The Bay of Pigs debacle is one incident that the United States would like to forget.

Bilal Haye

5/10/2007

The Bay of Pigs debacle is one incident that the United States would like to forget. It came as a slap in the face at a time when the United States was looking to earn credibility and respect in a bipolar world. “How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?” was the sentiment expressed by then president Kennedy. Indeed, how could he be so stupid and lead fourteen-hundred men to their capture or death? The answer is a complicated one, and lies in several parts. First of all, the organizational structure of the government has to be blamed. The American government is run on a bureaucratic system, one in which there is a definite hierarchy in which powers are delegated in order to carry out certain tasks. Certain problems which arise are factored, or broken down and assigned to certain people or organizations, as was the case in the Bay of Pigs debacle. Once problems are factored a complicated scenario arises where all parts of the “machine” have to work together in order to achieve the desired results, or goals. Most often this is not the case. A lack of communication can be seen in the American government whilst the plan to invade Cuba was being drawn. On one hand, Bissel, Dulles and the CIA were in the process of making plans to invade Cuba using Cuban exiles; on the other hand General Gray and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were proposing a plan to invade Cuba had to have American backing in order to succeed. Both plans were being drafted at the same time because the JCS did not know of the CIA plan, but were reluctantly forced to go along with the CIA plan after it received President Kennedy’s approval. Here another problem with organizational behavior of the government comes in, one regarding standard operating procedures. The JCS continued operating under the policy making structure of the Eisenhower regime in which they played the role of briefing officers, rather than advisors; they withheld their opinions until they were specifically asked for. Hence, doubts about the CIA invasion plan were not duly expressed.

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Another part of answer as to why President Kennedy could be so stupid and allow the Bay of Pigs invasion to take place lies in the internal politics of the government. Rational decisions are hard to make as “players in positions” are all projecting their own opinion which results in a compromise being made, shunning rational solutions. Action channels are formed as information flows upward through the chain, and decisions flow downward. Each player’s perception of a problem reflects their position, creating multiple faces of an issue; decision making by the players is based on their perception of an issue. The decision to approve the Cuban invasion was taken amidst strong opposition of the plan coming from people like Schlesinger and Undersecretary of State Bowles, but these two people were in positions of relatively low power as related to the CIA chiefs. The CIA chiefs were adamant that an invasion take place soon as time was running out, while Kennedy was concerned that the Trinidad plan was “too spectacular” and a quieter landing was needed. In the end an irrational compromise was made to allow troops to land in the Bay of Pigs, an area where they wouldn’t be able to blend into the mountains, like the earlier plan suggested, if they encountered any problems. Another good example of players in position pursuing their own goals would be when Kennedy did not sanction the use of American force to help the invasion force when it so desperately needed it, as that would make this blow up into even a larger conflict than it already was, leaving the onus on Kennedy to respond to critics and other countries while on a face saving mission.

Another part of the answer lies in the fact that it is human nature to seek conflict; Stevens writes that “… warfare is a constantly recurrent and universal characteristic of human existence.” This coupled with cognitive consistency, the principle that people “try to keep their feelings, actions and cognitions mutually consistent,” can lead people to make irrational decisions. The whole atmosphere of the Cold War, an atmosphere of distrust and portrayed as a battle verses good, the free world, America, and evil, Communism, Russia, shaped American foreign policy, including that of President Kennedy. This atmosphere also affected American Cuban relations keeping in lieu with the cognitive consistency principle that says that we tend to oppose institutions we dislike and expect them to act “in ways repugnant to us, have values dissimilar to us, and to support people and institutions we disapprove of.” And in this pursuit of consistency, Kennedy made the grave decision of blocking out opposing opinions. As said before, there was considerable opposition to the CIA backed plan of an invasion force being sent to Cuba.

A passage in Lebow’s article states, “ the move to In less than ideal circumstances stress can be so acute as to compel the policy maker to adopt a decision-making strategy to protect him from it;” this was the case with Kennedy. With pressure from the CIA to execute the plan, and his own doubts surrounding the disarmament of the guerillas if such an action was called off, led Kennedy finally to issue the final approval for the invasion to take place.

The Bay of Pigs debacle was sanctioned by President Kennedy not as the result of one single factor, but as a collection of all factors such as organizational behavior, governmental politics, and psychological factors. The first step taken to avoid another such incident should be to change the organizational behavior of the government so there is more cooperation and communication between people and institutions to whom problems are factored. It is obvious the lesson wasn’t learnt till after September 11, 2001 as a communication gap between the CIA and the state department i.e. Pentagon, was cited as the basis of the intelligence lapse; the Homeland Security office has now been made to bridge the gap. There was also a problem with the action channels as evidence which hinted at attacks on American interests did not reach the proper quarters. Perhaps the only thing that can be done is a shake-up of the bureaucratic governmental system, all other factors such as psychological factors are impossible to eliminate, and players in position will always want the best for their institution or department.

Rhodes, International Relations: Introductory Readings p. 287

Rhodes, p. 302