From 1890 Austria-Hungary received unconditional backing from Germany. In 1890 the Kaiser introduced a new course in foreign policy which involved expanding German influence in the Balkans and the near east, since this could lead to conflict with Russia, the Kaiser decided to abandon Bismarck’s policy of good relations with Russia and strengthen Germany’s Alliance with Austria-Hungary. Germany needed to prevent the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, which would create a power vacuum in South-East Europe that would threaten Germany’s security. For this reason the Kaiser offered Austria unconditional military support in 1890.
The Balkan Problem became linked with the Great Power rivalries as a result of the alliance system.
Up until 1903, the Balkan Crisis was relatively dormant. Until 1903, the pro-Austrian Obrenovic Dynasty under Alexander Obrenovic ruled Serbia. Russia’s interests lay in expansion in the Far East, India and Afghanistan, rather than the Balkans. Events began to take a turn for the worse after the pro-Russian Karageorgeovic became King of Serbia after 1903 and returned to the policy of recovering Serbian territory from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Austria’s response to the growing threat was to initiate the ‘Pig Wars’ to undermine the Serbian economy. France began to invest in the Serbian armaments industry. Russia’s defeat by Japan led to a revival in her interest in the Balkans and support for Serbia.
A more aggressive response to the threat from Serbia was decided upon by the foreign minister and the chief of the general staff Horzendorff. Tighter control over Serbia was now needed to prevent expansion.
In 1908 Austria annexed the Serb province of Bosnia and the threat of German military support forced Russia and Serbia to accept this.
Russia was humiliated and was determined to fight sooner than be forced to back down again whether supported by France or not. Russia began a thorough reform and increased her armed forces dramatically.
Due to embarrassment, Serbia became more dedicated to the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian empire in order to achieve its ambitions. Black hand terrorists began to commit acts of terror inside Austria Hungary.
The Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 saw Serbia’s power increase in population and in territory. Serbia’s confidence was due to support from Russia and a battle hardened army of 400,000, and felt it could confront Austria Hungary. Conrad Von Horzendorff and the foreign minister Count Leopold von Berchtold urged emperor Franz Josef to confront Serbia and eliminate the Serbian threat once and for all. The Austrian government expected Russia to be deterred by the threat of military intervention as it had been in the Bosnian Crisis.
The Excuse for the Austro-Hungarian Empire to crush Serbia once and for all came when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on June 28th, 1914, by Gavrillo Princip, a member of the Serbian terrorist group, ‘The Black Hand.’ This attack was an excuse for solving the problem of the Serbs within the Austrian Empire. The Austrians issued an ultimatum to Serbia to comply with ten conditions, even thought there was no proof that the Serbian government was to Blame for the assassination of Ferdinand and his wife.
Serbia replied favourably and accepted nine of the ten points, however, the Austrians were not satisfied and declared war on 28th July, 1914. The Serb reply to the Austrian ultimatum indicated that they did not want a war, but they couldn’t agree to one of the points as it involved delegates from Austria-Hungary taking part in the assassination enquiry. Serbian courts would be influenced by a foreign country and this would be a threat to Serbian independence.
The Austrian declaration of war on Serbia was the first step towards general war in 1914. After the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, Russia felt it had let down its Slav allies in the Balkans, so was determined to go ahead. On July 30th Russia mobilised their army and prepared for war without first consulting France or Britain. Germany declared war on Russia and stayed true to its alliance with Austria-Hungary. Germany went to war with France on August 3rd. However, Britain did not get involved until the launch of the Schleiffen Plan.
In August 1914 all members of the rival alliance systems, except Italy, declared war on each other. The outbreak of war was a result of a series of crises and mistakes. The Great Powers had been pushed towards war due to events prior to 1914, events after Sarajevo sparked off the war, which was originally only between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
However, Russia backed Serbia as it had been hostile towards Austria-Hungary since the Crimean war. The survival of Austria-Hungary was vital to Germany as it was necessary for the success of the new course and was vital to the security of Germany.
This linked the Balkans to the Alliance system and hence to the rivalries of the Great Powers. Russia was allied to France, which had been hostile to Germany since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Also, Austria-Hungary was allied to Germany, which increased the possibility that Germany would be drawn into conflict with Russia, and therefore France as well.
One theory is that the First World War broke out by accident, mistake or as a result of miscalculation or mismanagement. There had been several very serious international crises around this time which had been successfully managed so why was this one any different?
The Italian historian Luigi Albertini pointed to the discrepancy between the gravity or severity of the crisis, and the qualities of the statesmen that had to deal with it. Implying that the statesmen of the time, around 1914 were incompetent and thus the world was doomed to war as the statesmen lost control of events.
Lloyd George said that the Powers stumbled into war due to the alliance systems. The ultimatum was dispatched by Austria to Serbia on July 23rd. On July 24th Russia backed Serbia and offered total support. On July 25th Russia made preparations for mobilisation in support of Serbia. Serbia effectively rejected the Austrian ultimatum, Austria therefore undertook partial mobilisation i.e. those parts of her army that were to be used against Serbia. Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28th. Russia introduced full mobilisation in support of Serbia i.e. those to be used against Germany as well as against Austria-Hungary on July 30th. On July 31st, Austria introduced full mobilisation of all her forces i.e. those to be used against Russia and Serbia. Germany made preparations for mobilisation in support of Austria-Hungary. On August 1st Germany introduced full mobilisation i.e. those to be used against Russia and France. Germany declared war on Russia. Germany declared war on France on August 3rd because France indicated that she would fulfil her alliance obligations to Russia. On August 4th Britain declared war on Germany to honour a treaty obligation made to Belgium in 1839. This shocked Germany as they never imagined that Britain would honour what they regarded as a mere ‘scrap of paper.’ On August 6th Britain and France declared war on Austria-Hungary as it was allied to Germany.
AJP Taylor argues; ‘Pre 1914 alliances were so precarious and fragile that they cannot be seen as the major cause of war.’ He argues that the war broke out due to ‘undue dependence on military plans and timetables.’
By 1914 German military planners were obsessed by the threat posed by Russia as Russian military reforms introduced in 1912 would produce a vast Russian army of 2milion men by 1917, which would be three times bigger than the German army. They were also obsessed by the threat of war on two fronts with France and Russia as France’s 700,000 army was nearly as big as Germany’s 750,000 army, Also, the German high command were sure that war was inevitable after Sarajevo and that delaying war would result in France and Russia gaining power.
The high command took a risk and gambled on the outcomes of disputes between various alliances and situations. This led to Germany’s dependence upon the Schleiffen plan, where France would have to be attacked unprovoked.
Another view, that of Fritz Fischer is that the German ruling classes, politicians and military leaders wanted war, thoroughly prepared for it then provoked it, their intention being world domination. This could be upheld by Germany’s warlike and aggressive foreign policy up to 1914, as their spending on armaments and the navy increased dramatically. The statesmen of all Powers were prepared to accept the risk of war to pursue selfish national interests, e.g. France wanted to recover Alsace-Lorraine and in 1912 converted the defensive alliance with Russia to the offensive.
Russian Behaviour in 1914 could be deemed as provocative as it was first to fully mobilise, triggered by the Schleiffen Plan.
Some historians blame Britain as Britain was determined to stop Germany achieving world power status and it was later admitted that the policy in 1914 was that of encirclement.
Some other possible explanations are that war arose as a desire to divert attention from domestic dangers by engaging in war abroad. A radical, young German historian Eckhardt Heir put forward the idea that ‘Crisis, even war would come to be seen by those making decisions to be a more attractive alternative than domestic reform.’ This could be true for many of the countries involved in the war. Austria for example was faced with the collapse of the parliamentary system and insoluble national divisions and therefore it could be argued that she most appreciated the value of a good, short war as the Great war was expected to be. Fischer corroborates this view as he referred to a serious domestic crisis in Germany in 1914. He concluded that the German ruling classes deliberately sought war to preserve their domination of German society. Both are examples of the role of INNENPOLITIK.
Each differing view of an historian offers a different aspect as to why war actually broke out. The Balkan crisis could be viewed as a catalyst as all Powers involved had personal, or interests of their allies which lay in the Balkans thus providing enough discrepancies to provoke war.
