If we continue with the policy of collective security against fascism then we must attempt to rectify our current position with Britain and France, in particular Britain because of the incident involving the USSR generously offering a minor sum of money to its proletarian brothers and Britain abruptly accepting this as an insult. An agreement with Britain and France would certainly appeal to the USSR more as we could attempt to initiate economic links between the British and French Empires also and the naval might of Britain is second to none. However, Britain and France remain uncommitted to the policy of collective security – which they have shown on numerous occasions by appeasing Hitler – with the Munich conference being one of them. Furthermore, simply because we initiate a relationship with Britain and France does not guarantee that gain an economic understanding also. The agreement may be seen by Germany as a sign of aggression, and we could lose the only actual partner that we have had economic relations with since after the Great War.
A further critical factor which must be taken into consideration is the occurrences of the Spanish Civil War. Whereas Britain and France decided to remain neutral and not get involved in the undertakings of the war, we went against the fascists i.e. Germany and this may hold against us in the future. This action of ours, although allowing us to gain a significant amount of expenditure in gold, may have aggravated all of the other powers in central Europe, and made them less willing to strike a deal with us.
As I previously mentioned, we were not invited to the Munich conference by any of the powers even though it was our own Litvinov whom stressed the grave dangers lying in the future and the readiness of the Soviet government to join in a conference of the great powers to ‘check the further development of aggression’ – in particular Czechoslovakia. His proposal was rejected by the British government who to discuss only between Hitler and Daladier. France, who had a pact with the USSR to defend Czechoslovakia, remained quiet on this issue and this could be a potentially eye-opening event. In particular we learned that neither power, Fascist nor Allied, had any concern whatsoever for the views of the Soviet Peoples.
There are many reasons why the USSR would benefit from an agreement with Britain and France. For example, an agreement would stop the potential for a war on the single front of the USSR, which would in turn significantly reduce the amount of pressure that would be placed on the red army. Furthermore, the likelihood of a war actually breaking out is further reduced, as Hitler would supposedly cease his “invasion” of Europe if he knew there would definitely be sanctions from the other powers. Moreover, the Soviet Union may be able to incorporate some economic aspects in the agreement also. On the other hand, the Soviets suspected that Britain wanted to turn German aggression on to the USSR while it watched from the sidelines. Furthermore, Britain and France had repeatedly appeased Hitler and shown little enthusiasm for collective security against fascism. Moreover, they had excluded the USSR from the Munich Conference even though the USSR had treaty obligations with Czechoslovakia of whom the conference was mainly about. Britain and France had also dragged their feet over the triple alliance negations proposed by Litvinov in April 1939. There is also the added doubt of whether the alliance would actually be upheld by Britain and France, and if so would the USSR bear the brunt of the fighting. Furthermore, Britain and France were not prepared to accept the USSR taking territory or having a sphere of influence across Eastern Europe.
On the other hand there exists a potential pact with Germany which also has many advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, a pact with Germany was the only way to be sure of avoiding war in the West – Soviet security was your main concern. Secondly, the pact would avoid a war on two fronts – the USSR was involved in hostilities with Japan, and Germany had influence with Japan through the Anti-Comintern Pact. Thirdly, the Soviet armed forced had been hit by the purges and the rearmament programme was nowhere near completion. A pact would at least by the USSR more time. Furthermore, the USSR would gain half of Poland and a sphere of influence from Finland to Romania, including the Baltic States and an agreement would be in line with the Treaty of Rapallo and the good relations of 1922 to 1934. Moreover, Germany was still the USSR’s major trading partner. On the other hand it would be an ideological somersault – a reversal of collective security against fascism.
In conclusion, I would recommend that you, Comrade Stalin, attempt to initiate a pact with Germany simply because the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and also the competition. An agreement with Germany is more favourable because of our recent history of trading and cooperation – the complete opposite to our relationship to Britain and France, who did not have enough courtesy to invite us to the Munich conference, even though its political implications would affect us in arguably the severest way.
