Faced with this shortfall Russia had to turn to her allies for assistance in providing essential wartime products. France and Britain however had their own problems and so could only offer limited assistance, and American orders ran behind schedule. The severing of trade routes, moreover, made it tricky to get imports to where they were needed – many had to be brought in from the east.
The industrial sector was further disadvantaged by the sending of skilled workers to the front (upto on quarter of the industrial working class according to Burdzhalov), and mismanagement of what resources were available.
A workforce which was frustrated by lack of supplies and skilled personnel was further hampered by the other facets to the problem of transport and supply. A lack of tenders and carriages left supplying grain to the cities increasingly problematic. Westwood writes that the drafting of peasants was not the cause of supply problems as many rural areas were overpopulated anyway – the problem was finding room on a rail network of which was increasingly given over to troop movements. As rural problems grew, so the cities were deprived of grain at the expense of the front. The growing queues and hunger in Petrograd left the workers frustrated, and more disposed to rebellion.
The nature of the grain problem went beyond that of marketing and transportation, to the very root of Russia’s economic situation. The lack of consumer products caused by mobilisation of the majority of Russian industry left the peasantry with little incentive to market their produce. Moreover, the hyper – inflation caused by costly repayments of allied loans left the consumer items that were still available out of reach to the peasantry anyway. The peasants increasingly withheld grain they failed to see the benefit in marketing. The large numbers of peasant conscripts dying arguably rendered this phenomenon more frequent. Grain was not getting to market due to poor marketing and distribution, and the grain seizures which resulted set the peasants against the regime. The grain problem accounts in part for the decline of regular grain supplies to Petrograd up to February 1917. Accordingly disillusionment with the war, and by late 1916 the regime, increased.
Prosecuting a war effort successfully in these circumstances was never going to be easy. The decision of Nicholas II to take command of the army however was catastrophic. While in reality symbolic, his leadership only served to shift blame for military defeats away from the Generals who were really at fault, onto his shoulders. Defeats resulted in low morale, and high levels of desertion. Soldiers returning to their towns and villages from the front line served to stoke up opposition to the Tsar
The Tsar was not singled out for criticism, however. The Tsarina was criticised for administration of Russia ‘at home’ while her husband was at the front, and the influence Rasputin was seen as having was much maligned. As Read says, ‘Russia’s disastrous performance in the First World War…brought about the final destruction of Tsarism’. The truth as to the dire straits the military (and country back home) was in was often kept from the Tsar. Diakin writes of police reports keeping the truth from the Tsar as he had enough on his plate. Hostility and overlapping jurisdictions between agencies, for example the ministry of internal affairs and the police department, further hampered the war effort. Nicholas often did not have the full picture, and this made shrewd responses near impossible. There was however a good deal of blame to be directed at Nicholas, who failed to appreciate the domestic situation, or the folly of his taking symbolic control of what was already a sinking ship of a war effort.
It is in this context that the growing urban unrest must be seen. Russia was trapped in a war it could not afford to leave, as allied loans were staving off economic collapse. Russia could not socially afford to continue, however, as peasants became opposed to a regime requisitioning grain, and the industrial sphere became increasingly frustrated by the lack of regular food deliveries or industrial war materials. Russia was not equipped economically, industrially or socially to compete in a military capacity with the industrial powerhouses it fought with, and against. The war thus provides the backdrop to the unrest, a general climate in which being opposed to the war, and increasingly the Tsar and his government, was seen as acceptable. The war, accordingly, has to be seen as a key reason in the fall of the autocracy. Without the domestic unrest that increasingly accompanied it however, it would not have been enough to topple the regime. The unrest that developed in the months immediately preceding the revolution was over war problems, and these shall now be looked at.
Working class strikes increased through 1916, with skilled workers using their ironically strong bargaining position to push for better wages and conditions. The movement was not regarded as seriously revolutionary however, and so when international women’s day arrived on the 23rd February it caused no great stir. Workers seized the day as an excuse for a general strike, however, and by the 25th the authorities were ordering troops to fire on the masses that had taken to the streets. The 23rd – 25th period however only showed the limitations of the worker movement. It had been operating at saturation, and did not exact reform or concessions. The important thing about these strikes was not the level of worker involvement per sé, but rather the effect of a city – wide general strike in the context of war. The war meant that the strike had to be dealt with quickly and decisively, as to have the industrial workers not at their benches would have catastrophic implications for national morale and stability, and may cause Russia to lose the war. The mass arrests made by soldiers of the Petrograd garrison were to be the last, as news of police machine – gunning protestors caused the soldiers to have a change of heart. By 1pm on the 27th the first ranks of soldiers who had resolved to defend the workers reached the Tauride Palace.
The decision of the soldiers to disobey their orders was key – multiple historians see this factor as key in the success of the 1917 revolution compared to the failure of the 1905 one. This military revolt however does not account for the fall of autocracy, it was not the rank and file reservists who forced the Tsar to abdicate. In any case, the Tsar did not perceive this unrest as a serious threat. Therefore, the unrest in Petrograd between the 23rd and 27th February serves only as a contributing factor in the abdication of the Tsar and the end of autocracy. The ultimate factor in this event was the position and attitude held by the Russian liberal movement at the time of the breakdown of military loyalty in Petrograd. The influence of middle – ranking agitators should be noted in this context. The attention of political parties afforded to the soldiers later in 1917 was largely absent at this point, with the rank and file stoking each other up generally.
Hasegawa sees the lack of high ranking Bolsheviks, replaced by lower order Bolshevik workers who were good at motivating a crowd but understood little of Marxist theory, as important. There was no high political group assuming ideological or practical leadership of the protest movement in February in the way that the Bolsheviks did in October. Once the Duma capitulated in the wake of the order to prorogue, the insurrectionists had to look for a group in which to vest the theoretical power they had won. The unprepared state of not just the Bolsheviks, but the left wing in general left the liberals a window of opportunity to take control of the revolution. Fear of the movement becoming more extremist, and the refusal of the Tsar to grant the concessions and reforms necessary to safeguard the future of the autocracy forced the Gentry into alliance with the liberals. This made persuading the Tsar to abdicate the only option in safeguarding the revolution.
One can see the end to autocracy as the result of a long chain of events. The problems of supply and production generated by the requirements of war on a semi – industrial society left the workers in a strong bargaining position. With his reputation tarnished by heavy military defeats the failure of the Tsar to provide significant concessions, particularly in the latter half of 1916 turned growing opposition to the war into opposition to Nicholas. His failure to heed the warnings of his Gentry, and their consequential alliance with the liberals caused a rupture in the top of society, through which popular dissatisfaction flowed. The breakdown of military loyalty left the autocracy without its two traditional vestiges of support. The lack of ability to control the popular movement left the Provisional Committee of the Duma with the prospect of needing the Tsar to abdicate in an attempt to get some closure to the reform movement. The fact that they sought abdication in favour of his son shows their true intentions. One has to ultimately assert, however, that the end to autocracy was caused by the refusal of Michael to take such a poisoned position in the wake of Nicholas’ refusal to step down in favour of his son. Those that sought Nicholas’ abdication had never wanted an end to autocracy – it reduced their legitimacy to not have a rubber stamp for the Provisional Government. While the problems of war, and the February strike movement provided the context in which a drive for abdication was viable, it was the actions of the Tsar and his family which ultimately signalled the end of the autocracy.
Hasegawa, T, ‘The Problem of Power in the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia’ in Canadian Slavonic Papers, 1972; 14ii p.611
Burdzhalov, KN, Russia’s Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd, 1987, USA, p.18
ibid., p.21
5 Read, C, From Tsar to Soviets, the Russian People and Their Revolution, 1996, London, p.38 - 39
Westwood, JN, Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812 – 1992, 4th ed., 1993, Oxford, p.226 - 227
Burzhalov, Russia’s Second Revolution, p.72 - 73
Read, C, From Tsar to Soviets, the Russian People and Their Revolution, 1996, London, p.35
Diakin, VS, ‘The Leadership Crisis in Russia on the Eve of the February Revolution’, in Soviet Studies in History, 1984;23, (1), p.13
10 ibid., p.12
Smith, SA, ‘Petersburg in 1917: The View from Below, in Kaiser, DH (ed.), revolution in russia, 1917 The View from Below, 1987, Cambridge p.62
13Longley, DA, ‘The Mezhraionka, The Bolsheviks and International Women’s Day. In Response to Michael Melancon’, in Soviet Studies 1989; 41 p.632 – 633
14Hasegawa, p.613
Kerensky, A, ‘Why the Russian Monarchy Fell’, in Slavonic and East European Review, 1930; 8 (24) p.497