Artists were less renowned for work of high quality. Painting was more directly exposed to connections with political propaganda – which meant that the majority of pictures were stilted and identified with the official line on collectivisation. The most common themes were therefore contented peasants on collective farms, industrious workers etc.
Archictecture was even more directly controlled by the State, since plans and designs could rarely be implemented without State funding. Priorities were given to prestige projects, which formed an integral part of the regime`s obsession with ‘gigantomania’.
Also under state control and geared to propaganda purposes was the film industry. But film was used more subtly in Russia than in Germany, producing abiding masterpieces such as ‘Red October’ and ‘Ivan the Terrible’. The film director Eisentein ranks as one of the greatest of the century – though Stalin often interfered with Eisentein`s work. His influence was, however less inhibiting than that of Hitler and Mussolini in Germany and Italy – neither of which produced a single feature film of any quality. The State`s control of the arts was in one sense successful as it made them totally subservient to the needs of the regime. On the other hand such limitation of creative talent was frustrating and, in the post-war period, produced large numbers of dissident writers as it`s legacy.
Qst. (2) To what extent was the transformation of Soviet agriculture and industry in the period 1929-41 achieved at too great a cost to the people of the Soviet Union ? (22mks).
Ans. The impact of Stalin`s policies in relation to agriculture need to be examined in terms of the speed with which collectivisation was carried through; the effect on productivity; the reaction of the peasantry to their new orders; and the extent of suffering caused by rural disruption.
The standard argument is that agriculture was sacrificed to the development of industry. The emphasis was on collectivisation to destroy individual consumerism.
To Stalin and his supporters the only future for agriculture lay in collective farms which would replace small-scale peasant farms with larger units, in which land was held communally and in which peasant work was organised on a larger scale.
After the 1928-9 (winter) drive to encourage voluntary entry into collective farms had little effect – the State decide to adopt a more ‘hard-line’ approach and by the summer of 1929 the free market in grain had been abolished and peasants who failed to deliver the set amounts of grain were punished.
By 1931 52.7% of holdings had been forcibly collectivised and by 1941 98% were collectivised.
Production figures showed collectivisation to be a disaster eg. the grain harvest declined from 73.3 million tons in 1928 to 71.7 million in 1929. An increase to 83.5 million tons in 1930 was followed by a sharp downturn to 69.5 million tons in 1931 and 69.6 in 1932.
The human effects were catastrophic. In 1932-33 large areas (eg Ukraine) experienced a major famine. The suffering also showed itself in the unprecedented upheavals caused to Russian society. Peasants were turned against each other, layer by layer.
The kulak minority was targeted by less affluent peasants everywhere. Smaller-scale producers fell victim to the hysteria and panic that affected the localities. There was also a knock-on effect on the urban areas as factories, workshops and munitions works were overwhelmed by the influx of millions of desperate peasants seeking employment and survival.
On the positive side, historians usually credit Stalin`s agricultural policy with facilitating the subsidisation of industrial growth, thereby avoiding dependence on loans from the West.
Furthermore, collectivisation strengthened the State politically and enabled the State to firmly control the countryside.
However, the role of agricultural changes actually served to impede the rate at which industrial growth could occur.
The transfer of population (often argued as providing labour for industrial growth) was too rapid for industry to employ effectively; this created huge administrative problems as well as appalling social conditions.
In terms of Stalin`s industrial policies his aim of rapidly accelerating industrialisation was based on two main considerations :
-
In the first place he aimed to create a command economy that was specifically to the survival of the Soviet regime against the hostility of the Western powers. He made this clear in a speech in 1931 where he said ‘We are fifty to a hundred years behind in advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we shall be crushed. That is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us’.
Hence it makes sense to many historians to see Stalin moving the Soviet economy on to a war footing (which also explains the emphasis on heavy industry – iron, steel and machinery that could easily be converted to armaments production – at the expense of light or consumer industry).
The Five Year Plans were therefore gearing the Soviet Union to total war.
-
The other element of Stalin`s industrial decision-making process was ideological. Industrialisation was the only fully reliable means of developing a socialist economy. Stalin now accepted that Socialism in One Country had to focus on enlarging the urban proletariat and that the socialist way of doing this was through state-controlled industrial enterprises. This meant curbing the consumer sector. Capitalism had to be eradicated from the Soviet Union and since it was most entrenched in the peasantry, Stalin was able to justify using the peasants to subsidise industrial development and to reduce the emphasis on consumerism.
How efficiently then was industrialisation implemented? Several major achievements have been attributed to Stalin. The first three Five-Year Plans (1928-32, 1933-37, 1938-42) did much to develop the basic industries (though the industrial foundations had been laid during the reign of Peter the Great and were later consolidated before the 1905 Revolution – with the development of textiles in Moscow area, heavy industrial plant around Petrograd etc).
The scale of increased industrial production is impressive (eg the first Five-Year Plan (1928-32) increased steel production from 3 million to 6 million tons, coal from 35 million tons to 64 million tons and oil from 12 million to 21 million tons; the second Five-Year Plan (1933-7) raised the figures to 18 million tons for steel, 128 million tons for coal and 26 million tons for oil.
This in turn, had a positive impact on employment – far higher levels were achieved than had been anticipated at the outset of the first Five-Year Plan. Instead of the 3.9 million expected in state industry by 1932-3, the number reached 6.4 million. The pace then slowed down to 7.9 million by 1937 and 8.3 million by 1940. Urban populations also increased dramatically by something like 200,000 per month, or by a total of 30 million between 1926-30.
The result of Stalin`s policies was the transformation of the USSR into a major industrial power. Stalin effectively sealed off Russia from the West and enabled her to survive amid its hostility. Ultimately, Stalin`s industrialisation assisted the Soviet Union`s survival in the Second World War.
On closer examination however the effectiveness of Stalin`s Five-Year Plans can be challenged.
Although the Stalinist dictatorship was ruthless, ruthlessness did not necessarily produce efficiency – even in the area of its greatest supposed achievement, heavy industry. There was, for example, little overall consistency in the pace of the Five-Year Plans.
This was due largely to the disruption caused by local influences. Local managers had to protect themselves by exaggerating their needs for investment and by hoarding materials to ensure that they had sufficient supplies. This meant shortages elsewhere and a consequent lack of overall balance (ie the unrealistic targets set by the Centre forced the localities into defensive measures that could be obstructive to balanced growth).
There is no doubt that Stalin sacrificed light, consumer industries in order to press ahead with a select few heavy industries – coal, steel , oil, farm machinery and armaments. This produced a major social upheaval.
The pressure on accomodation was enormous, resulting in extreme overcrowding and extensive squalor as huge dormitories were established for workers. Hence, there was an inherent contradiction in the whole process.
Collectivisation and industrialisation, intended to modernise Russia, actually tore apart its social fabric. The result was the collapse of many accepted codes of behaviour and morality. This made it easier to exploit the population but more difficult to stabilise working patterns. It also meant that there was an undercurrent of fear that contributed enormously to the purges and to political instability.
In conclusion then, we can say that Stalin`s agricultural and industrial policies 1929-41 – whilst achieving certain successes (eg strengthening the State politically, increased industrial production, positive impact on employment etc) did so, only at a huge human cost (eg. deaths of millions of peasants as a result of famine or slaughter by agents of the State, misery, and fear via Stalin`s State-sponsored Terror machine – coupled with poor and dangerous working conditions and poor living standards ie. food prices were very high during the early years of collectivisation (eg in 1933 there was an 80% increase in the price of food and bread and a 55% increase in the price of butter).
It is therefor not unreasonable to suggest that ‘Stalin`s Revolution’ was achieved at too high a human cost in terms of the millions of Russian lives literally destroyed as a direct result of economic policies implemented by the Soviet State in the period 1929-41.
D.McCready 19.04.03
