For the last 30 years, many attempts have been made to create a state of peace in Northern Ireland. The main three attempts before the Good Friday Agreement were “The Power Sharing Executive and Sunningdale Agreement”, “The Anglo-Irish Agreement” and “The Downing Street Declaration”
The Power Sharing Executive and Sunningdale agreement, spanning from 1973 and 1974, just over six months, aimed to undermine IRA support in the Catholic community by giving them a say on how Ireland was run. The agreement aimed to work with Eire to create a new start for Northern Ireland. Despite its very short time in practice, the agreement at least brought the parties together to negotiate and hear the views of others. Eire was involved, so this pleased the Nationalists, however, the involvement of Eire did not pleased the unionists, and with the strike of the Ulster workers council, these factors forced the agreement to come to a halt, which meant that the agreement was not a huge success.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was an agreement between the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Irish Taoiseach Garrett Fitzgerald. It aimed to cease all IRA violence, cut all support in Northern Ireland for Sinn Fein and work towards a united Ireland. The arrangement pleased a larger amount of people than the previous attempt for a greater amount of time. Eire and Britain were on the whole very pleased with the agreement. Many parties thought it had great possibilities, and, for a while, the violence rate dropped. The involvement in Eire helped to unit the north and south, however, the unionists were again annoyed at the interference of Eire, so the MPs resigned.
It also failed because Sinn Fein publicly refused the partition of Ireland, which led to a great deal of violence and a collapse of the agreement. In my opinion, it also failed because primarily it did not gain the support of Sinn Fein and their supporters because it publicly opposed the party. Also, aiming for a united Ireland would displease the unionists, so the agreement would not gain the support of many people who it mattered to the most, even if it did please mainland Britain and Eire.
The final proposal developed before 1998 was the Downing Street Declaration, agreed between the British Prime Minister John Major and the Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds. It was an agreement quite similar to the previous one, aiming for peace, the uniting of Ireland over time, and targeting an end of terrorist violence. The agreement also stated a new government in Northern Ireland was to be formed and was desperate to decommission all weapons possible. It saw a promising amount of successes, with even paramilitaries working towards peace. The agreement pushed for a ceasefire and set out the plan for a peace process in Northern Ireland. The agreement was successful in persuading people that something had to be done, and, as the most achieving of the three agreements set the foundations for The Good Friday Agreement. Suspicions from the unionists led to failure of the agreement. Other factors that attributed to this were the disagreements between the Unionists and Sinn Fein. The unionists wanted decommissioning of weapons, while Gerry Adams’ Sinn Fein did not. The possibility of the releasing of paramilitary prisoners also enraged some. Again, I believe that the exclusion of Sinn Fein displeased some, and, despite their sometimes “-extreme” views, they should still be allowed to carry their view and have input into the assembly unless they were found to have strong connections with the IRA. This agreement, however, was a huge improvement on the previous two.
Many problems, on the other hand, still exist. Violence is still a very regular occurrence, and about 4 in every 5 news stories in Northern Ireland are based around extremist violence or arguments in the Northern Ireland assembly. The two groups do not trust each other, and believe that their opposites spy on them, as has been seen in the recent suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Catholics’ trust and attitude towards Britain and the Protestants has far decreased in previous years. Excluding the British troops’ behaviour in the Easter Uprising, some other events have made the Catholics mistrust Britain. In January 1972, 27 Irish civilians were shot in Nationalist Londonderry after a moderately peaceful rights march. At 4.07 PM on the 30th January a paratrooper asked permission to arrest some rioters who had stayed behind to confront the soldiers who had blockaded their route. Just three minutes later, the soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing 14 innocent men, six of the just seventeen years old. While the soldiers maintain even now that the victims were armed and first fired upon them, there is no published proof to this day that the victims were carrying weapons. The Catholics of Ireland claim that 14 were ‘executed’. A secret memo was discovered, dated three weeks before the incident, from a senior British Commander, telling the soldiers “CS Gas and rubber bullets do not deter rioters”. He recommended instead that “the minimum force needed to restore law and order is to shoot selected ringleaders”. This made many very doubtful of whether it was an accident that the Catholic protesters were shot dead.
Many Catholic Paramilitary prisoners, in 1980, decided to fight for special privileges. They thought because they were not prisoners who had actually committed crimes, and were ‘prisoners of war’, that they were being unfairly treated, as a real criminal. They believed that they should get to wear their own clothes instead of the prison uniforms, and that they should receive a greater number of visits from loved ones and friends. To achieve their aims, they decided to hunger strike. 10 people died from starvation, including Bobby Sands, who ended up with 100 000 mourners at his funeral. These people arguably were martyrs, and not only did they achieve their special privileges for other paramilitary prisoners, but they raised awareness a great deal and also got support. If none had died, and the prisoners had been force-fed, it is probable that not many people would have been made aware of this and support for paramilitary prisoners could be lower than it is now.
Another thing that has gained Catholic support is the ‘Dirty Protest’ of 1976, where political prisoners covered their cell walls in their excrement and wore nothing but a blanket to achieve their aims. Their aim was to bring back the special category prisoners, who received extra visits and had no uniform. In 1971 these were introduced, but later in 1976 they were banned. The prisoners’ efforts made great impact and have been remembered ever since. Resentment was built between the Catholics and Protestants again. Th4e Catholics felt that the Protestants were again discriminating against them, and that the prisoners should have special treatment, however, the Protestants considered the Catholics to be as bad as a typical prisoner, and that causing violence, even if they were at war with Britain was incorrect because Britain was not at war with the IRA.
These incidents are considered by some to be factors that have widened the gap between the two sides, each group dismissive of the other’s views. Both sides have always felt that the other is untrustworthy, and this is something that is still a major problem. The disagreement concerning whether all weapons should be decommissioned is also a huge problem that must be overcome if peace is going to be reached. This problem exists because Sinn Fein and the Nationalist paramilitaries believe that the decommissioning of a huge amount of arms is “unrealistic”. The Unionists, however, on the other extreme, are desperate to get all weapons decommissioned. A compromise would be suitable to overcome the difficulty, and possibly the IRA could give weapons up bit-by-bit. The Unionists, however, often feel that the Nationalist paramilitaries act fake, “phantom disbandment” of weapons, so there is another huge lack in trust. Events like Bloody Sunday have not helped the lack of trust, as in most of these events one side must have been lying, making one side untrustworthy and the other right to mistrust the other ‘side’. Violence is still a problem, but although it is still a regular occurrence, it is not as frequent as it has been.
Recent events in Northern Ireland have not spelled out a promising future in the peace process. The suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Good Friday agreement in early October led to doubts in the future of what had previously seemed a rock solid agreement, with a few ‘hiccups’. Suspicions that the IRA has been gathering intelligence have led to an increase of mistrust again on both sides. The lack of trust has been there for years, but until this event, there had been no real justifiable evidence to accuse the opposite side of anything in recent times. Several have been charged in the allegations of the IRA intelligence, and, as the Assembly has been suspended for almost a month, it is unlikely that it will be re-launched in the near future. Northern Ireland secretary John Reid too put the breakdown of the agreement down to lack of trust, saying that “powersharing can only work in partnership if both sides trust each other”, adding that “a number of factors most importantly the continuing alleged violence that is being used by the republicans is completely undermining trust”. A promising fact, however, is that there have been four previous suspensions in the agreement, the longest Three months in February 2000. Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein President, publicly confronted Dr John Reid, accusing him of being “very, very dishonest in his remarks”. The British government, as stated earlier, has been backing up the idea of great mistrust within the groups. The government believes that “until people learn to trust and rebuild together we won’t get to the essence of this problem”. No one seems to be able to admit any partial responsibility for the suspension of the assembly. Whether the reason for the collapse is David Trimble and the Ulster Unionists publicly advertised lack of trust towards Sinn Fein and the IRA or the fact that violence remains, mainly caused by the Nationalist paramilitaries, every party blames another. The Ulster Unionists blame the paramilitary groups, while Sinn Fein blame John Reid and the Unionists. David Trimble said his party would pull out unless the UK proposed the expulsion of Sinn Fein. In my opinion, forcing Sinn Fein to leave the Stormont administration would be a mistake. Despite the views of Sinn Fein, it should be allowed to have input into the assembly. The expulsion of Sinn Fein would lose support for the agreement from all its followers, and possibly more Nationalists, and, as previous attempts have shown, trying to please just some parties is unrealistic and will not work. Recently, violence has increased, possibly due to increase in IRA intelligence or maybe just down to a state of anarchy in the absence of the assembly. Recent incidents include a Catholic man being crucified, his arms and leg being nailed to a cross. Luckily, the man survived but was critically ill. It is suspected that loyalist extremists were behind the crucifixion. On the 15th October three were injured in a drive by shooting in North Belfast. The victims were all loyalists. These incidents demonstrate how violence is still a major problem, and that both sides are responsible for creating a share of it.
This does not, in my opinion, mark an end to the ideas behind the Good Friday agreement. Although there is still a regular occurrence of gang violence linked with conflict in views and religion, there has always been this violence, and, at times, there has been a much greater amount. The SDLP leader Mark Durkan even went as far as saying that he has “more confidence in it than ever”. The Good Friday Agreement is based on the foundations of the Downing Street Declaration of nine years ago, and, if the agreement was to break down fully, it could act like its predecessor as a stepping-stone for another new agreement, with better aims and policies. So even if the agreement did come to a halt, the ideas should definitely not be scrapped because it has been seen that some of them, when put into action, do actually work. The government will also have learnt that other aspects of the agreement do not work. Even if the agreement is not scrapped and does continue, I believe the government should do their best to please every group involved as has been done in the Good Friday Agreement. The Government should try to persuade the Unionists to be more trusting of the Nationalists and the Nationalists to be more trusting towards the Unionists. The Unionists should be encouraged not to resign from the assembly every time a result cannot be reached, and the IRA and loyalist extremists should be promised better rights as prisoners the less violence is deployed, however, the cause of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland is of not easily detectable as the paramilitaries often use Guerrilla warfare and do not often own up to the violence. The decommissioning of weapons should be subject to a review and a compromise. Weapons should be monitored and given up step-by-step. The IRA should be scrutinised if discovered to fake disbandments, while the Unionists should be encouraged to communicate, even if they do not agree with an opponent’s view, and should be more trusting of the IRA, as it is possible that one reason the IRA is bitter is because it feels it is discriminated against and is not trusted. Ideas like review of policing should be followed up whether the agreement is or not, because an end to discrimination could be a huge step towards peace in Northern Ireland.
The ideas used in The Good Friday Agreement have not ceased, and should be followed up in the re-launch of the agreement or carried on to a new agreement, however, if a new agreement is formed, the ideas should be amended instead of being directly translated and repeated, as it would just result in a suspension like the one at present.