To What Extent was British Appeasement to Germany in the Interwar Period Justified?

        This particular topic has two opposing viewpoints. The pro-appeasement stance is reflected in Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War by Graham Darby. Britain had been devastated by the Great War of 1914-18 in terms of loss of life and the economy. Over £7 billion in debt had accumulated; export markets were lost and traditional industries such as textiles declined. Darby states that, “Clearly Britain could neither face nor afford another war.” Nevertheless, Britain’s prestige and influence was still very high but, “Britain’s global responsibilities were in fact a logistical nightmare.” Because of Britain’s suffering economy, military expenditures were dramatically reduced and thus appeasement was the only choice. For instance, she spent £692 million in 1919-20 but only £115 million in 1922. The Depression further weakened Britain’s position, which contributed to appeasement, “…the Depression made rearmament a financial impossibility.” However, with the advent of Hitler, Britain was forced to rearm. “When he became Prime Minister in May 1937 Neville Chamberlain…was prepared to take the initiative. Policy changed from passive to active appeasement.” Financial constraints on rearmament convinced Chamberlain that, “conciliation…was to be preferred to confrontation.” Winston Churchill, Chamberlain’s political opponent, was an anti-appeaser. Darby portrays Churchill as a darker character: “Churchill’s alternative belligerent approach was based on a romantic unrealistic view of Britain’s position in the world.” Darby takes the pro-appeasement standpoint by stating that, “by waiting…Britain was better prepared – the country was united, better armed and had the support of the Empire and the moral support of neutrals.”

        Anti-appeasement attitudes are reflected by R.J.Q. Adams in British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, though the factual information is consistent with other sources, including Darby’s. The French overestimated the size of the German forces invading the Rhineland. Only fifteen lightly armed battalions actually entered. This 1936 crisis reveals much about British foreign policy at the time as, “it made crystal clear that neither the Government…nor the people were willing to countenance the possibility of war over what they considered an exclusively European and largely French dispute” Thus, appeasement shouldn’t have been used; it allowed Hitler to feel comfortable with rearming and eventually starting war. Adams appears to possess negative feelings towards British appeasement to Germany. Adams states that,

“There seems to be little doubt that the slightest armed resistance by Britain and France would have stopped the march into the Rhineland dead in its tracks. There is little doubt that, despite the weaknesses of the British and French military in 1936, they and the world would have been better off confronting the Wehrmacht than rather in 1939…The [British] Cabinet did not do what was clearly best for the nation and, as it turned out, for the world because they failed to understand the danger in which they found themselves. As it was, Hitler was strengthened not weakened,”

In critically examining both authors, one can perceive biased attitudes, instead of ideally objective approaches.

C        Evaluation of sources        

Historical sources must be analyzed critically before synthesizing conclusions. The two main sources utilised for this investigation were Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-41 by Graham Darby, published in 1999, and in British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39, by R.J.Q. Adams, published in 1993.

Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-41 was written for the Access to History: In Depth series. It is a study guide of sorts which “concentrates on the origins of the Second World War [and] appeasement and the historical debate surrounding the policy,” amongst other topics. It was designed for “studying history at a higher level” and it’s well structured. There is an introduction regarding appeasement, and then analyses. All factual information was presented objectively, which is the ideal method. However, some of Darby’s personal bias was incorporated into the analyses, making it limited, despite attempting to be entirely impartial. For example, Darby states: “Churchill’s alternative belligerent approach, some might say, was based on a romantic unrealistic view of Britain’s position in the world,” He writes that, “Chamberlain was a decent man who had lost relatives in the slaughter of 1914-18,” and later, he states bluntly that “Hitler caused the war,” From these extracts, it appears that he’s sympathetic towards Chamberlain and the appeasement policy.

British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39, was written by R.J.Q. Adams, in which he “examines the policy of appeasement…[and] explains the motivations and goals of the principal policy-makers,” Despite in-depth analyses, Adams’ presentation is much more opinionated when juxtaposed against Darby’s work. For example, “There seems to be little doubt that the slightest armed resistance by Britain and France would have stopped the march into the Rhineland dead in its tracks…The [British] Cabinet did not do what was clearly best for the nation and the world because they failed to understand…Hitler was strengthened not weakened,” These extracts clearly show bias.

Both sources are good for providing information but because of the biases, one must use them cautiously. Both books were published in the last decade of the twentieth century, one near the beginning and the other at the end. Since they were issued six decades after their subjects, constant unearthed information added to the benefit of hindsight helped the authors’ examination, though they still are limited due to personal bias.

D        Analysis

This topic whether or appeasing Germany was justified or not been re-examined countless times. This action was very significant in history for it could have thwarted WWII. As time progresses, increasingly more information is uncovered but this of course requires further critical analysis.

On one hand, appeasement was justified. In many ways, the effects of the Great War caused appeasement. As previously mentioned, a negative sentiment swept across Britain because of the loss of 750 000 young lives. The ‘never again’ mentality was additionally burdened by the badly deteriorated economy, not to mention the Great Depression. Because of the substandard economy and the unpopular support for another armed conflict, Britain clearly did not want nor could they immediately afford another war. For the time being, she wanted to return to splendid isolation while maintaining her global prestige. The only practical choice for Chamberlain was appeasement, which of course in his own mind was the only justification he needed. No other choices were realistic, especially considering the frame of mind of the general British populace. Appeasing Germany also provided more time for strengthening the armed forces, which eventually led to the Allied victory. Furthermore, “Many in Britain felt Hitler had a good case, and many were also won over by his anti-communist stance and saw him as a useful barrier to Soviet expansion.” There were many good reasons for supporting appeasement.

On the other hand, appeasement was not acceptable. “Peace at any price was never the policy of Chamberlain or his cabinet; the British government would not accept German domination of Europe.” Hitler should have been dealt with promptly in order to halt the Nazi quest to form the Third Reich. The 1936 Rhineland crisis was one of the first major acts of appeasement, followed by other confrontations such as the Anschluss in March 1938 and the relinquishing of the Sudetenland Chamberlain in the 1938 Munich Conference. All of these events continually added to Hitler’s confidence in attaining his goal of the Third Reich. Churchill, among others, “feared German military resurgence from the earliest point, [the Treaty of Versailles]” If appeasement was not employed, the Nazi regime could have been dealt with quickly and with relatively little, or perhaps no, blood shed. Consequently, it would have eliminated any chance at German supremacy, which was the last thing Britain, or any Ally for that matter, wanted. Thus, the Second World War would never have transpired. By deterring Nazi Germany as soon as possible, millions of lives could have been saved from battle, not to mention the lives lost due to the Holocaust. This justifies that appeasement should not have been used; Hitler should have been eliminated without delay.

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E        Conclusion

To be a good historian, one must critically analyze information that contributes to the topic. After analyzing the sources that I used, and thus allowing for biases, I have arrived at my conclusion. I believe that appeasing Germany was justified to a great extent. Without doubt, a primary motive for enacting this policy was to avoid war. Despite Chamberlain’s naivety, can one criticize this stance? The general public is of significance concerning any government, especially a democracy; “public opinion was an important factor in the formation of British foreign policy. The memories of the horrors led to a ‘never again’ mentality,” and “Britain’s position as the financial mainstay of the Allied cause had cost her dearly; her industry and economy were exhausted, and her massive fiscal resources depleted.” “Appeasement aimed to reduce the armament burden on the national finances.” If appeasement hadn’t been selected, what other practical options were there while considering the populace? Also, German bombers were a serious pressure on British government. Chamberlain knew that Britain was vulnerable to air-attacks and he didn’t want a duplicate of the Guernica incident at home.

If appeasement hadn’t been chosen, the consequences should also be considered. If Britain proposed armed conflict to suppress Germany, how would the British public react? Considering Britain’s distinctly weaker army, would its military even be capable of defeating the enemy? And if the Nazis had been held back, for example if Allied forces had turned the Nazi troops back in the Rhineland crisis, would that have impacted the Hitler dictatorship enough to stop it dead in its tracks and prevent any chance at global warfare? This issue of appeasement is very involved and still debated today.

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F        List of Sources

• Adams, R. J. Q. (1993) British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39. Stanford University Press; Stanford, California.

• Best, Geoffrey (2001) Churchill: A Study in Greatness. Hambledon and London; Great Britain.

• Chamberlain, William Henry (1962) Appeasement: Road to War. Rolton House Inc.; New York, United States. Published simultaneously by Burns and MacEachern; Canada.

• Darby, Graham (1999) Hitler, Appeasement, and the Road to War 1933-41. Hodder & Stoughton; London, Great Britain.

• Shen, Peijian (1999) The Age of Appeasement: The Evolution of British Foreign Policy in the 1930s. Sutton Publishing Limited; Gloucestershire, Great Britain.

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