Using Livy, How Great a General was Hannibal?
Using Livy, How Great a General was Hannibal?
When Hannibal left Italy in 203 BC "he had filled Italy...with monuments of his tremendous campaigns"1. In this essay I will consider Hannibal's legacy and what aspects of his personality created these 'monuments.' After research,2 I have set out some criteria of a great general and in this essay I will attempt to establish to what extent Hannibal fulfils these criteria. According to Lazenby, to do what Hannibal did required "great strategic skill, tactical ingenuity and sheer force of personality"3. I will consider where these characteristics came from and how he used these characteristics to his advantage in the Second Punic War.
After Hasdrubal was assassinated Hannibal became general of the Carthaginian army in Spain. He had had an interesting upbringing as the son of a popular war hero, Hamilcar. Hamilcar "led the boy [Hannibal] to the altar and made him solemnly swear...that as soon as he was old enough he would become an enemy of Rome"4. There was some debate as to whether Hannibal should become commander at this young age. However "the troops received him [Hannibal] with ominous enthusiasm, the soldiers feeling that in the person of this young man Hamilcar himself was restored to them...the same vigour in his look, the same fire in his eyes"5. Indeed one of Hannibal's flaws was, according to Caven, "his all consuming ambition to excel in all that his father had taught him...the terrible game of war, the only worthwhile occupation for a Barca"6.
This 'game of war' was all about knowing how to be a good general, and how to defeat the Romans. In my opinion a good general must fulfil the following criteria. He must deceive the enemy; have a good strategy, know the state of his own forces and his enemy's capabilities and intentions. He must know the objective. He must defeat his enemies and forces, take the offensive, have unity in his command and know how to economise his army. He must manoeuvre into favourable positions, surprise the enemy, and have security from sabotage or subversion. He must have a good administration. He must adapt to the enemies plan smoothly and rapidly. He must take into account the domestic and foreign reactions to his activities. He should use psychological warfare. He must have a flexible army with the ability to use sophisticated tactics. He must either use force or guile to win the war and put the enemy into a dilemma where they are damned either choice they make. He must understand and utilize all available terrain.
The terrain Hannibal faced was and included a daunting journey over the Alps. His strategy was simple. Saguntum was a Roman protected city, situated below the river Ebro, significant because Carthage had influence over all land below the River Ebro (river Ebro treaty 226 BC). Saguntum was seen as a 'listening post' on Carthaginian activities, and so had to be dealt with. Hannibal's strategy was to attack Saguntum, therefore provoking Rome to declare war on Carthage (and not on Hannibal). This was a good time to start a war as Rome was occupied elsewhere - with the Illyrian pirates and with the Gauls. It would also "make those tribes who had already submitted more obedient and the rest who were still independent more cautious"7. After an eight month siege Saguntum was taken and valuable resources were plundered, providing the money to pay for his troops and to prepare for his strategy - the invasion of Italy by land.
He told his men to winter and to return in early spring, but sent out envoys to find out the conditions he would face on his journey - the military and political situation, the logistics of the campaign and the resistance of the Gauls to Roman pressure. Hannibal also took measures for the security of Spain and Africa, including taking troops from their homeland and placing them in another part of the Carthaginian Empire ensuring their loyalty to the Carthaginian army, rather than to their country. All of this shows good administration.
His strategy seemed strange, but was actually quite clever. He planned to invade Italy via the Alps* because he did not have a good enough navy to protect him against the Roman fleet. After crossing the Alps he would try to recruit the Gauls, as they hated Rome as much as Hannibal did. He would try to separate Rome from her allies because they provided 50% of the Roman army - over 35,000 Infantry and 3,500 Cavalry. He wanted to cause schisms in the Roman political system so he could break up Rome from the inside. This strategy would take Rome by surprise. Even though this was a superb strategy there were still some problems. The journey would kill many troops and animals. Rome and its allies closely joined by the Pax Romanus and they would be hard to separate. If Hannibal was ever to take on Rome, he would need an army for siege, not for blitzkrieg, as his current army was designed for.
His army was compromised of 12,000 African infantry who were good at holding the enemy at bay. He had 8000 Spanish infantry who were good at guerrilla warfare, but could also be used in normal field battles. However, the key to his army was his 6000-strong cavalry. His infamous Numidian horsemen were world renowned, excelling at skirmishes and ambushes. His Spanish heavy cavalry were very useful. Hannibal knew about all the strengths of his army. They allowed him to have sophisticated tactics, as this requires "well-trained, articulated forces that are armed with different weapons and possess different capabilities."8 ...
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His army was compromised of 12,000 African infantry who were good at holding the enemy at bay. He had 8000 Spanish infantry who were good at guerrilla warfare, but could also be used in normal field battles. However, the key to his army was his 6000-strong cavalry. His infamous Numidian horsemen were world renowned, excelling at skirmishes and ambushes. His Spanish heavy cavalry were very useful. Hannibal knew about all the strengths of his army. They allowed him to have sophisticated tactics, as this requires "well-trained, articulated forces that are armed with different weapons and possess different capabilities."8 He knew how to wield them and to use them to his advantage. They were a highly mobile, blitzkrieg army. He would not send them to do something they could not do. He knew when they needed rest, and when they needed encouragement. We know that Hannibal was a charismatic leader, for example when crossing the Alps and he saw his army was demoralised he made a grand, encouraging speech to stop them from mutinying. In addition he made the descent easier on his troops by cutting a Z shape into a cliff so they could walk down without incident. Over the 16 years that he was in enemy territory he managed to keep his mercenary troops united, despite their differences in language and religion. This is an amazing feat in itself.
The main way Hannibal dealt with this problem of schisms in his army was unity of command. He left behind 7000 troops that he thought were unreliable and might have voiced discontent of his leadership as he had shown his leadership over and again and could not afford his orders being questioned. An example of his leadership was when Hannibal's column was marching up a small defile in the Alps and they were ambushed. Hannibal had his crack troops ahead, and restrained them from going back to help until the correct moment, as this would only add to the confusion, and cause more people to fall off the cliff. He had security from sabotage or subversion. A good example of this is when some Gauls present themselves as being friendly guides, but Hannibal was suspicious. They lead Hannibal into a trap but he was wary of them and managed to defeat the army. He showed that he could be a good administrator by providing enough money to pay for his troops most of the time. He became a prominent politician in Carthage after the war.
These men had to endure many things while they were under Hannibal's command - hostile Gauls, the cold, a long journey, and marching around Italy. They had to survive many battles when their endurance was called on time and again. The first battle between Hannibal and the Romans was at the river Ticinis. Some Gauls defected to Hannibal before the battle. It was a skirmish involving 6000 Carthaginian and 2000 Roman horsemen. The Numidians flanked the Romans as they were to do in the battles to come. Publius Scipio was injured, saved only by his son, Scipio Africanus, and was unable to take command during their next encounter. Many more Gauls went over to Hannibal after this show of superiority. However, Hannibal did not use these men to fill his ranks. He "welcomed them enthusiastically... [and] sent them off to their own cities to tell their compatriots of what they had done and urge the rest to join him"9. Hannibal acquired a Roman grain store nearby, so he could stock up on supplies for his troops.
The Battle of Trebia was the first battle of any significance. It shows another of Hannibal's great attributes; psychological warfare. Tiberius Sempronius Longus had just arrived from Sicily and had doubled the size of the Roman army. Longus was "consumed with the ambition to force a decisive battle as soon as possible"10. Hannibal probably knew that Longus was going to be brash and arrogant and he assumed that he could lure Longus into a trap. The night before the battle Hannibal personally surveyed the battle site so he knew and understood the terrain. He then got his best men to choose 2000 men. He did this so they would know the importance of their job. They were closely united - they had put their trust in each other. They were told to lie in wait for the Romans. The next morning Hannibal got his troops up early, fed them and prepared them for battle. They rubbed oil all over themselves to keep themselves warm (it was nearing winter). He then got his Numidian cavalry to torment and coax Longus into battle before the Romans were prepared. Longus sent out his entire army and followed the Numidian's back across the freezing river. "The time he [Longus] chose for the engagement was dictated not by the facts, but by his personal motives, [so] his judgement was bound to be at fault"11. Longus engaged the Carthaginians exactly where Hannibal wanted him to and was ensnared in his trap. The Romans were annihilated.
This battle shows for the first time Hannibal's use of deception. He utilised the terrain to his advantage. Needing "a resounding victory to maintain the morale of his men and the enthusiasm and war-like spirit of the Gauls"12, Hannibal had taken a risk by isolating his Numidian horsemen from the rest of his troops. "Hannibal was always inclined by temperament to favour the unexpected solution"13. There were many consequences of this battle. Many Gauls flocked to support Hannibal. Rome started a defensive (but not Fabian) policy, putting garrisons at strategic points throughout Italy. After wintering his men in the Po valley Hannibal marched through marshy countryside for four days and three nights. Many horses and pack animals died. Hannibal lost his sight in one eye. He knew the condition of his men was bad, and so rested them, again showing this key aspect of good generalship. He "collected information about the enemy"14. He knew he was likely to face Flaminus (one of the consuls) at Arretium. Flaminus was "absurdly overconfident"15. Hannibal walked straight past Flaminus, burning and pillaging the region, and tormented the Roman troops. Hannibal was again using psychological warfare. Flaminus was pulled into a huge trap at the Battle of Trasimene in 217 BC. 15,000 Romans were killed. Of the captured soldiers only the allies of Rome were set free, encouraging schisms in the alliance system.
The next major encounter was at the battle of Cannae in 216 BC. It was to be his most famous victory. The term of office for the Dictator Fabius had come to an end and the consuls Varro and Paullus were elected. Varro is depicted as being reckless, arrogant and inexperienced militarily. Paullus was a cautious, sensible and experienced patrician. Hannibal met Varro and Paullus outside Cannae. He chose a battlefield where the wind and dust would be in the face of the Romans. It would be useful for Hannibal's cavalry as it was a flat plain. However, the Romans liked it as well because there was a river on one side, so they could not be out flanked. The Romans had a huge army of approximately 70,000 troops while the Carthaginians had about 63,000 troops. Hannibal deceived the inexperienced Varro by leaving his central line weak. Varro charged all his forces into the centre, and Hannibal used a double enveloping manoeuvre. It was an absolute massacre. Over 90% of the Roman army was either killed or captured, while only 9% of the Carthaginian army was killed. Paullus, 80 senators and 29 military consuls were also killed.
All these battles show Hannibal's use of force - one of the ways you can win a war. The other way is guile. Hannibal actually preferred this method, and you can see his use of guile in his tactics- deception and psychological warfare. Hannibal used guile as part of his strategy when he was counteracting Fabian tactics. After Trasimene Rome had two main obstacles to overcome - firstly, Hannibal's superior ability on the battlefield, secondly, the inexperience of the newly recruited Roman troops. To combat this Fabius let Hannibal roam around Italy unopposed. His strategy of avoiding major battles earned him the name "concutator" - the delayer. This forced Hannibal into disadvantageous positions and prevented him from collecting food and letting his troops rest. Meanwhile Rome was becoming stronger and its troops more experienced.
However Minucius, Fabius' second in command, was becoming impatient. All he could see was Italy being pillaged and destroyed. This was a direct result of Hannibal's psychological games - he was trying to coax Fabius into battle. It worked. After a small victory Minucius proposed that he and Fabius should share the dictatorship. Hannibal had succeeded in his strategy - the Roman army was split. Minucius was coaxed into another battle and would have been slaughtered were it not for Fabius' intervention. Hannibal was a great military leader because he was able to counteract Fabius' tactics by adapting his enemy's plan. He employed the philosophy of 'divide and conqueror' - dividing Fabius from Rome and from his men. He used brilliant guile tactics such as the 'oxen' episode where Hannibal used misdirection - he attached candles to oxen and, at night, drove them up a hill that Fabius was guarding. Fabius saw the lights, thought Hannibal was moving, and told his men to go and stop him. In actuality Hannibal was quietly escaping, using another route.
To use guile successfully a general has to have a manoeuvrable army and to understand terrain. Hannibal knew how to manoeuvre his army into favourable positions. He also knew how avoid battles himself - by using circuitous paths through the Apennines. He shows his knowledge of terrain during his crossing of the Alps. When he came across a blocked passage he used heat to crack the stones so he could clear the path - "could anyone imagine a more improvident general or more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been if... [he] had not familiarised himself with the roads or the lie of the country"16. However, Hannibal did not know what effect travelling through a marsh would have on his troops after the battle of Trebia. In my opinion he made mistakes while trying to outmanoeuvre Publius Scipio before he got to Italy. Hannibal allowed Gnaeus Scipio to be sent on to Spain, therefore blocking Hannibal's supply line. Polybius says that by attacking Saguntum Hannibal "would be able to advance in safety towards Italy without leaving an enemy in the rear."17 Surely this same principle applies to a huge Roman army as well as a city. There were consequences for Hannibal, much needed reinforcements were not be able to get through and the Carthaginian war effort was redirected to Spain, rather than to Hannibal.
Hannibal made some other major mistakes. He was unclear about his prime objective. He wanted to defeat Rome, distract Roman forces from abroad and split Rome from its allies. Rather than concentrating on defeating Rome, he concentrated on splitting Rome from their allies. In principle this was a good idea, but what he was doing was actually contradictory - Rome and its allies were one in the same. To defeat Rome you would need to defeat their allies. Every time Rome's allies were defeated made it harder to turn them later. Losses in war only made them more resilient. In my opinion he was successful in only one of his objectives- he did manage to distract Rome from activities abroad. Hannibal did not defeat Rome, and only managed to split some allies from Rome. And these new allies increasingly became a liability.
However Hannibal did have one opportunity to win the war for Carthage. This was after the Battle of Cannae. Hannibal had decisively defeated all of Rome's field armies and had an opportunity to attack Rome. Livy quotes Mago in the aftermath of the battle: "no one man has been blessed with all Gods gifts. You know how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory"18. Hannibal decided not to attack Rome at this time because the stakes were too high. If he had failed to take Rome he would have lost the entire war for Carthage. Hannibal would spend the next thirteen years trying to consolidate his power and recruit more allies. Hannibal proposed better conditions under Carthaginian rule. He would restore their freedoms. He therefore favoured captured allied troops. He tried not to devastate their land. He had to show that Rome was eventually going to be defeated by defeating Rome's armies in the field. Hannibal needed to show the allies that it would be better to support him now, rather than later. However yet again there were some problems with this strategy. The Roman allies did not resent Rome as much as Hannibal thought they would. They had no desire for revenge against Rome, as the Gauls did.
The Gauls and the Italians were old enemies and it was hard for them to trust each other. It was also hard for the Allies to trust Hannibal. Was he reliable? Would he give them autonomy if he won? Hannibal may have been tenacious, victorious in battle, be a strong leader and wealthy, but Rome was all these things as well. The allies saw that Hannibal was only one man who unified a divided army, and they had much more confidence in Rome to provide the next generation of tenacious, victorious and wealthy leaders. It was hard for them to change many good leaders for one excellent leader. Overall, it is my opinion that Hannibal's relations with his allies were a failure. They eventually lost the war for Hannibal. They undermine Hannibal's greatness as a general, as we see that Hannibal lacked foresight - what if Carthage couldn't provide the extra troops he would need? However, Hannibal realised that Rome's allies was one of its weaknesses. He tried his best to exploit it. It was only with planning and a good education that he would have known this weakness.
Even though many Roman and foreign allies went to Hannibal's side they eventually became a liability. Hannibal had to divide his forces to defend his Roman allies. He refrained from raiding the territories of his allies. He was unable to get new recruits. He desperately needed fresh, experienced men from Africa as his veterans were becoming weak and tired. Only a small force was sent, bought by Bomilcar. Meanwhile, events were unfolding worldwide. In 215 BC both King Phillip II of Macedonia and Syracuse signed a treaty with Hannibal. However Phillip was unable to cross the Adriatic to help him (214 BC). In 208 BC Hasdrubal broke through into Northern Italy, but was killed at the battle of Baecula. By 206 BC Spain was lost to Carthage. In 205 BC the Macedonian war ended. All these events show that an inevitable consequence of this war of attrition was that the Carthaginians and their allies would grow weaker.
This weakness was evidenced at the battle of Zama. The armies were quite even, in size and training. Scipio Africanus, the general of the Roman troops had taught his forces Hannibal's tactics. He had acquired Numidian horsemen gaving him the advantage over Hannibal. It was Cannae in reverse. Hannibal was defeated for the first time ever. I believe this was because he did not choose the battleground well. There were no features he could use to hide his troops, or to stop himself from being outflanked. However Polybius says that "Hannibal had achieved the distinction of having drawn his line on that day with remarkable skill"19 using his veterans as a van-guard.
In conclusion we can see that Hannibal fulfils all of my criteria for being a great general except for a few. He fails in his dealings with Roman allies - he underestimated Rome's capabilities and there grip on their allies. He failed to secure his supply lines - this is an administrative failure. He also failed to prioritise his objectives - he cannot see any other way to defeat Rome other than splitting it from its Allies. He fulfilled all the other criteria that I set out. He is one of the best generals ever.
3, 569 words.
Titus Livius (Livy) XXX: 28
2 An Encyclopaedia Britannica article entitled The Conduct and Theory of War
3 Lazenby, page 256
4 Livy XXI: 1
5 Livy XXI: 2
6 Caven, page 86
7 Polybius III: 17
* However, it was never Hannibal's plan to cross the Alps. This aspect of the journey occurred because of Scipio's blocking of the normal route.
8 An Encyclopaedia Britannica article entitled The Conduct and Theory of War
9 Polybius III: 67
0 Polybius III: 70
1 Polybius III: 70
2 Pamela Bradley, page 138
3 Polybius III: 78
4 Polybius III: 80
5 Polybius III: 80
6 Polybius III: 48
7 Polybius III: 17
8 Livy XXII: 51
9 Poybius XV: 12
Edward Moloney, 16/05/2007, Classical Civilisation coursework, 1