To what extent in the period 1906-1914 did the Russian Monarchy succeed in removing the primary causes of internal tension and create a wider base of support?

        Stolypin was made Chief Minister after his predecessor, Witte, was dismissed. It was Stolypin’s main aim, as it was Witte’s, to maintain the Tsarist system. Stolypin was hugely capable, as shown in his ability to form a relationship with the Duma, and in his regime of, “Suppression first and then, and only then, reform,” in order to combat the social bitterness that produces opposition.

        Stolypin introduced his land reforms in order to de-revolutionise and create an efficient and prosperous peasantry. However, there is debate over how successful these reforms were. Stolypin made the mistake of assuming that the peasants had a western-style desire for personal property, and that it was the Mir which caused poverty. Unfortunately, the strong communal tradition was ignored, and the conservatism of the peasants meant that the land reforms were not welcomed by all. A Land Bank was set up to provide loans with which to buy land, and there was also mass voluntary relocation to areas such as Siberia in order to put these empty lands into agricultural use. Although there are figures which suggest that these reforms were a success; between 1907-1916, 20% of peasants left the commune and by 1913, 5 million households moved eastwards. However, productivity rose by only 1% per annum, and most land remained in the ancient strip system. Due to these conflicting statistics, it is difficult to come to a definite conclusion about the success of the land reforms. Altogether, it seems that the reforms seemed to be failing before 1914, due to the new problems of jealousy and vicious attacks on those who chose to leave the Mir and the lack of motivation for change amongst the peasant masses. The idea was too ambitious, and so the Tsar was unsuccessful in his attempt to appease the peasants by improving the underlying problems of backward agriculture.  

        Unlike his introduction of reforms in order to de-revolutionise the peasantry, Stolypin introduced a regime of oppression to deal with the workers, which clearly would not result in their support for the Tsar, but instead led to the passively volatile attitude of the proletariat. Since Stolypin had general control over the military and the peasants, he felt strong enough to repress the workers. The 1905 legislation granting civil rights was quickly withdrawn, all Trade Unions and perceived revolutionary newspapers were outlawed, 60,000 were executed/imprisoned/exiled giving rise to the term, “Stolypin’s Necktie,” as a synonym for the hangman’s noose. This bitter but passive attitude lasted until 1912, when the shooting of striking workers in Lena led to a rapid growth in political protests. This return to 1905 levels of disorder was largely due to the various incompetent ministers the Tsar appointed, following Stolypin’s assassination. Their lack of imagination meant that the only course they could see was further repression, which was part cause/part effect of the increasing public disorder. The ever increasing number of strikes amongst workers is clear evidence that the Tsar had failed in removing the primary cause of their discontent; he desire for higher wages and better conditions, and that he had not gained their support.

        Between 1906-1914 there was rapid industrialisation, however, the high percentage increase in productivity was made easy, due to the low base from which it began. This industrialisation did little to improve relations between the Tsar and his people. The workers were not happy, and more pressure was put on the peasants to increase production. Therefore, the attempt to correct the backward industry merely meant that the Tsar lost more support from his people.

        There were also a number of social reforms which were, at least partly, successful, such as the Duma’s plan for universal, free primary education. However, this came with the contradictory impression that Stolypin’s withdrawal of the 1905 concession for greater university autonomy; students were repressed and strikes resulted in mass expulsion. This sent a mixed message to the Russian people, as it was clear that the Tsar and his government were not willing to comply with the 1905 reform ideas, nor were they willing to relax the harsh regime of oppression. This would clearly not have gained the Tsar popularity. Therefore the Tsar was mainly unsuccessful in his social reforms which were designed for appeasement, not the repression that followed.

          The fact that the Tsar allowed the aggressive nationalism to grow in Russia demonstrates his ineptitude, as the government’s apathetic attitude towards the numerous pogroms and, once again, the retraction of the 1905 concessions to minorities such as the Finns meant that the revolutionary parties grew within these groups, increasing opposition to the Tsar and his autocratic regime.

        From this evidence it can be deduced that the Russian Monarchy was unsuccessful in its attempt to remove the primary causes of internal tension and gain a wider base of support. Although there were attempts to correct Russia’s main problems, such as the industrialisation and land reforms, these did not have the required success that was needed to adequately modernize Russia. The attempts to gain support were equally unsuccessful; the Tsar sent contrasting messages in his withdrawal of the concessions made in 1905 which frustrated his people, and the repression of the workers and minority groups fuelled opposition.