The ridge was as far as Haig’s forces had advanced. They had not come anywhere near to capturing the German railhead at Roulers let alone taking the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend where there were two German U Boat bases. This meant that the Germans were still cutting of British food and ammunition supplies with their U Boat campaign and that they were still receiving theirs. The campaign most definitely failed in this respect.
Moreover, the minor victory of taking the Gheluvelt ridge was of questionable worth. Only three months later, at the start of the German Spring offensive, Haig was forced to give up the ridge. An extract from Lyn MacDonald’s book ‘They Called it Passchendaele’ describes it thus: ‘When the German spring offensive began in 1918 it was no longer possible to continue to hold the ridges. There was a strategic withdrawal. Passchendaele was given up. The salient was reduced to a tight little circle that consisted of Ypres and its outskirts. It was smaller than ever before.’ The fact that the British soon gave up the only advantage gained from the whole Passchendaele campaign makes the offensive seem rather a waste of time and lives, let alone a complete failure. However the success there was from the campaign did not arise from the Passchendaele area itself.
In the context of the wider World War the Passchendaele campaign can be seen as a little more successful. One of Haig’s primary objectives was to try to protect the French from German attack as they were still very weak from the disastrous Nivelle offensive. In his memo to the war cabinet he mentions that the ‘depressing effect [from the Nivelle offensive] in France would be especially dangerous’ and that ‘French hope must have something to feed on.’ This aim was accomplished and is seen as one of the more successful aspects of the British campaign. The Germans had to concentrate very large numbers of their troops on the Flanders area and try to limit the engagement of forces in other areas of the war, namely in Caporetto, Italy. The German Official History source states that ‘two divisions on their way from the East to Italy [Caporetto] had to be diverted from Italy to Flanders.’ The fact that the Germans needed so many forces to deal with Haig’s campaign meant they had to release pressure on other areas of the war, which can only have been a good thing. However the fact that German troops did let up slightly at Caporetto did not stop them inflicting more damage on the Italian front. After the Italians had been crippled at the 10th Battle of the Isonzo Haig did not wish that happened again but this was not so as Brian Bond’s book ‘They Called it Passchendaele’ clearly states ‘ Passchendaele neither prevented the final collapse of the Russian armies in autumn 1917, nor the rout of the Italians at Caporetto’.
The Russians (mentioned in the quote above) were another of Haig’s main objectives concerning the wider World War. Russia was in the middle of a revolution and was threatening to pull out of the war. This would have meant that the Germans could then concentrate solely on the Western Front putting them in a very strong position for 1918. Of course this was to be avoided at all costs and Haig hoped that his offensive would solve that problem by, if successful, encouraging Russia to remain in the war. However as the above extract shows, the campaign did little to help the situation. It would seem then that this aspect of Haig’s campaign was a failure also, but not necessarily. The fact that the Germans used a vast majority of their troops on the Western Front instead of the Eastern Front did actually determine that the Russians were not taken over from the Germans. By the time the Russians had pulled out of the war Germany were really too weak to use this to their advantage. I would say then that the campaign in this respect was partly a success because although Russia did not remain in the war for too much longer the Germans were too weak to then do anything about it. A memo to the British Museum from Haig’s chief of staff in 1920 explains this well: ‘….by means of dealing blow after blow on the German divisions the fighting value of the German army was seriously diminished; and further, there is no doubt that the British Armies, by engaging the whole of the German forces so vigorously, prevented the enemy from concentrating in great force against either the French or the Russians.’
This brings me to my next point. Even though as the book ‘1914-18 the Great War’ states ‘Haig had not even fought to a draw’ the Germans were severely weakened by the aggressive offensive and this did effect them later in their campaign. Many sources on the Battle of Passchendaele do state plainly that ‘above all else the battle had used up German strength.’ It is very possible that maybe without the Passchendaele campaign the Germans would have been strong enough to gain complete victory in the early stages of 1918. However it is ridiculous to state that the same did not happen to the British. After the battle the British troops were also very weak and exhausted. The famous war correspondent Sir Philip Gibbs recorded after the battle that ‘For the first time the British Army lost its sense of optimism, and there was a sense of deadly depression among many officers and men….’ I believe then that the fact that the Germans also suffered from the campaign is futile if the British did so to the same extent. It could be argued though that the British could afford for this to happen because if they did not severely weaken the Germans they would have been defeated later on.
The number of lives lost at the Battle of Passchendaele shows the outcome for both sides also. It is estimated that Third Ypres cost the British between 244,000 and 324,000 casualties, depending on whose figures you believe. The German causalities are thought to range from around 200,000 upwards. One source says that that ‘Germany, while hurt badly, had lost fifty thousand fewer men than Britain.’ Either way it is clear that there was no victor in the Passchendaele campaign.
In conclusion, I agree that the campaign was most definitely a failure if you consider the Allied lives lost and the objectives Haig set himself. However, it was not a complete failure, though it was possibly seen to be one at the time. The fact that it weakened Germany so severely probably effected Germany’s participation afterwards and the sole outcome of the war. Haig’s campaign was also successful in protecting the French and to an extent the Russians. However, that is as far as it goes.
