The treaty of Versailles was signed between Britain, France and USA. Lloyd-George, Clemencau and Wilson all devised a treaty that could cripple Germany, leading to their aim - prevention of further conflict and a war.

Hitler introduced conscription and rearmament in 1933. This was a complete breach of Versailles, as Germany was rebuilding their military and could become a potential threat. Rearmament in Germany helped reduce unemployment and helped Hitler in his long-term objective to make Germany strong once again. He rearmed secretly at first, and then said he did it only because ‘other countries refused to rearm’. Revisionist, Kershaw argues that ‘Any slow down in rearmament (Hitler took)... would inevitably bring increased unemployment in its train... (Hitler) saw this as all the more reason to hasten expansion to gain 'living-space.' In 1948 Winston Churchill published the first volume of his Second World War memoirs, The Gathering Storm. In which he endorsed the judgements made by the authors of Guilty Men - 'there was never a war more easy to stop;' it was an 'unnecessary war' brought about by the failure to stop Hitler rearming. The introduction of rearmament did come as an answer to the Versailles Treaty, as a defence to the major demands. The combined arguments of ‘the Guilty Men and Revisionists school of thought reflect the damaging effects that was left following Hitler rearmament. I believe that being unwilling to stop Hitler rearming merely wetted his appetite and he became more ambitious.  

By 1935 an Anglo-German naval agreement was reached. Germany, a growing threat, promised not to expand its navy beyond 35 percent of that of Britain. By this pact Hitler did much to reassure the British and drive a wedge into the Anglo-French entente. A very deceptive move by Hitler, that left Britain in a much weaker state. Hitler was now ambitious territorially and had now manipulated Britain into a military expansion. This was the first, and obvious, sign of appeasement; Britain didn’t want to vex Germany. The reasons against this was clear, Germany had a Fascist and ambitious leader, who Chamberlain was keen to avoid conflict with. They had been allowed to build their military up, and were now a potential enemy. Britain was careful not to upset the balance in Europe.

The final factor that Britain had a definite chance to involve itself in stopping Germany came On March 7, 1936. In defiance of the Treaty of Versailles the German army entered the demilitarised zone along the River Rhine. This act totally breached the pact of Versailles. Germany had took land from France, Britain’s ally, and gained a territory. Historical debate centres around the Rhineland as the start of the war. The debate considers that it would have been easier for Britain to stop Britain in 1936, in contrast to 1939.  Britain had allowed Germany to control the European status, 17 years after their damaging onslaught in the Great War.

The idea has developed among historians that there had been a series of 'lost opportunities’ to stop Hitler, in 1936 over the Rhineland. Revisionist Bell considered that it ‘was not the last chance to stop Hitler without war. France had indeed the chance to stop Hitler, but only by going to war’

I believe that the policy of appeasement began in 1935, with the signing of the Naval agreement, however the last chance that Britain had to stop Germany more forcefully came in 1936 over the Rhineland intrusion. The British government had the chance but had missed the last, and easiest, opportunity.

The pushing power of Hitler had led to an inevitable war, as suggested by Hitlocentric’s. Hilgruber, a Hitlocentric, believed that ‘Hitler followed a three stage plan, to dominate Europe, to gain sufficient territory in the Middle East and lastly to achieve global domination form the USA.’9. The school of thought to challenge this are the Revisionists, AJP Taylor believed that Hitler was a master of opportunism, and didn’t follow a plan. The arguments of the ‘Guilty Men’ highlight the obvious flaws in British foreign policy, and the negligence of action towards Hitler, of how damaging these became over time. The policy of appeasement, before 1936, was very much aligned to the dictation of Adolph Hitler. Where Chamberlain didn’t want to upset him, or appear to be setting against him. To do this would disrupt the political status in Europe, and Neville Chamberlain believed that this would cause war. Appeasement could avoid this, however, as I will now examine, had war become inevitable by 1936 due to Britain’s failure to act on the Naval agreement of 1935 and at the Rhineland in 1936? Had the policy of appeasement encouraged the opportunistic Hitler and simply aided a leader with a masterplan?

Chapter two.

British reaction to Hitler’s actions reflected the problems they had as a nation in the twenties and thirties. British foreign policy was now openly Appeasement. Neville Chamberlain, a previous Chancellor of the Exchequer, had a specific direction for Britain, economical strength and independence. He understood that Britain was not ready for another war. The debate on the economics of the war remains in high contention. Richard Overy states ‘Economics were not in that bad of state that (Britain) need not to go to war.’1. The impacts of economy on Foreign Policy was clear to see, Neville Chamberlain was cautious over the factors such as economy, which ultimately led to his policy of appeasement. However as Overy states it could be argued that Neville Chamberlain used economics as an excuse to appease Hitler, as this was his personal ambition, to avoid war. I believe that economics were a serious factor to Neville Chamberlain, however the public’s perception of them was more important in following appeasement, and thus delaying war.

In 1938, the four superpowers of Europe met in Munich. Britain, France, Italy and Germany headed a peace campaign, where discussions on the direction of peace were to formulate. It was agreed that Germany could receive the Sudetenland. Chamberlain agreed for this to happen as it would prevent a start of the war. A triumphant Chamberlain came back to Britain, and declared it as ‘peace in our time.’ This could not have been more wrong, as cartoonist, David Low depicted, Czechoslovakia was not a ‘far away country of which we know nothing,’ that Chamberlain was willing to believe, but rather the ‘keystone of Western defence’2

Post Revisionist Parker held a different view on the results of Munich.  He believed ‘Chamberlain knew that his policy was less popular than it should be. Most people supported Munich because it bought time.’3 The public were the centre of all of this, as Revisionist, AJP Taylor suggests, ‘Chamberlain had become trapped between two uncontrollable forces – the exogenous force of Hitler and the endogenous force of the resentful British Public.’4. In my view the revisionist stance of being trapped between Hitler and Public Opinion is most logical. Chamberlain was a political leader that aimed to please the public, through his implementation of own policies.

In April 1938 Germany occupied positions in Austria and had ordered a plebiscite. An amazing 99% wanted an amalgamation with Germany. The figures were unrealistic, but unchangeable. Hitler had achieved land and ambition. Chamberlain took a stance of appeasement, choosing and as Robert Pearce, describes that Britain ‘scarcely complained when Hitler…sent his troops into Austria’5. Allowing Germany to do without any resistance simply whetted Hitler appetite. It was here that Hitler had made his second territorial advancement, and with each step, he was growing with confidence and ambition. Britain’s failure to react had led to this growing ambition. The importance of Appeasement was now a major part of politics. Appeasing the war was simply prolonging the inevitable, war was going to happen, it was a matter of time.

In the wake of Kristallnact, a German night devoted to mass killing, ordered by Hitler, Britain’s view of working alongside Germany was soon rejected and instead a policy of working against them was implemented. The view was changing radically from one of hopeful if not misguided appeasement to preparation for war.

By March 1939 Chamberlain was loosing his grip on the policy of appeasement, and Hitler was running chaos in Europe. He entered Czechoslovakia in March 1939, resulting in a complete breach of Munich. Britain had to react.

On 17th March 1939 Chamberlain did a ‘u turn’ in his Foreign Policy, he had finally abandoned Appeasement and verbally threatened Germany in the form of his Birmingham speech. Robbins believed that Hitler had a ‘callous lack of regard for the promises he had made towards Chamberlain at Munich.’6 Neville Chamberlain knew of the potential problems that Hitler could present. **********HELP OFF MISS CHAMBERLAIN QUOTAGE*************

The Birmingham speech came to late in my view, Chamberlain had allowed Hitler to bring the war to him, as opposed to play on a level field. Chamberlain had been humiliated, with his Birmingham speech, deceived, by the breaking of Versailles and Munich, and most damagingly fell victim to Hitler’s step by step journey to world domination. Chamberlain said in his speech that "Germany ... under her present regime has sprung a series of unpleasant surprises upon the World: the Rhineland, the Austrian Anschluss ... but the events which have taken place this week in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself seem to fall into a different category and they must cause us all to ask ourselves: is this the end of an old adventure or is it the beginning of a new.’ 

However, the Revisionist school of thought believes that Hitler was an opportunist, and the way the war fell was due to failed attempts to stop him and ambition. Similarly, Mommsen, believed that Hitler followed an ‘ill thought out ‘expansion without object.’7.

It is the view of Post Revisionist RAC Parker that I believe to hold an equitable point of argument, ‘Chamberlains appeasement came about due to financial constraint domestic pressures and strategic difficulties’8. Chamberlain had kept loyal to his policy long after it had failed. Parker highlights the problems he had to face, and due to a lack of alternatives it seemed Chamberlain followed, what he and much of the public first thought to be, the right path. It was not until 4 years after the first appeasing event, the Anglo-German Naval pact that Chamberlain decided to change his stance.

The opportunities to stop Hitler came on several occasions. The most prominent of these came in 1936 when he entered the Rhineland. A strong form of resistance would have stopped Germany, and would have stopped the growing ambition and desire of Hitler and his public. As a result of this Hitler was able to continue his European domination. Hitlocentric Gerhard Weinberg believed that ‘ the only realistic accommodation Chamberlain could have reached…(was to) abandon its old age commitment to uphold the balance of power in Europe’9, This therefore allowing Hitler to dominate parts of Eastern Europe.  

Word Count: 2,263

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