There were mixed opinions towards the League. Sharp referred to the League of Nations as a "compromise agreement, which pleased none of the parties involved." It was also referred to by Foci, the military commander-in-chief of the allied armies at the end of the war as, "this is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years". These statements clearly show the realities of the League.
The moral validity of the Treaty was always questionable and the location of the treaty was questionable as it was France who suffered the most in the war in infrastructure and also the number of casualties. Taylor a revisionist also discussed the moral validity of the treaty. He felt that the peace treaty was unfair. ‘The peace of Versailles lacked moral validity from the start.’
Lord Esher who was present at the conference agrees with Taylor and also believed that the location of the treaty was wrong and could lead to dire consequences. ‘Men who have individual axes to grind in a city like Paris steeped in old traditions.’ The location meant that the treaty-lacked credibility as France wanted to punish Germany. From this we are able to understand why Appeasement was a necessary policy.
Britain to an extent felt that the unjust nature of the treaty might provoke Germany to reverse the terms of the peace by force. Britain and France instead of backing the League and collective security, preferred appeasement.
This was highlighted in the event of 7th March 1936 when Germany Remilitarised the Rhineland. By remilitarising the Rhineland Hitler was breaking the terms on the treaty of Versailles and also the Locarno agreement of 1925. The French however offered no such opposition and sought the support of Britain, but because Chamberlains policy was to appease legitimate grievances and many felt this was a grievance. "Germany has the right to station their troops anywhere within its own country." This shows the opinions that were held in Britain and with the government accepting the view of Keynes it meant that Britain would not lend France support to stop the Germans from remilitarising the Rhineland. Lord Lothian stated they are "only going into there own back garden." This statement shows clearly the British were in favour of appeasement, expressing that military action against Germany’s actions was not necessary. However Britain did accelerate her rearmament programme. Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, stating that; heavily challenged the view that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was no threat to France;
"Another idea which ought to be combated was, the prevail ant one that the occupation of the Rhineland was no threat to France. It was a threat because so long as the Rhineland was demilitarised, the Germans in order to invade France through Belgium, would have to use large forces to hold the Rhineland and their striking forces would be reduced. After occupying the Rhineland, they could fortify it, hold the frontier with a relatively small force, and greatly increase their striking force on the northern bank.” Eden is clearly stating that the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was indeed a clear threat to France and international peace but he still maintained that appeasement should be followed but only from a position of strength.
Churchill was also a clear critic of the policy of appeasement stating that " We cannot look back with much pleasure on our foreign policy.... the violation of the Rhineland is serious because of the menace to which it exposes Holland Belgium and France." However this criticism is not fully conclusive as to stop Hitler would indeed have fundamentally required military action, which neither Britain nor France were ready for due to the strong consensus amongst their societies for the avoidance of any military conflict, which had resulted in slow military rearmament this again shows that appeasement was the only viable policy that existed in the eyes of the British government as they avoided at great lengths to prevent an outbreak of war.
Britain’s policy of appeasement was increasingly tested again in the Spanish civil war in July 1936. It perceived by the majority of Europe as a struggle between the aggressive and advancing doctrine of fascism and the weakening force of democracy. The Spanish civil war was initially the result of an army revolt, which broke out against the Spanish left-wing republican government. Francisco Franco assumed the leader of the revolt. Leon Blum was sympathetic towards the republican government, but was fearful of a right wing backlash. Blum therefore suggested a policy of non-intervention by all European powers be promoted. Consequently the British government were enthusiastic of this policy. Therefore the non-intervention committee included Britain, France Russia, Germany and Italy. However Mussolini and Hitler broke the agreement and sent extensive help to Franco. Hitler realised that Britain and France would not take a stand. This was a huge risk but as Britain was following Appeasement, Hitler took his chance taking advantage of the situation. The league initially called for the withdrawal of foreign participation, but did nothing to back up its demands, and by this stage in time the league had come to be recognised as a spent force. British opinion on the breach of the non-intervention policy was mixed. Some of the left wing groups for example, the I.L.P and the Communist Party wanted the government to support the republic against Spanish fascism, however the Labour part under its new leader did not want to become involved and Chamberlain was determined on non-intervention as he saw "no sense in preparing for war over a quarrel in a country so far away that we know little of." Anthony Eden also supports the policy of non-intervention. "The policy of non-intervention has limited and bit-by-bit reduced the flow of foreign intervention in arms and men into Spain. Even more importantly, the existence of that policy, the knowledge that many governments, despite all discouragement were working for it, has greatly reduced the risk of a general war... Six months ago, I told the house of commons of my conviction that intervention in Spain was both bad humanity and bad politics. Nothing that has happened since has caused me to modify that judgement; some events have caused me to confirm it. "Clearly Anthony Eden is in strong support of the non-intervention policy. He feels that by all European powers promoting this policy the risk of a general war is substantially reduced. Therefore he favours the system of collective security promoted by the League of Nations. Having this in mind therefore it can be argued that the non- intervention policy allowed Hitler to take advantage of his situation, undermining Appeasement suggesting that it did contribute to causing the Second World War.
An extract from J. Gurney supports the idea that non-intervention was a disgrace.
"The Spanish civil war seemed to provide the chance for a single individual to take a positive and effective stand on an issue which seemed to be absolutely clear. There were many people who claimed it was a foreign quarrel and that nobody other than the Spaniards should involve themselves in it. But for me and many others like me, it was a war of principle, and principles do not have national boundaries. By fighting against Fascism in Spain, we would be fighting against it in our own country, and every other." This source suggests European powers should have intervened and overthrown the Fascist dictators. By doing so in this country would have sent a message that fascism would strongly be opposed in their countries. So Franco’s victory was essentially another triumph for Hitler and this proved to be another example, which highlighted the true weakness of appeasement.
However, Britain was again about to try and appease Hitler. Versailles stated that a German union with Austria was forbidden, and until 1938 none of Hitler’s actions had actually overridden the territorial frontiers established in 1919. A claim made by Hitler on the day of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland stated:
"Germany has no territorial claims to make in Europe" However subsequent events proved how deceitful this was. Hitler’s overall objective was the union of all German-speaking people into a greater Germany. In January 1938 Austrian police uncovered plans by the Austrian Nazi party to cause trouble with the ultimate aim of "provoking German invasion. In response to this, the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg arranged a meeting with Hitler to prevent a Nazi overthrow. Consequently Hitler took the "offensive" and accused Schuschnigg of persecuting patriotic Germans and of breaking the 1936 agreement. Hitler mobilised forces on the frontier, German troops entered Austria on 12 March. By the 13 March the German union with Austria was cemented. Consequently a further plebiscite saw a 99.75% vote in favour of Anchluss. “The positive result of the plebiscite gave chamberlain an excuse for not reacting and therefore he still felt the policy of appeasement was working”. It was also felt among the British that Germany had a limited number of reasonable demands. These demands arose from the Treaty of Versailles about which the British had begun to feel guilty. From this we can see another weakness in Appeasement which Hitler took advantage of. This opinion was highlighted from an extract from the editorial, Kilmarnock Standard, 19th March 1938. It states "Austria is no longer an independent country. It is one of the states that comprise Germany It was natural and inevitable that such a union would occur sooner or later. Even in the Treaty of Versailles the possibility of it was foreseen...strictly speaking there is no good reason for opposing the union of Germany and Austria”. However there were others who were less optimistic about the union of Germany and Austria. Many felt that as the union of Austria provided Hitler with the confidence to undermine Chamberlain and Appeasement to his own end. Many as a “disastrous set of circumstances in which more War and destruction could inevitably be foreseen” perceived this level of power in the hands of Hitler. This pessimistic view was shared by Winston Churchill 1938, in which he states "The public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austria small country brutally struck down, its government scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi party doctrine imposed on a catholic population and upon the working classes of Austria and Vienna... But there are some things which I have not seen brought out in the public press... Vienna is the centre of all the communications of all the countries, which formed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and all of the countries lying to the south east of Europe. ...The mastery of Vienna gives to Nazi Germany military and economic control of the whole of the communications of south Eastern Europe, by road, by river, and by rail. What is the effect of this upon what is called the balance of power?" Here Churchill is voicing his concerns for the safety of Europe, he acknowledges that the balance of power is unwisely tilted towards Germany, which will inevitably result in more demands and possibly war. The victory of the Anchluss proved yet again that Hitler could get away with international bullying. The British policy of appeasement was clearly failing to control the demands of Hitler. Yet Chamberlain was till rigorously adhering to its policy.
The Sudetenland crisis highlighted another weakness in Britain’s policy of appeasement. It became clear that Hitler’s conception of a "greater Germany" was not content with the Anchluss. The Sudetenland was crucial for Hitler if he was hoping to move against Poland or Russia. Chamberlain however wasn’t convinced that the Sudetenland was a great enough issue to go to war over. Anxious to avoid war he attended a conference held in Munich in September 1938. Following his policy of appeasement Chamberlain agreed that Hitler could have the Sudetenland, but no more of Czechoslovakia. Once again it can be seen that Chamberlain used Appeasement to give Hitler his confidence but it was ok, according to Chamberlain war seemed to have been avoided as Hitler claimed this was the last of his territorial demands. British opinion to this development was mixed. A. Taylor, the origins of the Second World War state, "British policy over Czechoslovakia originated in the belief that Germany had a moral right to the Sudeten German territory, on grounds of national principle. The victory for self-determination would provide a more stable more permanent peace in Europe." This statement from Taylor clearly supports the actions of Chamberlain at Munich, and is also in agreement with the British foreign policy of appeasement. By meeting Germanys demands Taylor believes that Chamberlain has avoided the cataclysmic events of World War 1. However there were opponents to this view. As described in a letter to the editor of the Scotsman signed "an ashamed peace-lover. “Am sure that on hearing the result of the Munich conference over the wireless in the early hours of Friday morning, thousands of people all over the world would be shocked and humiliated. Hitler and Mussolini have got practically everything they asked for without firing a shot and their prestige instead of being diminished in their own countries has gone up by leaps and bounds. Czechoslovakia the victim had no opportunity of a say in the deliberations, which sealed her fate.... At the crucial moment Britain and France have shown clearly that they are unwilling to fight for Czechoslovakia but... They are willing to guarantee that she hands over her industry, property etc to Hitler as it stands... Britain and France have thrown Czechoslovakia to the wolves." This letter clearly disapproves of the actions and decisions, which took place in Munich. It also questions the policy of appeasement, in that the letter criticises the fact that Hitler and Mussolini are time and time again getting their demands met. The letter also attacks Britain and France for not supporting Czechoslovakia especially when France had an agreement with her. It places sole responsibility on Britain and France for the state of Czechoslovakia. A year later Hitler broke the agreement, and sent German troops to occupy Prague. Chamberlain reacted at once claiming that Hitler had gone too far and must now be stopped.
There are mixed opinions towards this policy, and the question why historians have debated appeasement continuously over the passing decades. Many believe that Chamberlains policy of appeasement was fuelled by a desire to do everything in his power possible to avoid war, and his belief that all European powers shared the same feeling. The catastrophic events of World War one set in a deep fear and hatred of war among many. We can see this from all the situations he gave into German grievances, and to some it may show the weakness in Appeasement because it gave Hitler the confidence to take advantage of his situation. However It is also felt that Chamberlain followed the policy of appeasement as a means to buy some time as he realised that British defences were hopelessly inadequate, as British military strength had been greatly reduced due to the commitment of disarmament. Even at the time of the Anchluss Britain was declared unprepared for war.
Therefore it seems more persuasive to conclude, whatever the reasons for the continual policy of appeasement, it can be said that appeasement with the sole aim of preventing war did not succeed, however what it was seen to do was prolong the inevitable. Many strongly feel that the continual demands of Hitler were flared by the lack of opposition, and his continual greed for expansion, his demands were rarely attacked, simply given into with little hesitancy.
A.J.P Taylor – The origins of the Second World War –pg. 52.