His father’s assassination affected the young Tsar tremendously when he first came to the throne. Where Tsar Alexander II had maintained a relatively relaxed view to his personal security throughout his reign, even when it was greatly apparent that the revolutionary wave had reached such a height that he was in grave danger. The new Tsar appeared to constantly fear for the lives of both himself and his family. He was always terrified that the same fate that had met his father was to await him. Van der Kiste comments upon how the new Tsar and Tsarina barely stepped outside at first and the family would always observe the strictest security, ‘such a move was symptomatic of total panic, and as the...lack of revolutionary outrage lengthened...the guards...grew bored of waiting for something to happen.’
Both Tsar Alexander II and Tsar Alexander III had begun their reigns in times of great national crisis. Tsar Alexander II was faced with the disastrous and highly embarrassing showing of the Russian army in the Crimean War and all the stark home truths that he had been forced to acknowledge. Whereas Tsar Alexander III ascended to the Russian throne with the sudden and unexpected death of his father and the rising upsurge in revolutionary feeling and action that was making itself felt within Russia. His father’s death appears to have very clearly indicated to the new Tsar the direction that his policies and actions would take, not only was this from the beginning of his reign but it also continued to influence him throughout the thirteen years of his reign. Van der Kiste appraises that once the Tsarevich was married that the Tsar had stopped taking an interest in preparing his son for the enormity of the occupation that lay before him. The Tsar, unlike his father had very little preparation for the office of Tsar, and was all the more unprepared due to the suddenness of his death.
Again, further evidence that their reigns were so very different can be seen in their handling of each of these difficult and challenging situations that they had to contend with on their accessions to rule. Tsar Alexander II had taken to heart the very apparent deficiencies in the Russian system and had made the first tentative steps toward reform. Hutchinson argues that Tsar Alexander II’s actions after Crimea had ‘...underlined the need to adapt to a rapidly changing world.’ Yet Tsar Alexander III’s response was to systematically destroy the remnants of the political groups in Russia, especially the ‘People’s Will’. This was found to procure the result that the revolutionary spirits had ‘slumped’. However one organisation was found to have survived, and the Tsar was to face many of the same dangers of his father. This group was not allowed to remain and was swiftly rounded up by the police. Though it would seem a natural action to take, taking into consideration the Tsar’s already conservative views and the recent death of his father, Tsar Alexander III would not yield to the calls from the Liberals for further reforms as a means to pacify the revolutionaries.
Tsar Alexander III was exposed to differing views and ideologies as to how to deal with the revolutionaries across the country. On the one hand Liberals were calling for a greater commitment to reforms as the only means to prevent revolutionary activity again. Conservatives dismissed a ‘...senseless...’ the idea that the regime ought to encourage public initiatives outside of their bureaucratic control, such as the participation of the public in political discussions or political debate within the press. Any concessions would simply encourage, not deter the extreme organisations and groups they maintained. Tsar Alexander III however kept to his repressive approach when dealing with the revolutionaries responsible for his father’s death. Again, this marked a departure from the reign of Alexander II, with a very public showing of the Tsar’s war against terrorism. Tsar Alexander III also ignored pleas from the liberals to treat the revolutionaries with deference. Tolstoy even wrote to the Tsar citing ‘...liberal indulgence...’ as one of the reasons that terrorism had flourished and asking him to use ‘...Christian forgiveness...’ against the extreme groups.
Where Alexander II had recognised the great need for reform after the revelations that the Crimean War had brought, Alexander III saw the best means to deal with a situation or crisis was to employ reactionary measures. The measures that had been taken by his father on the morning of his death for the limited elected representation on official bodies to be charged with advising the Tsar on legislation are one such example. It was thought, and feared, by those such as Melikov that the reactionary Tsar would disavow these proposals immediately. However, to the surprise of many he ordered a series of ministerial conferences to discuss the proposals. Pobedonestov increasingly dominated these, and in the end he had scored a decisive blow against Liberalism. It would seem, like his father he could also be indecisive.
The Tsar stated his resolve to uphold the autocracy: ‘In our great grief God’s voice bids us boldly take the helm of government, trusting in divine providence and believing in the strengths and truth of the autocratic power which we called upon to confirm and defend from all encroachments for the good of the people.’ E. Crankshaw comments that ‘He was not against pragmatical reforms in principle but was determined to stop anything that smelt of Liberalism dead in it’s tracks, and did so with a minimum of fuss.’
Increasingly all the progress of the past Tsar was destroyed and the Tsar ‘...brought his repressive policies to bear on many aspects of Russian life.’ There had been such a revision of his father’s reign that the period has been called the age of ‘Counter-Reforms.’
Alexander II’s reforms had inevitably brought about an increase in the right of the people to discuss and criticise the regime, a consequence that the Tsar had taken personally. Alexander III was outraged at the impertinence of the educated classes, such as University professors, students, and schoolteachers (rural especially) to assume that they were able to criticise the divinely ordained autocracy. This anger brought about many of the ‘Counter-Reforms.’ In 1882 a supposedly ‘temporary’ law effectively gagged editors of newspapers and journals. Tighter controls made it increasingly difficult to distribute or sell publications that in any way criticised the government.
The judiciary, which had been in receipt of one of the most far-reaching reforms, was also heavily encroached upon. With the creation of the ‘Land Captains’ many aspects of the local district came under their authority. The Land Captains offered new career opportunities to the nobles, the aspects of the local area that came under their authority included administrative, judicial and policing. Tsar Alexander III was able, through the Land Captains to further erode the reforms of the 1860s. The Land Captains had effectively replaced the elected Justices of the peace provided by the 1864 Judicial reform, whilst the separate sphere of jurisdiction awarded to the Land Captains enabled the regime to be rid of the plans that would create zemstvos at the lowest level (volost). The regime had reinforced the class divisions that already existed in local areas. Local government was also re-organised, coming under closer bureaucratic control. A law in 1890 ensured that the nobles retained their dominance over the zemstvos assemblies, whilst even the election of the Zemstvos President’s had to be approved by the Minister of the Interior. This was governmental interference, as Hutchinson comments, ‘...in the villages to a degree that was unprecedented in Russian history.’
The Emancipation of the Serfs remained relatively intact, perhaps this was such a momentous piece of legislation that to withdraw it would have been political suicide as far as the Tsarist regime was concerned. The new Tsar did have the democratic powers to think of, and to remove this political concession would have been a move that would have alienated the Russian Empire from world politics. The emancipated peasants were angered to find themselves under closer scrutiny and bureaucratic control than before.
There was also the programme of ‘Russification.’ During the reign of Tsar Alexander II there had been moves by some educated, enlightened bureaucrats in government to remove the ‘baneful’ influence of the Orthodox Church, particularly in the field of education. There had been limited action in this field, but any such moves had been stopped dead in their tracks with the accession of Tsar Alexander III. Van der Kiste comments, ‘Autocracy, he firmly believed, was divinely ordained and nationalist, based on the fact that ‘real Russians’ were Russian Orthodox by birth and monarchist by conviction, was an essential policy of government.’ Tsar Alexander III was also notoriously both Anti-German and Anti-Semitic. Van der Kiste comments that ‘...he was easily drawn into the prevalent anti-German movement, which found sympathy with the Tsarina...’ Measures were taken, such as Russian imposed as the principal language on the Baltic provinces, which was a quarter of the realm. He also imposed Russian educational and judicial procedures on the Baltics also,
Another notorious tale concerns the Tsar before his accession when he was Tsarevich. On the role call for a regiment he was agitated to hear far too many German names, when the call came to ‘Woronoz’ he exclaimed ‘Thank God for Woronoz!’ In demonstrating his Anti-Semitism, Alexander III once commented upon an official document: ‘...we must not forget that it was the Jews who crucified our Lord and spilled his precious blood.’ Pogroms occurred against Jews in 1881; these were inspired by nationalist, racial and religious prejudice. The Tsar further increased the restrictions on Jews, as a quota for admission to educational institutions, Jewish lawyers were banned from the bar and residential restrictions were tightened and Jews were deported en masse from Moscow and Kiev. It must be acknowledged that under the rule of his father there had been an increase in Russia in terms of religious acceptance, and increases in the rights of minority groups, these were retrenched on an incredible scale under Tsar Alexander III.
Tsar Alexander III did however achieve one positive action that historians have found difficult to discredit him with. He had maintained peace within the Russian Empire for the duration of his reign. One factor that can be attributed to his keenness to avoid conflict can be seen in this extract from Van der Kiste: ‘The Tsarevich returned from the (Crimean) battlefield much embittered by his experiences. Russia he felt had enemies worse than the Turks, namely corrupt Commanders on the Russian side.’ Not only was he morally opposed to war there were strategic reasons behind his maintenance of peace. He had recognised very early on in his reign that Russia could only survive if she were to Industrialise, and rapidly. Tsar Alexander knew that Russia must avoid conflict, to be able to get on with the processes without interruptions or any unnecessary depletion of her reserves.
The comparison between two Tsars of Russia, father and son is a natural one to make. However there are various and often contradictory interpretations of both Tsars and their reigns. It is this that makes it difficult to draw comparisons and distinctions between the two Tsars. However, it is safe to say that, in answer to the question, that there was indeed a great difference between the two reigns. Whereas Tsar Alexander II has been described by Mosse as ‘...a disappointing liberal...and an inefficient autocrat.’ Tsar Alexander III is seen unequivocally as an autocrat, and has never been seen as a liberal. However, it is far too simplistic to merely state that they were polarised in the methods of reign. Tsar Alexander III embarked upon industrialisation, which, though he never meant it to be, can be seen as a reforming action. His father, had toyed with the idea of reform but had drawn back, appalled at what he had unleashed, desperately back tracking most of the reforms. His son finished this off for him. Yet, there is distinctive evidence to suggest that, just before his death he had planned a far-reaching reform. Melilikov was unable to persuade Tsar Alexander III of this though, and that legislation proved to be defunct. However, much as t is possible to draw some vague, if not tenuous comparisons between the two tsars it must be acknowledged that the reign of Tsar Alexander III marked a great change and movement away from that of his father, Tsar Alexander II.