By the turn of the century all of the powers in Europe bar Austria-Hungary were looking outside of the continent for glory and gains. The imperialist intentions were the result of rapid economic growth and partly an attempt to further increase it, by searching for new markets and new resources. In many ways it was, “a passing of initiative in Europe from British hands to others eager and now able to take it,”1. Challenge from France and Russia on Africa and India was beginning to come in the form of direct threats. Russian was beginning to challenge the North western frontier of India from Asia and France expansion in Indo-China was also beginning to represent a problem. Russia who had advanced rapidly in economic terms represented a bigger threat due to a quickly expanding railway system right across Asia. Britain’s “prize jewel” was indeed India, the most profitable country in her empire and these challenges to it made her if not worried then take notice.
However while these powers remained detached there was no real threat to Britain due to the obvious supremacy of her military and particularly naval power. Yet the when the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1879 was followed by an alliance between Russia and France in 1984 Britain began to feel weakened by the isolation which the Times had described as “..Deliberately chosen…” in 1896. The intention of it had not been to leave them in the situation they now found themselves, as more or less the enemies of everyone. However Britain did assume at this point that the alliances within Europe cancelled each other out, not even questioning the possibility of intervention.
Britain was more alarmed by an apparent threat by Germany to side with France in international issues during crunch times, and this was a concern that came into fruition
1. R.K Webb – Modern England
when Great Britain attempted to smuggle the upper Nile into the Congo Free state. Although Britain was able to enter political battles alone, an ally started to seem as though it might make life easier for them, at least in terms of making a good show. The real issue for the British however was that Germany had been considered by Britain as their natural ally. To a certain extent it was still the case that “most British Statesmen believed that Germany could be won over at some price or another.”2 despite German uttering. However the threat that Germany posed was becoming ever more apparent as she first challenged and then overtook Great Britain as the leading exporter of goods. Aside from an economic challenge Germany started to pose a military challenge and eventually an obvious political one as the risk of siding with Britain would come at the expense of upsetting both France and Russia which was a becoming a costly risk.
It was not however until the Boer war broke out in 1899 that Britain had any cause to doubt her military strength. Britain’s military strength was absorbed by a war which lasted far longer than the British had envisaged and provoked the animosity of virtually every country in the world. Aside from this, “post mortems on the Boer war showed clearly how deficient intelligence and planning were,”3 and highlighted that while Britain’s force far exceeded that which would be required for internal and smaller battles, if larger battles with Great Powers were to be necessary Britain was going to struggle. Many Britain's came to the same conclusion that, “The Boer war had only seemed to show the dangers of British isolation.”4
While the Boer war highlighted a weakness in Britain’s military power, the military strength of other powers was beginning to grow. Germany began to threaten Britain’s naval supremacy following Admiral von Tirpitz’s navy bill of 1898 which lead to threats in sea lanes approaching Britain’s ports. Russia too showed growing naval strength after 1898 and the challenge that she represented to India through Asia meant that the British Navy was required both at home and abroad. Whitehall became increasingly nervous as she realised that, “Britain had become an over-extended empire, magnificent but unnatural.”5 This growing concern led to an almost defeatist military attitude, the aim was merely to defend as best she could. The major concern was still the Russian threat and there was a growing unease that a quarrel with Russia in any part of the world, detracting forces from India, could result in its invasion. With this concern, concern over the Suez Canal, and concern over German naval threats at home, came concern to protect British interests in China. The newly imperialist minded powers were busy dividing up parts of the world which were not under the power of the British and the most profitable acquisition of these was thought to be China. Britain worried that she did not have the strength to fight battles for all of her interests at the same time and that her, “Isolation now afforded her no viable policy and left her exposed and vulnerable with no powerful friends and with powerful, jealous and rather spiteful enemies.”6
It would be inaccurate however to assume that Britain entered into an alliance because she was scared of the growing power and threat that other powers were posing on her economic interests and complete supremacy. In many ways Britain was as arrogant as ever, her attempts to make peace on the continent were, until 1904 rather half hearted and ambivalent. The pact that she made with Japan in 1902 was in many ways a rather
2- AJP Taylor – British Empire to 1902
3-R.K Webb - Modern England
4- AJP Taylor – British Empire to 1902
5- Ronald Hyam – Britain's Imperialist Century 1815-1914
6- Alan P Dobson – Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century
convenient way to help her defend her interests in the Far East, with particular attention to a possible Russian threat. It allowed her to concentrate her interests at home rather than half way round the Globe and was accompanied by an act to strengthen her own naval power to once again gain complete dominance over the Germans in naval terms. The pact was also useful as a show of goodwill towards international relations during discussions. If Britain had really felt worried then they may well have opted for a stronger ally.
The situation did however continue to change, provoking a move to settle colonizing differences first with France in 1904 and then with Russia in 1907. By this time Germany’s threat was by far and away the biggest and most contentious amongst the British as they resented the way Germany, previously perceived as an ally, had moved against them.
Although therefore British methodology had changed slightly by the time of their first alliance it was largely just for show and convenience. The pact gave them an easy way of defending their own interests on home shores that were beginning to come under threat from Germany and, defending their Indian and Chinese interests in the Far East. The changing Global situation, and particularly the emergence of the Russia-France pact, which made Russia all the more stronger, was probably the main trigger of any change in policy. However the naval and economic threat of Germany and the weaknesses highlighted by the Boer war were also factors helping to provoke an actual change rather than talk of one. Despite therefore, “moments of naval rivalry, the central battle was between economies, Treasuries, central banks and stock markets rather than between armies and navies.”7. However the extent of any change is not altogether straightforward, the original pact was largely for convenience and those that followed again largely for show and reassurance; Britain had merely decided it was easier to have friends than enemies. Britain’s policy and underlying objective remained the same to a large extent. In short, “there may have been uneasy moments, but it remained splendid all the same.”8
7- P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins; British Imperialism Crisis and Reconstruction 1914-1940
8- AJP Taylor – British Empire to 1902
