVP) and the Social Democrats (SPD) fell apart over measures to handle the crisis. The SPD refused to consider cutting unemployment benefit, which the liberals insisted, was needed. After 1930 there was no stable government and a growth of both right and left wing extremism. Certainly strong government was needed (the best policy was to increase spending through borrowing and create jobs through public works, but this needed a sense of vision and determination such as F D Roosevelt was to provide in the New Deal for America, which got her out of the Depression.) The death of Stresemann in 1929 also removed a key figure who could have provided strong but moderate leadership as an alternative to Hitler
- The soaring electoral success of the Nazis in these years points to the fact that many were turning to the radical parties for a way out of the economic crisis and the Depression was undoubtedly a key reason for Hitler’s rise to power. However, the economy was beginning to recover anyway by the time he took office in 1933 and had the recovery come a little sooner, the moderate parties might too have recovered.
The popularity of the Nazis: mainly Mittelstand (middle class), peasant farmers, industrialists and only partially working class voters. The Nazis failed to make much inroad in large industrial areas and cities e.g. in the Ruhr or Berlin. Communists quite strong here while most stick with the social democrats. Nazis did much better among peasant farmers to whom they promised fixed prices and security of their land (against foreclosure: i.e. being forced to sell their land to pay mortgages). Farmers had suffered badly under Weimar: not only an agricultural recession even before the Depression (food prices too low) but had suffered from the Free Trade policy of Weimar allowing cheap imports of food from Denmark and Poland. Industrialists supported because of the fear of rising communism and the attraction of strong leadership (Hitler had given up the left wing ideas of the early Nazis). They hoped he would do away with trade unions and allow low taxes on business. Hitler also promised them public spending on large civil projects which would mean work and profit for private firms. Rearmament would mean work for manufacturers like Krupp. So Hitler would keep out the communists, provide opportunities for big business while industrialists funding did help Hitler win votes 1932. After power in Jan 33, one of the first things Hitler did was to organise support from the industrialists.
The Mittelstand (civil servant, teachers, lawyers) had always suffered from disunity unlike the working class and their trade unions: so Mittelstand felt threatened by organised labour and had rather lost status under Weimar with farmers especially suffering in the Depression; behind this was the long term resentment at the loss of savings in the hyperinflation of 1923 and an inherent mistrust that Weimar govs were poor economic managers. Hitler’s promise of national unity (curtailing the power of both labour and the big industrialists) definitely appealed to the Mittelstand who had always only been lukewarm about democracy anyway and rather liked the strong rule that the Kaiser had provided.
Hitler’s own political abilities: he was a superb orator and manipulator of voters at mass meetings while the propaganda by Goebbels was carefully targeted at different groups. Hitler also had real control: forced Strasser into rejecting an offer of Chancellor ship by the Nationalists. Hitler clearly offered the prospect of strong leadership in utter contrast to the dithering Weimar politicians.
Popularity of Nazi Ideas: they clearly convinced some: overturning Versailles, the Diktat/’stab in the back’, the promise to regain the lands lost in 1919 and the promise of national unity to end class warfare as well as full employment, but Hitler’s extremism (and especially anti Semitism) may have put some off (even fearing he might start another war), but many voted for him not because of Nazi ideology so much as simply wanting a strong leader to deal with the Depression:
Failure of Weimar to win loyalty and confidence especially with the Depression: a strong factor simply because in countries with strong democracies (GB, USA), these survived the Depression. In Germany democracy was weak: only since 1919 and associated with the 1918 defeat and humiliating Versailles: but it hit real trouble with the Depression: PR and weak coalition govs unable to provide the strong policies needed: e.g. the coalition between the liberals (the DVP) and the Social Democrats (SPD) fell apart over measures to handle the crisis. The SPD refused to consider cutting unemployment benefit which the liberals insisted was needed. After 1930 there was no stable government and a growth of both right and left wing extremism. Clearly then one should stress the causal connection between economic crisis and political extremism.
Arguably though, Weimar was not inevitably doomed: the trade cycle was already picking up in 1932 and u/e beginning to fall: so was the Nazi vote: but for right wing intrigue, Hitler might not have got into power at all.
The disunity on the Left: an overlooked factor: the failure of moderates (social democrats) and extremists (communists) to present a united front to Hitler.
The intrigue of right wing politicians: Hitler never gained an overall majority so did not gain power simply through the popular vote; the Nazi vote was also falling in 1932: that is why the intrigue of von Papen and von Schleicher, persuading Hindenburg as president, to make Hitler Chancellor in January 1933 is so important; they expected to benefit from his popularity but be able to manipulate him behind the scenes.
VARIED REACTIONS AMONG THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO THE RISE OF HITLER.
1 From some a belief that Hitler would not last (even after the Enabling Bill and setting up a dictatorship. At the start of 1933, it was widely assumed that the heterogeneous nature of the catch all Nazi programme promising all things to all men would quickly result in far reaching disillusionment of the NSDAP’s mass base and a rapid drop in Hitler’s popularity.
2 though there was a mood that at least things could not get worse and that ‘we should wait and see about Hitler”. Already the propaganda machine was working to portray Hitler as a dynamic, different kind of leader while the Depression had bottomed out and the slow recovery the Nazis were to claim all the credit for,
3... so too his ruthless suppression of the communists after the Reichstag fire and Enabling Bill: many middle class approved.
4 Expressing opinion though became very difficult in the new Nazi police state: the only open image of Hitler was that portrayed by Goebbels who was busy building up a cult of leadership that certainly won a lot over: the symbol of German unity (even though the Nazi party itself and its ideology were less attractive) and as the economy recovered, so did confidence in Hitler that he was tackling the problems of poverty, rural indebtedness and unemployment. A turning point was reached when the Army did not oppose Hitler over the Night of the Long Knives: many now too afraid to oppose Hitler (earlier e.g. the boycott of Jewish shops had failed through lack of public approval)
5 To the prospects of the economy (and the reversal of Versailles), there was another set of considerations in the 1930s: another world war; and the memories of the trenches were still very vivid. Hitler here faced a basic weakness in his popularity. He gave a hugely important speech on 17 May 1935 in which he promised that his only task was ‘to secure peace in the world’
6 Of the different sections of the German people:
Workers: had not voted for him in large numbers and were skeptical that he could end the Depression: shocked by the abolition of trade unions, but actually did welcome the jobs he created and the ‘strength through joy organisation.
Peasant farmers: had voted in large numbers and stood to gain from the self sufficiency, fixed price policy and the security to their possession of land that the Nazis promised.
The Industrialists: felt that Hitler could stop the communist threat and strongly approved of his measures: the Enabling bill and abolition of trade unions especially: rearmament might bring them fat contracts and profits: so would the public spending programme on motorways and schools and hospitals.
The Middle Classes: angered by the hyperinflation of 1923 and in despair over the Depression, welcomed strong leadership and national unity offered: again strongly anti communist: apprehensive about another war though and disliked the anti Semitism
The Army: welcomed the promise of rearmament, apprehensive about war (might lose); disliked Hitler as an upstart and feared the challenge of the SA. Hitler’s elimination of the latter won the Army over to his rule.
