Why did it prove impossible to solve the problems created by Balkan nationalism before 1914

The first Balkan war of 1912 was a conflict between the Balkan league of states and their crumbling former Turkish occupiers. The Balkan countries involved, driven by a fierce nationalism, succeeded in defeating the Turks, and thus the problem of insecurity about influence in the Balkans between Austria Hungary was exacerbated. The goals of Austria Hungary were to ensure that the loss of Turkish control in the Balkans didn’t result in any strong Balkan nations that could generate nationalist agitation in its own territories. This fear resulted din the creation of the state of Albania, which prevented Serbian access to the sea. The goal of Russia was much at odds with this, as gaining support in the Balkans would coincide nicely with their ideals of Pan Slav nationalism and their desires for a port on the Adriatic. Closely tied with Serbia, the Russians were unhappy with the creation of Albania by the Austria Hungary. The Treaty of London of may 1913, an attempt to soothe the issue created by Great Britain and moderated by Germany, approved the creation of Albania. The Russians economically dampened and with opposition from Germany and Great Britain regarding the issue, did not give Serbia support and war over the Balkans was prevented. However, the root problem itself of rivalry between Austria Hungary and Russia was not solved as Russia (faced with a loss of face and the prospect of a loss of relations with its main Balkan ally) became more determined to realize its goals in the Balkans by supporting the Serbians in the future.

        The second Balkan war in 1913 further demonstrated that the problems of insecurity, rivaling interests and suspicion created by Balkan nationalism between Austria Hungary and Russia were becoming increasingly impossible to solve. The defeat by the Balkan league (with some Turkish support) of Bulgaria resulted in large gains of territory to Serbia (something that was very much in tune with the nationalist, expansionist desires of the Balkan country). This made Austria Hungary nervous, and made Russia even more prepared to support its Balkan ally. The tensions were heightened, even further, and thus the problem between the two powers by the end of 1913 looked even more looming impossible.

        In conclusion, the problems created by Balkan nationalism proved impossible to solve because of the lack of conclusive and tension-relieving communication between the powers ( the attempts to solve the problems were not compromises and left Russia with face loss), and because of the intrinsically opposite nature of the Russian and Austria-Hungarian desires in the Balkans. The threat posed by Slavic nationalism in Austria Hungary, and the desire for influence and pan Slavic nationalism by Russia were goals too vital to the two countries to be compromised over. The tension and suspicion built up over the three key events mentioned served to make the situation worse, until the countries were on a collision course destined for bloodshed.