After the red army crossed polish borders in 1944, Stalin destroyed all non-communist resistance along with the Polish Home Army, but still did not allow Polish communists to seize power, this was a compromise which was necessary in order to keep himself from the Western Powers criticism. However, by setting up the ‘Committee of National Liberation’ he was able to cover up the extent of Communist control over Poland by appealing to those who wanted social reform. This reassured the Poles and the Western powers that there was no immediate creation of communism. Though at first it appeared that Stalin showed a surprising pragmatism in trying to secure his interests, he in fact was perfectly in control, and by having this committee set up he did not compromise, he simply covered up his real intentions of a forthcoming regime within Poland. His real policy was revealed when the Polish Home Army rose up to Germans in Warsaw in August 1944. Stalin then went on to impose his policies, and by January 1945 had achieved a communist dominated Committee acting as the provisional government for Poland.
As in Poland, Stalin appeared to show a surprising amount of compromise when persuading Bulgarian communists to pursue a moderate policy, which would also involve tolerating political opposition and to work within a Patriotic Front Coalition. This was as Stalin still felt the Western Allies were a threat to the eventual Communist takeover of Eastern Europe. He continued to hinder his own interests in order to pursue a far different policy to that of Communism, that of a subtle consolidation of power. This had meant Stalin had to make obvious compromises in order to fool the Western Powers into believing Communism would not immediately takeover; He had kept true to his agreement with Churchill in stopping Tito from helping the Greek communists and he also raised no objection to their defeat by the British troops. Immediate plans were not to be pursued, rather than this they to be paused as Stalin wanted to firmly consolidate his power in Poland.
So, similarly again, Stalin persuaded local communists in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to enter democratic coalition, this looked on the surface to be a ready compromise in consolidation of power, however it did give Stalin an advantage in that this had effectively legitimised Communism as a party and allowed them to work from within the government. This was the general pattern throughout Stalin’s consolidation of communist power within Eastern Europe, and although it appears he is making a large compromise in terms of his interests, the compromises and pragmatism he shows acts as a cover for his long term plans.
Therefore Stalin did show the readiness to compromise and act pragmatically in securing his interests, but this is simply how it was perceived by the USA and the British, when in actual fact, Stalin did act in his own interests throughout the liberation of Europe, but did so without conflicting with the Western Powers in any way.
