The first of July was a gloriously hot summer’s day. The 60,000 strong allied offensive waited eagerly in the front line trenches ready to go over the top and face their German opponents. As it was all that awaited a vast proportion of them was a muddy grave. The first day of the Somme was one of slaughter and undoubted failure. It is a tale of slight gains made at the expense of terrible losses which resulted in 57,000 casualties. The opening day of the Somme campaign was such an unmitigated disaster due to firstly the over estimation of the power of the artillery barrage. The shell fire was far too sparse along the German front line; the concentration was only 30 tons per square mile. This meant that the shells had not managed to penetrate the deep bunkers, where the German machine gunners had been sheltering. Secondly Rawlinson didn’t have enough faith in the ability of his troops, therefore he instructed them to walk across no-mans land at a steady pace. However the German machine gunners had survived, this meant that the victor in this battle would be the first to reach the German parapet. As the British were instructed to walk across no-mans land they lost the race to the parapet and were subsequently easy targets for the German machine gunners. Thirdly the mines that blew ten minutes before the attack began alerted the Germans to the fact an attack was about to take place, this gave them more time in which to reach the parapet. Finally poor communications on the Somme resulted in plans being delivered after events had occurred which made them useless. This resulted in attacks being repeated long after it was clear there was no point in attempting them.
However as the battle progressed, the BEF appeared to learn from the mistakes made on the 1st July. This suggests that an apparent learning process was taking place. This was shown most effectively during the July 14th Dawn assault, or the Battle of Bazentin ridge. This was surely a triumph and a great tactical success. The declared intention of capturing the German former 2nd line was fulfilled with ease. The use of concentrated artillery directed by aerial support and a creeping barrage caught the Germans off guard, un-prepared and bewildered. Another example of this learning process is the battle of Flers courcelette in September which was another startling success for the BEF. The reason I refer to the British learning experience throughout the battle of the Somme as a learning process rather than a learning curve is because it was by no means smooth. Rawlinson’s subordinates seemed set on launching isolated, piecemeal attacks to obtain local objectives, because of this the allies were not able to capitalize on their success and instead, as on the 23rd July, returned to making mistakes that were reminiscent of the 1stJuly.
The battle of the Somme is sometimes viewed as an attritional success. This involved the gradual wearing down of the German army. The fact that the Allies had a larger supply of troops, supplies and armaments at their disposal than the central powers meant that if the attritional stalemate on the Western Front were to continue then the Allies would eventually come out victorious.
In conclusion I believe that the battle of the Somme was more of a success than a failure as it taught the BEF how to fight and at the same time degraded the German army. At the end of 1916 the two armies were much more evenly matched than they had been 6 months earlier. Also while British morale remained high, German morale suffered. Captain Von Hentig famously described the Somme as “the muddy grave of the German army.” Although generals have justifiably faced criticism for their failure to learn lessons faster and apply the lessons learnt more consistently, I believe that the victory of 1918 was only possible because of the attritional battles of 1915-1917.
Charles Holroyd Words-935
Bibliography
- Forgotten Victory-Gary Sheffield
- The Somme- Peter Hart
- The Battle of the Somme- Paul Chapman
- www.johndclare.net
