The attitude of France was somewhat more hard-lined. A million and a half French had been killed, and four million wounded or missing. Clemenceau was determined to prevent a repetition of the Great War, and believed the way to do this was to take everything that he could get from Germany in the way of land and reparations. He also suggested that Germany should be broken up into several individual states. That would almost conclusively place any further aggression out of the question. France had suffered the most out of the war; Clemenceau and France believed that that warranted the very harshest of measures. He wanted the Rhineland turned into a buffer-state, patrolled by French troops. This was moderated by Wilson and Lloyd George, who said that it would do little good aside from creating the reverse of Alsace-Lorraine. Clemenceau wanted the very maximum reparations from Germany, in order to cover every last bit of expenditure. He also demanded that the wartime alliance between the Allies be continued.
This differed significantly from the attitude and vision of President Wilson, who had only become involved with the war when it was absolutely unavoidable. Wilson was an idealist and wanted to let Germany off lightly. He argued for ‘National self-determination’, the principal allowing a state to choose its future. This would help people like the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks create their own states. Wilson believed that if national self-determination had been used in the case of pre-1914 Bosnia, then war could have been avoided. Wilson also advocated the foundation of the League of Nations. This would be similar to a world parliament, and although not governing the member states, would help prevent another large-scale war. If Germany was treated lightly, then it would be less likely to seek revenge.
Wilson and Lloyd George had a degree of difficulty in persuading Clemenceau to sign a realistic, workable treaty. However there were some things on which all three agreed in principal:
- That Germany was solely responsible for the war
- That Germany should, therefore, be liable to reparations
- That Germany’s armed forces should be limited in order to help prevent any retaliatory actions
These were the three points that the treaty was based around. The big three could not each get what they wanted, but needed to reach a compromise.
Whatever the details of the treaty were, Germany was always going to find something to complain about. The average German felt that the war had been caused by pre-war encirclement, or ‘Einkreisung’. Germany believed that war was inevitable, because he was being prevented from expanding by countries such as France and Russia. Was this an early feeling of ‘lebensraum’? Germany did not consider himself responsible for the Great War. Nor did the Germans believe that they had lost the war. They were still in Belgium and France when the Armistice was signed, and were not aware to what extent they had been beaten back and how fast they were retreating. The Germans were also horrified at the harshness of the treaty. The Germans thought that the Armistice had been a cease-fire in order to negotiate peace. There was not a representative of Germany at the outlining of the treaty; the first time that it was read by a German was when it was signed. Germany did not agree with disarmament. The feeling was very much that Germany had something better to do than re-starting a war that they were not going to win easily: Germany needed re-building and restructuring. This desire to rebuild was not helped by the loss of land or the ‘crippling’ reparations. If Germany was going to rebuild, being excluded from the League of Nations was not going to help. It needed to integrate itself with the other nations, not be isolated. Ask a German what he thought the future held, and he would reply that Germany had no future.
What Germany failed to remember was that he had signed the Armistice agreement, even if his arms were tied behind his back. The Armistice agreement had comprised of Wilson’s fourteen points, reparations and ‘any other things’. Germany knowingly disregarded the second and third points. When he was presented with the treaty of Versailles, though, he had little choice apart from to sign it without argument. After all, there was little he could do about it. The British, French and Americans were poised on the edge of the Rhineland, ready to cross into Germany should the need arise. The treaty was signed on June 28th 1919; it can be paraphrased into four main points:
- A League of Nations to be set up in order to prevent any future repetition of war (Germany excluded).
- Germany lost territory. Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, a Polish corridor was created (breaking Wilson’s ideal of N.S.D.) with Danzig as a free city, colonies in German East Africa were handed over to the British and the Saar was administered by the League for fifteen years.
- The War Guilt Clause: Germany accepted responsibility for starting the war (and therefore accepting reparations).
- Reparations for military and civilian damage. No figure was set, and this concerned both Clemenceau (who thought they had got away with it) and the Germans (who thought that they would be paying in excess of what they owed).
France felt that the treaty was too light. The French felt cheated out of the harsh deal demanded by Clemenceau. As a result of not getting the Rhineland turned into a buffer-state (and therefore not achieving his goal), Clemenceau’s reputation fell through the floor. He had accepted a fifteen year demilitarised zone and a continuation of the wartime alliance, but had not delivered what he had advocated at Versailles. In addition to this, a figure for reparations had not been set. For the moment, Germany would not pay for the civilian and military damage caused. This, to the average Frenchman, meant that Germany had the potential to rebuild and, one day, re-attack. That prospect was not aided by the US Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Guarantee. The crucial two thirds majority was not received, and the motion was not passed. As soon as the USA decided that it did not want to continue the alliance, Britain dropped out, leaving France on it’s own. Added to this, Germany (even after the loss of land) had a population of sixty million to France’s forty million. France had a low birth-rate and the fact that it was less industrialised than Germany did not help. Once the treaty was signed, the future looked rather unappealing for France.
Britain, on the other hand, had done rather well out of Versailles. The British thought that they had secured a good peace settlement. They did not realise that Lloyd George had not delivered a very stern settlement, but did not seem to mind, they had acquired countries from what used to be German East Africa. Britain felt no longer threatened by Germany – its navy had scuttled itself at Scapa Flow that year and Germany did not present itself as a threat to Britain. Although Lloyd George did not mention it at the time, he had engineered the treaty in such a way that future reconciliation between the two countries was possible.
America was unique in the sense that the only Americans that was really concerned about Versailles were those directly connected with the war (i.e. Wilson and the Army). Most Americans either didn’t understand or concern themselves with what seemed a very disorganised, complicated and distant continent. This feeling of general apathy left Wilson to his own devices as to what kind of peace he secured. The typical American (and therefore the typical senator) didn’t want a long-standing involvement in and responsibility for what happened in Europe. For one, it contradicted Washington’s principal of isolationism and non-involvement in external affairs that did not directly involve the USA. Wilson thought that the treaty was a little excessive in its measures, although he did agree that Germany should be punished. He had placed his faith in the League of Nations as a way of preventing further war. The only problem with the League was that Germany was excluded indefinitely at the request of Clemenceau.
In summary, then, it is clear that there is not one answer; the response is dependent solely upon who is asked. The Germans were only ever going to be happy with the treaty if the Allies accepted defeat and responsibility, which was not going to happen. The German people did not realise to what extent they had been beaten, and as a result did not believe that they deserved to pay reparations. They were asking ‘What about the damage inflicted by the Allies?’. There was nothing in the treaty that mentioned (or even hinted at) the British, French or Americans compensating Germany. The Allies did have a solid case for this though. The entirety of fighting on the Western Front had taken place on French and Belgian soil, which was as good a reason as any to take as much money as possible away from the Germans. The French did not believe that the Treaty was just on the counts that it left Germany open to future violations of the border. True, Germany had signed the treaty agreeing never to enter the Rhineland with an army again, but after the fifteen year Allied occupation there was only the promise of permanent demilitarisation. That was not good enough for the sceptics. Reparations were not satisfactory (i.e. economic collapse was not guaranteed) and this incensed the nation that hoped Versailles would solve all the problems caused by the Germans during the Great War. France felt bitter and cheated by not only Versailles but also by the man that had promised everything and delivered very little. It could be argued that France and Germany both thought the same about Versailles, but for reasons that were totally polarised. The Americans, as previously mentioned, were generally apathetic. The Great War had not affected them to such an extent that it would make them care about what happened in Europe. After all, the Americans had only joined the war in late 1917 and missed out on prolonged spells in the trenches of the Western Front. Perhaps if the USA had joined the war earlier on, Wilson’s ideals of peace and appeasement would have been quashed. It would also have led the American people to care what happened in Europe. The only thing the Americans thought about Versailles was how the USA had got itself into it. Wilson, however, thought the Treaty rather harsh. Britain was the only country that got anything of worth out of Versailles, namely protection from the German Navy and a few colonies in East Africa. In response to the question ‘Was the Treaty of Versailles Just?’, the answer depends wholly upon who is asked, as each country held different opinions.