Kornilov certainly had plans to send a corps to Petrograd, long before the actual ‘so-called’ Putsch occurred which gives some credence to the idea that Kornilov intended to overthrow the Provisional Government. Asher states,
“As early as August 19, Kornilov instructed his Chief of Staff, General Lukomsky, to concentrate the Third Corps in the areas of Nevel, Novye-Sokolniki, Velikie-Luki, within convenient striking distance by railroad of both Moscow and Petrograd. After some prodding by Lukomsky, Kornilov gave as his reason the anticipated Bolshevik insurrection of September 10-11 and intimated he was prepared to act to suppress it without the consent of the Provisional Government. On September 3, I. P. Romanovsky, Quartermaster General of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, signed an order to distribute hand grenades to divisions that were to seize Petrograd from the south. By September 6, before the termination of Savinkov's conversations with Kornilov, the three cavalry divisions composing the Third Corps were concentrated at their respective positions.”(p.297)
It seems fairly straight-forward that Kornilov had made plans to send troops to Petrograd without the consent of the Provisional Government, however it appears that Kerensky believing a Bolshevik insurrection was imminent had in fact asked for the very same thing to be done.
Kerensky sent moment Savinkov was to Stavka to meet with Kornilov and pass this on to him, and thus Kornilov’s plans gained some legal credence. Ukraintsev who was a member of the Commission of Inquiry into the Kornilov affair set up by the Provisional Government to investigate the events states,
“We read and re-read the tape trying to discover in it something which could contradict General Kornilov’s statement. In fact, a certain imprecision in some expressions was capable of causing doubt, but this was easily explicable by the necessity for General Kornilov to be fairly secretive, as the conversation was not conducted directly, but through an intermediary, namely the military telegraphist. There was the same lack of precision in Kerensky’s expressions, obviously for the same reason. Taking this into account, the fact remained that we had in our hands a tape which provided incontrovertible material evidence that the calvary corps was advancing on Petrograd with the knowledge and consent if not of the whole Government, then of its head, and that the accusation against General Kornilov therefore collapsed. What in Petrograd had appeared as a crime of the Supreme Commander was transformed into a legal act and we, the Commission, found ourselves in a totally absurd position.”(p.291)
It is clear that Kerensky was not as ‘in the dark’ about Kornilov’s sending the calvary corps to Petrograd and was in fact a party to it. However, although Kornilov now thought he had the backing of the provisional government for his plans Kerensky began to have second thoughts after a visit by a man called V.N. Lvov.
Lvov was a self-appointed go-between who put it upon himself to get Kornilov and Kerensky to work together. However, he told Kornilov that Kerensky was amenable to a dictatorship led by Kornilov to strengthen the government, and then scared Kerensky by telling him that Kornilov called for the establishment of martial law in Petrograd, the resignation of Kerensky and his cabinet, and the transfer of all military and civil authority to him. Kerensky was worried that his position as head of the government would be compromised due to this and his own request for a corps to be sent to Petrograd. Soon after Kerensky telegraphed Kornilov, posing as Lvov, supposedly to confirm what Lvov said, however due to the vagueness of Kerensky’s questioning it did not validate that Lvov’s message was correct, nor did it constitute a denial of any conspiracy on Kornilov’s part. Despite this, Kerensky used this as confirmation that Kornilov intended to overthrow the Provisional Government. Asher states,
“Now, on the basis of Lvov’s report, it appeared that Kornilov meant to place himself at the top. Kerensky did not intend to relinquish power, and Lvov’s report presented him with an opportunity to turn the tables on Kornilov. The Prime Minister deliberately employed vague phraseology when questioning the General so that Kornilov would have no opportunity to deny a conspiracy. Kerensky did so realizing that a straightforward denial on Kornilov’s part would make it difficult to gather support of the Provisional Government to act against what Kerensky now chose to regard as a plot against the duly constituted authority himself. To put the matter somewhat crudely: “Kerensky seized the most propitious moment, in order not to be eaten by Kornilov, but on the contrary to devour Kornilov himself.” ”(p.297)
It appears that due to Lvov’s intervention, Kerensky became anxious that Kornilov’s plans differed from his and wished to renege on the agreement thus he betrayed Kornilov.
In light of this evidence it appears that neither Kornilov nor Kerensky were innocent in this affair. Kerensky had knowledge of Kornilov’s plans to send the calvary corps to Petrograd and had in fact asked him to do as much. After Lvov’s visit Kerensky believed he’d made a mistake and thus reneged on the agreement with Kornilov, and used it against Kornilov. Kornilov although believing he had the approval of the Provisional Government to do what he was doing, had been prepared to do so prior to any agreement with Kerensky. The fact of the matter is that there was an attempt at a military coup by Kornilov as when Kerensky called for his dismissal, he refused to step down. Essentially Kornilov had merely reverted to his original plans prior to his agreement with Kerensky.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. Primary Sources
Kerensky, Alexander (1960). ‘The Bolshevik Victory: Why Did the Provisional Government Fall? And Why Did the Bolsheviks Successfully Seize Power?’ in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How? (Boston: Heath & Co.), pp.78-84.
Ukraintsev, N. (1973). ‘The Kornilov Affair: Observations by a Member of the Extraordinary Commission of Enquiry’, ed. James D. White, trans. James D. White and Nijole White, Soviet Studies, XXV, No.2 (October), pp.283-298.
II. Secondary Sources
Ascher, Abraham (1953). ‘The Kornilov Affair’, Russian Review, 12, No.4 (October), pp.235-252.
Asher, Harvey (1970). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation’, Russian Review, 29, No.3 (July), pp.286-300.
Asher, Harvey (1953). ‘The Kornilov Affair’, Russian Review, 12, No.4 (October), pp.235-252.
Jones, David R. (1976). ‘The Officers and the October Revolution’, Soviet Studies, XXVII, No.2 (April), pp.207-223.
Strakhovsky, Leonid I. (1960). ‘Kerensky Betrayed Russia’, in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How? (Boston: Heath & Co.), pp.85-96.
White, James D. (1968). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Study in Counter-Revolution’, Soviet Studies, XX, No.2 (October), pp.187-205.
Wildman, Alan (1992). ‘Officers of the General Staff and the Kornilov Movement’ in Edith Frankel et al (eds.), Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.76-101.
Strakhovsky, Leonid I. (1960). ‘Kerensky Betrayed Russia’, in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How? (Boston: Heath & Co.), pp.94-95.
Asher, Harvey (1953). ‘The Kornilov Affair’, Russian Review, 12, No.4 (October), p.243.
Kerensky, Alexander (1960). ‘The Bolshevik Victory: Why Did the Provisional Government Fall? And Why Did the Bolsheviks Successfully Seize Power?’ in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How? (Boston: Heath & Co.), p.81.
Jones, David R. (1976). ‘The Officers and the October Revolution’, Soviet Studies, XXVII, No.2 (April), p.211.
White, James D. (1968). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Study in Counter-Revolution’, Soviet Studies, XX, No.2 (October), p.187.
Asher, Harvey (1953). ‘The Kornilov Affair’, Russian Review, 12, No.4 (October), p.242.
Wildman, Alan (1992). ‘Officers of the General Staff and the Kornilov Movement’ in Edith Frankel et al (eds.), Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.80.
Asher, Harvey (1953). ‘The Kornilov Affair’, Russian Review, 12, No.4 (October), p.241.
Asher, Harvey (1970). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation’, Russian Review, 29, No.3 (July), p.297.
Ukraintsev, N. (1973). ‘The Kornilov Affair: Observations by a Member of the Extraordinary Commission of Enquiry’, ed. James D. White, trans. James D. White and Nijole White, Soviet Studies, XXV, No.2 (October), p.291.
Asher, Harvey (1970). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation’, Russian Review, 29, No.3 (July), pp.295-297.
Asher, Harvey (1970). ‘The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation’, Russian Review, 29, No.3 (July), p.297.