Woodrow Wilson had joined the war for idealistic reasons on the part of his country: propaganda across America portrayed her role in the war as champion for democracy and the savior of Europe. Wilson had also formulated, prior to the German Armistice, a list of “14-Points”, based on which the latter had been signed. He wished for an extremely conciliatory peace, even one with no clear victors defined. In addition, he had no wishes to impose reparations on the German peoples, nor in any specific way, save the returning of Alsace-Lorraine and the ‘mandate’-ation of German colonies, punish Germany for her involvement in the war.
The German peoples were, if not satisfied, then certainly resigned to accept these points, and it is sure that if they had been put in place the Germans would never had had the bitterness they did that pushed them to World War II.
Wilson’s policies did, however, have a major fault in them: the leaders of neither of the other two important countries were prepared to ‘let Germany get away’ with such a gargantuan act of destruction in their eyes. Public opinion in the aforementioned countries (Britain and France) was very much in favor of an extremely harsh peace, with cries of ‘lets squeeze the Germans ‘till their pips squeak’ being echoed by the people.
Lloyd George, as mentioned before, was not prepared to take such a hard stance against Germany, if only because he realized that Germany’s economic benefits to Britain would be greater in the long term than any immediate spoils the Allies could reap from the war. He did, however, have to at least partially reflect the wishes of his people, and indeed wished for complete German naval inability and also German reparations to be paid. This put him in the same camp as Georges Clemenceau in certain matters, and thus strengthened the latter’s position greatly.
Clemenceau was about as far from Wilson in terms of policy towards Germany as you could get at the conference. He represented a peace of vengeance, and meant to destroy Germany so absolutely so as to completely remove her as a future military danger to his country.
France advocated as harsh a peace as they thought they could get away with. Clemenceau wanted a separate Rhine state to be created as a buffer state to France, Danzig to be annexed, the Saar to be annexed, and heavy reparations to be set upon Germany, in addition to the practical extinguishment of Germany’s military prowess. He also wanted sever restrictions on future Austro-German relations (which were accepted), making sure these two countries would not join together again. To summarize, France wanted a ‘destructive’ peace, one that would ensure her security and Germany’s inferiority for quite some time to come.
As was demonstrated above, the different powers involved in these discussions each had vastly different aims towards their defeated enemy. There was also the unpredictability of the British, who sided with Clemenceau on many matters but supported the Americans on others. What proved the undoing of the treaty was the fact that Wilson in particular was very willing to compromise on many of his ‘points’, to get his ‘League of Nations’ idea to get accepted by the Powers. Thus, the Treaty of Versailles came to be called “The Great Compromise” by many cynics around the world.
The resultant peace was a mix-match of various different elements of each peace plan: Wilson’s and Clemenceau’s. On the one hand, the Rhine remained German, the fate of the Danzig and Saar were decided by referendums (they remained German), and reparations still were massively underlying what the war actually cost. On the other hand, however, German demilitarization went ahead, as did the restrictions on Austro-German relations and also extremely importantly, a clause which Germany signed admitting its ‘war guilt’, an additional humiliation to the German peoples.
The greatest problem with the peace treaty was, however, that it was at once lenient, but gave the impression of sternity: the German peoples at the time viewed it as extremely harsh, due to their getting used to and “barely” accepting the 14 Points, but in reality, it was very moderate. It was this incited dislike that proved the Treaty’s undoing: for the Germans would never view themselves as responsible for its upkeep and consequently it would stay viable only as long as the Allies were prepared to uphold it. As it turned out less than twenty years later, the Allies were not prepared to uphold it for long if it meant the usage of force: Germany re-armed, the Rhine was remilitarized, and the former Entente Powers did nothing. Thus it came to be that one of Clemenceau’s worst fears came to be realized: he said, during the conference, that he would be adamant about the creation of a new Rhine state as demilitarization alone would not suffice to keep Germany in check. As it turned out, he gave in, and this came back to haunt France twenty years later, before World War II.
Also, the war-guilt clause, put there for an added punch to the humiliating blow the French were dealing the Germans, caused truly an anger and indignation among the Germans that virtually guaranteed their non-comitance to the treaty.
Despite all this ‘giving ins’ the French made, the Americans also had to completely change their view of a peace in Europe. It was this also that made the American senate refuse the treaty, putting additional burden on the French and the English and meaning that the Germans would have one less very powerful country looking over their shoulder. The lack of American support also took away from the Treaty’s credibility and re-enforced the view that it was based on vengeance and not justice.
In conclusion, it can be said that the Versailles treaty both angered the defeated, and gave them the means with which to express their anger. It is this that made the Versailles treaty a “witches brew”: in effect it was like shooting someone in the leg and then giving the loaded gun back to them for them to do as they pleased.
Bibliography
Sources used for background information
“World War I”, “Versailles, Treaty of”, "Clemenceau, Georges," Other Relevant Articles Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia Deluxe 2002 © 1997-2002 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
“Years of Change, European History 1890-1990” by Robert Wolfson, John Laver. ©2001 John Laver, Robert Wolfson. All Rights Reserved.
Class Notes, “The First World War – The Versailles Treaty”, all subchapters.
“Versailles Treaty”, Spartacus Educational,
“The Prince” by Niccolo Machiavelli
Cover Photo from Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia Deluxe 2002 © 1997-2002 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved., UPI/THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE.
It shows, from left to right, British prime minister Lloyd George, Italian foreign minister Giorgio Sonnino, French premier Georges Clemenceau, and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson.
Roham Gharegozlou, 1oIB
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