To what extent was the backstairs intrigue responsible for Hitler being able to take power in January 1933?

Shaun Kirby 13G GCE History Personal Study

Hitler’s appointment as chancellor on the 30th January 1933 has prompted extensive analysis. Critics of democracy often claim that Hitler was democratically elected to power. This is believed untrue. Hitler never had the popular votes to become Chancellor of Germany, and the only reason he got the job was because the German leaders entered into a series of back-room deals known as the backstairs intrigue. Some claim that Hitler's rise was nonetheless legal under the German system. The problem is that what was "legal" under the German system would not be considered legal under a truer and better-working democracy. Yet it is clear that there was are other reasons for the Nazis rise to power not least the strength of the actual party itself and failings of the Weimar republic. Assessing how far the backstairs intrigue was responsible involves looking closely at the sequence of events that finally led to Hitler becoming chancellor. The starting point of the study will be the downfall of the Weimar republic; as it was clear there were factors that proved pivotal in the failure of the Weimar republic. I will then look at the rise of the Nazis to power and the methods, which the Nazis utilized in attracting mass support. Finally I will carry out an assessment of the ‘backstairs intrigues’ and the sequence of events between August 1932 and January 1933 culminating in Hitler becoming Chancellor.

‘The German Weimar Republic was doomed from the start’. (1) Germany had no democratic tradition, and in fact many parties were deeply opposed to the creation of a democracy. These included old monarchists, the Army, the industrialists, the Nationalists and several other conservative parties. ‘ No government exists in a historical vacuum and the Weimar republic had to live with its legacy from imperial Germany’ (10). It was a solution to the German question, which created a sense of frustrated nationalism. Many, like the Nazis to come, were not so much members of the Republic as they were conspirators to overthrow it. (A).
Unfortunately, the constitution also contained several fatal flaws. One of the worst was Article 48 of the constitution, which granted dictatorial powers to the president in times of national emergency. Unfortunately, the president would frequently evoke this clause, and it ultimately proved the downfall of the Republic.

Another flaw was an elaborate and complex system of proportional voting and voting by list, intended to give minorities the fairest possible representation. (B) The Weimar constitution created a government that was not sufficiently centralized. Many of the German states retained a high degree of autonomy under the new government. (C)
In addition to these constitutional defects, there were two other problems that weakened democracy in Weimar Germany. President, Paul von Hindenburg, a strong-willed field marshal and war hero would be in his middle 80s and partly senile by the time Hitler started achieving real power. Although he personally detested Hitler, he made many costly blunders and miscalculations about him, thinking he could easily control him. But by then the aged field marshal had lost much of his competence.

The second problem was that the Army was not subordinated to the government, but was a strong political player in its own right. By the time Hitler started his final rise to power, the Army's most influential political figure would be Lieutenant General Kurt von Schleicher, who was a close personal friend of Hindenburg and other government leaders. He would emerge as a major power broker -- and an undemocratic one -- in the power struggles that erupted in the early 30s. Of course, Hitler had long made sure to cultivate his alliances with the Army.

Hitler's rise to power

Like all mass movements, Nazism only thrived in times of great national distress. However, it is important to note the significant limits of Nazi popularity even then. After World War I, Germany lay defeated, humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, its industrial regions occupied by foreign powers, saddled with enormous war reparations, and with no military to defend itself. Yet throughout the 1920s, Hitler could not exploit these setbacks to achieve political power. As late as May 1928, the Nazis had obtained only 12 seats in the Reichstag. The Reichstag election of 1928 seemed to be a high point for the republic with the SPD gaining nearly a third of the vote. There was howether a great fragmentation in the middle spectrum of politics. The injustices cause by hyperinflation hit this section of the population particularly hard and left a deep resentment for the Weimar. It was among such voters that the Nazis were to make large gains when economic crisis struck again. One must remember that ‘Even in its Golden years, Weimar democracy had never won the hearts and minds of large numbers of Germans” (11)

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The economic crisis arrived in the form of the Wall Street crash and the ensuing world depression. From the moment of its creation the republic faced serious economic problems. The German economy suffered most from the loss of foreign investment- ‘its dependence upon foreign short term loans ensured that the impact would be extraordinary severe.’(12). It took the Great Depression -- which hit Germany harder than any than any other nation -- to turn Nazism into a true mass movement. But even then, the Nazis never gained a majority of the people's vote. Nazism generally appealed to only a third of the German people, and these came from its lower classes, armed forces and war industries. Nearly two-thirds of Germany was opposed to Hitler. There was never any hope that Hitler could have won their support. The Great Depression gave Hitler a chance to blame the status quo, and he expertly exploited the people's misery to increase his political power. In elections held on September 14, 1930, the Nazis won 18 percent of the vote, increasing their seats in the Reichstag to 107. Overnight they went from the ninth to second largest political party in Germany.

Between 1931 and 1933, vicious power struggles would break out between rival political parties. The power brokers in these struggles were Hindenburg and Schleicher. The problem during this period was that no party even came close to achieving the majority required to elect its leader Chancellor. Coalitions were either impossible to build, or were so transient that they dissolved as quickly as they formed. Ambitious leaders from every party began maneuvering for power, striking deals, double-crossing each other, and trying to find the most advantageous alliances. Hitler himself would ally the Nazis to the Nationalist Party.

In 1932, hoping to establish a clear government by majority rule, Hindenburg held two presidential elections. Hitler, among others, ran against him. A vote for Hindenburg was a vote to continue the German Republic, while a vote for Hitler was a vote against it. The Nazi party made the most clever use of propaganda ‘the Nazis made promises to a cross section of society promises to the small man, the peasant farmer and the small shop keeper.’ (18) The Nazis promised to protect agriculture against foreign competition and big business to save the peasant and lower classes fall on crops. To big business on the other hand, it promised demolition of the Weimar system of industrial relations.

‘It was the range of propaganda techniques and their increasingly sophisticated application which marked a new approach to electioneering.’(21) The Nazis practiced mass politics on a grand scale by exploiting modern technology, employing loud speakers, radio, film but it was perhaps it was in the organization of the mass rallies that the Nazis showed their mastery of modern propaganda. ‘To many, it marked the future, ‘the new Germany,’ born out of a complete break with the present, but resting on true values – as they saw it –of the Teutonic past. The vision of the future went hand in hand with the denunciation of the past in Hitler’s appeal.’ (22)

In the first election, held on March 13, 1932, Hitler received 30 percent of the vote, losing badly to Hindenburg's 49.6 percent. But because Hindenburg had just missed an absolute majority, a run-off election was scheduled a month later. On April 10, 1932, Hitler increased his share of the vote to 37 percent, but Hindenburg again won, this time with a decisive 53 percent. A clear majority of the voters had thus declared their preference for a democratic republic.

However, the balance of power in the Reichstag was still unstable, lacking a majority party or coalition to rule the government. All too frequently, Hindenburg had to evoke the dictatorial powers available to him under Article 48 of the constitution to break up the political stalemate. In an attempt to resolve this crisis, he called for more elections. On July 31, 1932, the Nazis won 230 out of 608 seats in the Reichstag, making them its largest party. As leader he had the right to form government Schleicher and Papen agreed that he must come into their cabinet. Still, they did not command the majority needed to elect Hitler Chancellor.

In another election on November 6, 1932, the Nazis lost 34 seats in the Reichstag, reducing their total to 196. And for the first time it looked as if the Nazi threat would fade. This was for several reasons. First, the Nazis' violence and rhetoric had hardened opposition against Hitler, and it was becoming obvious that he would never achieve power democratically. Even worse, the Nazi party was running very low on money, and it could no longer afford to operate its expensive propaganda machine. Furthermore, the party was beginning to splinter and rebel under the stress of so many elections.

But at the lowest ebb of the Nazis' fortunes, the backroom deal presented itself as the solution to all their problems. Deal making, intrigues and double-crosses had been going on for years now. Schleicher, who had managed to make himself the last German Chancellor before Hitler, would eventually say: "I stayed in power only 57 days, and on each of those days I was betrayed 57 times." (3) It's not worth tracking the ins and outs of all these schemes, but the one that got Hitler into power is worth noting.

Hitler's unexpected savior was Franz von Papen, one of the former Chancellors, a remarkably incompetent man who owed his political career to a personal friendship with Hindenburg. He had been thrown out of power by the much more capable Schleicher, who personally replaced him. To get even, Papen approached Hitler and offered to become "co-chancellors," if only Hitler would join him in a coalition to overthrow Schleicher. Hitler responded that only he could be the head of government, while Papen's supporters could be given important cabinet positions. The two reached a tentative agreement to pursue such an alliance, even though secretly they were planning to double-cross each other.

Meanwhile Schleicher was failing spectacularly in his attempts to form a coalition government, so Hindenburg forced his resignation. But by now, Hindenburg was exhausted by all the intrigue and crisis, and the prospect of civil war had moved the steely field marshal to tears. As much as he hated to do so, he seemed resigned to offering Hitler a high government position. Many people were urging him to do so: the industrialists who were financing Hitler, the military whose connections Hitler had cultivated, even Hindenburg's son, whom some historians believe the Nazis had blackmailed. The last straw came when an unfounded rumor swept through Berlin that Schleicher was about to attempt a military coup, arrest Hindenburg, and establish a military dictatorship. Alarmed, Hindenburg wasted no time offering Hitler the Chancellorship, thinking it was a last resort to save the Republic.

On January 30, 1933, Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor. As Hitler historian Alan Bullock put it:

"Hitler came to office in 1933 as the result, not of any irresistible revolutionary or national movement sweeping him into power, nor even of a popular victory at the polls, but as part of a shoddy political deal with the 'Old Gang' whom he had been attacking for months… Hitler did not seize power; he was jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue." (4)

Hitler's deal did not even give him a majority in the Reichstag. His coalition of Nazis and Nationalists had only 247 out of 583 seats in the Reichstag, still not a majority. But Hitler wasted no time using his newfound powers to start eliminating his competition. New elections were scheduled for March 5, 1933. Goebbels was completely confident now of success. "Now it will be easy to carry on the fight, for we can call on all the resources of the State. Radio and press are at our disposal. We shall stage a masterpiece of propaganda. And this time, naturally, there is no lack of money." (5)

Hitler's opponents had brought him to power thinking that they could control "the Austrian corporal." Papen even boasted: "Within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak." But they fatally underestimated him. On February 27, 1933, a fire engulfed the Reichstag -- Germany's symbol, if not actual center, of democracy. Hitler blamed it on the Communists, and used it as an excuse to begin a brutal crackdown. This he accomplished by drawing up an emergency decree "for the Protection of the people and the State."

Upon Hitler’s appointment as chancellor there has been extensive analysis, as this analysis prompts the key question ‘ why did the Nazis, and not some other political group take power?’ The profound hardship the depression had created produced an environment of discontent, which in conjunction with Weimar’s other failings, could easily be exploited by the Nazis. Indeed it must be very questionable whether Hitler would have become chancellor if it weren’t for the economic downturn. His mixtures of racist, nationalist and anti-democratic ideas were readily received by a broad spectrum of German people especially the middle classes. Other extreme political groups didn’t enjoy similar success this is due to the way the Nazi message was communicated, by propaganda, Hitler himself as a leader couldn’t with these other factors have achieved power, it was due to the mutual recognition by Hitler and representatives of the traditional leaders of the army, the landowners and traditional industry that they needed each other which led to Hitler s appointment in 1933.

Conclusion

In conclusion the question of how can somebody like Hitler was able to take power, can democracy be blamed for Hitler's rise? No. The Nazis own answer was that the rise of Nazism had been accomplished solely through the triumph of the will ‘an incessant struggle against the odds that had been overcome by the Nazis ‘such an heroic party legend had purely propaganda value’ (28). Backstairs intrigues weren’t solely the underlying reason for Hitler being able to take power in 1933. Hitler’s propaganda techniques for winning mass support could have achieved little success without the external conditions, which exposed the electoral masses to the Nazi political alternative. Without the longstanding resentment and hostility against the Versailles treaty and the new Weimar republic, the depression, the worsening crisis of the government and state Hitler and the Nazis would have remained an insignicant minority on the extreme fringes of the political system. In bringing Hitler to power, chance events and conservative miscalculation played a larger role than the actions of the Nazi leader himself. ‘Hitler’s own actions were of only secondary importance in the bringing them to power.’(29)

Biography:

1. William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, chapters 3, 5-7, and Alan Bullock's Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, abridged edition, chapters 3-5.

2. William Shirer's The Rise and fall of the Third Reich p. 155.

3. Ibid., p. 175.

4. Alan Bullock, p. 137 Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, abridged edition, (New York:

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5. Shirer, p. 189.

6. Ibid., p. 194.

8. Shirer, p. 199.

10 Patrick salmon ‘Weimar republic could it have survived’

11 Ian Kershaw ‘Hitler 1889-1936 Hubris’ 1998

12 Ian Kershaw ‘Hitler 1889-1936 Hubris’ 1998

18 Dick Geary ‘Hitler and Nazism’ 1993

28 Ian Kershaw ‘profiles in power- Hitler 1991

29 Ian Kershaw ‘Hitler 1889-1936’ 1998

21 Geoff Layton ‘Hitler and Nazism’ 1993

22 Ian Kershaw ‘Hitler 1889-1936 Hubris’ 1998