Power Sharing had three main points. Firstly, there was to be a “new” Assembly to govern Northern Ireland. This was basically a resurrection of the Stormont Parliament, which was scrapped in March 1972 in favour of Direct Rule. The second part of Power Sharing was that the main parties in the Assembly were represented by a Power Sharing Executive, and would guarantee a share of power between the Unionist and Nationalists. The third and final point of Power Sharing was a Council for Ireland would link London, Dublin and Belfast so that matters of importance to all of them could be discussed. The details of this were worked out by parties in the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973.
The overall aim of Power Sharing was to undermine support for the Provisional IRA by allowing Nationalists to have a say in how Northern Ireland was run. The council was made up of 6 Unionists ministers, 4 SDLP ministers and one member of the Alliance Party. This Power Sharing Executive was perhaps the main reason why William Whitelaw’s peace attempt failed. The problem with the Executive was that there was an unfair balance of power. With there being 6 Unionist party members, even if the 4 SDLP members and the one Alliance party member grouped together, they would always be outvoted 6 to 5. Another problem was that the Unionists and Nationalists found it difficult to work with each other because to past differences.
Power Sharing finally collapsed in May 1974 after a general strike was announced by a group calling themselves the “Ulster Workers Council”. The strike was to protest about the Council of Ireland, and at first it did not have much support. Loyalist Paramilitaries stepped in and “convinced” people to join the strike. The next couple of weeks saw Northern Ireland grind to a halt as the intimidatory tactics of the Loyalist Paramilitaries came into full effect and the support for the strike increased. On the 27th of May 1974, the house of cards that was William Whitelaw’s Power Sharing collapsed, as the Power Sharing Executive resigned. Northern Ireland returned to direct rule.
The second failed attempt at peace in Northern Ireland was the “Joint Framework Document”. This followed the ceasefires in August and October of 1994. The Joint Framework Document was published in February 1995, and thought it failed to bring peace to Northern Ireland; it was the ground work for the “Good Friday Agreement”.
The Joint Framework Document included another “new” Assembly for Northern Ireland, a north-South Council of Ministers who had influence over a range of issues, and the most controversial point of the Joint Framework Document was the early release of paramilitaries. Although these points were the basis for the Good Friday Agreement, there were major problems with it. The first problem was Unionists still not wanting Eire to have any kind of say in the Affairs of Northern Ireland, and therefore, they did not like the North-South Council. The second problem was the Unionists wanting the Provisional IRA to decommission, which Sinn Fein stood in the way of. They did not believe the British Government was to be trusted, and refused the idea put forwards by US Senator George Mitchell, which was to hold an international commission to discuss decommissioning. The Provisionals bombed the London Docklands soon after this proposal. The third problem with the Joint Framework document, and perhaps one of the most poignant in any peace process was the early release of the paramilitaries. People did not like the idea of terrorist being let off for their crimes, especially when these people have torn families apart and killed without mercy.
One ongoing problem which disrupted the peace process in 1996 was the Orange Order’s annual march to celebrate victory at the Battle of Boyne in 1690. In 1996, when the march reached Drumcree, Catholic residents objected to the march. The police tried to stop the march, and violence ensued. The same thing happened in 1997 and it is still a problem to this day.
Terrorism was the main problem once again, and was in the ay of any more negotiations. Sinn Fein Leaders, Adams and McGuiness, were convincing the Provisional IRA to ceasefire so they could reach a deal for them. In July 1997, the Provisionals announced another ceasefire.
In 1998, after months of negotiating and talks with various parties, the “Good Friday Agreement” was made.
The first key point of it was “Recognition of the principle of consent”. This was basically an agreement where Ireland was to recognise the fact that Northern Ireland wanted to be a part of Britain and would remove its constitutional claim on Northern Ireland.
The second key point was that a Northern Ireland Assembly was to be created. It was to have 108 elected members and was to be run by a 12 member committee made up of members of various parties.
The third key point was a North-South ministerial council was to be set up by the assembly to direct co-operation between Ulster and Ireland.
The fourth key point was a Council of the Isles was to be set up with members from each Parliament in the UK & Ireland.
The fifth and final key point was that all participants were committed to disarmament of paramilitary organisations.
This is still the current peace initiative, but there are still ongoing problems, and the Good Friday Agreement did not bring total resolution. The current problems are built up suspicion, loyalist opposition to Eire’s and Sinn Fein’s involvement, the release of paramilitaries, the marching traditions, and the biggest problem, decommissioning.
There are still many problems in Northern Ireland, and work is still being done to secure peace between Unionists and Republicans. Although there are many obstacles concerning the Provisional IRA, Sinn Fein, the Marches and other party related problem, there are also outside threat from groups such as the “Real Continuity IRA”. Peace is a long way off in Ireland, but is something that is being worked towards, by current negotiators learning from past mistakes and basing new peace attempts upon past experiences.
