Weimer Republic. At once Hitler became a National figure again, and although he did not gain
much support from his campaign, the controversial ideas that he was putting forth put him in the
public eye. Hitler was also able to use the finances and organisations of Alfred Hugenberg’s
Nationalists to gain recognition; for example, Hugenberg had a monopoly on billboards and also
shares in film making companies. This meant that Hitler could use billboards and the cinema to
help P01 broadcast his speeches and the Nazi ideas. The Young Plan campaigns also meant that
the German’s were aware that Hitler strongly opposed the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of
Versailles. As one historian states:
“His first great opportunity came with the campaign against the Young Plan…enabled him to gain
publicity in the Nationalist press and to make contact with men of wealth and social position” A J Nicholls.
Therefore, his exposure and his increase in propaganda machine resources all meant that
when the economic crisis hit Germany, people were very aware of who Hitler was and that he
had opposed the Weimar Government’s plans. This made the German’s give support for Hitler
because they associated him with what was right and also they knew exactly what the Nazi party
represented because of their constant propaganda. In this way, the campaign of pre-economic
depression had helped the Nazis to gain support after it. Therefore, Hitler becoming Chancellor
was as a result of growing support due to the organisations the Nazis had set up pre-1929 as
when crisis hit Germany, all their work before the crisis was able to be capitalized upon and their
support rocketed. If the Nazis hadn’t spent so long developing their organisations and plans they
would never have been able to use the 1929 depression to their advantage with such a noticeable
degree of success because they would have been too busy organising their party to actually
campaign on the depression with such effectiveness.
The combination of the four ideas that helped to increase Hitler’s popular support after
1929 through the setting up of organisations prior to 1929, suggest that Hitler became Chancellor
in 1933 because of his party changes before 1929. No one is appointed Chancellor without large
public support. Hitler was able to capitalize on the economic depression because of his
intelligent party planning in setting up campaigns that would benefit his party in terms of support
in the long run. Therefore, it can be argued that Hitler was able to become Chancellor because of
the support he developed after 1929 (1932 election- 37% of the vote) and due to the fact the
support was largely because of his planning before 1929, one could say that it was the plans
before 1929 that led to his power. However, there are other areas consider when asking precisely
why Hitler came to power in 1933.
In 1929 an economic crisis hit Germany. The Wall Street crash had occurred in America
and this had effected the world’s economy. In Germany, the effects were devastating, especially
after America recalled her loans and hence left Germany with no stability, as she had heavily
relied on American strength to support her. Industrial production was down 42%, thousands of
businesses collapsed, and 5.6 million people became unemployed. Although 5.6 million people
were unemployed, the true figure of people who were directly affected is much higher. This is
because for every unemployed man, there would probably be a whole family left without income.
The depression also occurred at a time when people felt that the boom of 1924 would continue.
Citizens were promised that Germany would get better and grow to become even more stable
and powerful, when suddenly the opposite happened and Germany was thrown into a
depression. The people experienced dashed rising expectations and became angry, which made
the population politically volatile. When people are unhappy with their situation they become
eager to look for alternatives in order to better their situation, and the political alternatives were
the extreme parties such as the Nazi party, as W L Shirer stated:
“The depression… gave Adolf Hitler his opportunity, and he made the most of it. Like most great revolutionaries he could only thrive in evil times.”
Revolutions are most likely to occur when the population are volatile and desperate for change.
In this time, people started to support the Nazis and in the 1930s general election the Nazis
received 18.3% of the vote and became the second largest party in the Reichstag after the SPD.
This was a huge increase in support since the previous election, and signalled the changing
opinion of the general public for the Nazi party. The message of the propaganda machine had
finally reached the Germans. Therefore, it can be concluded that Hitler became Chancellor in
1933 because of the effects of the economic depression. Before the economic depression, the
Nazi party had been organised in exactly the same way as it had been after the economic
depression; however, there was a surge upwards in support for the Nazis after 1929. The only
aspect that had changed was the economic situation, and so it can be suggested that the most
important factor of Hitler’s rise to power was the econmic situation, because without a weakness
for the Nazis to prey on, the Nazis may never have increased their support. However, in
opposition to this, if the economic depression had occurred and the Nazis had not set up their
propaganda machine previously, they would not have been able to capitalize on this moment of
Weimar weakness to gain power. Therefore, the party changes prior to 1929 were the most
important issues in Hitler’s rise to power as it made people aware of the Nazis so that they could
increase support in any future crisis.
The unemployment levels during the economic depression rose to 5.6 million and a lot
more people were affected directly because of this. The Nazis were able to play on this issue
massively because unemployed people are desperate people, who can be radicalised in their
volatile state. The unemployment highlighted the Weimar incompetence and the Nazi’s
propaganda machine finally persuaded people that the Nazis had been right all along- the Nazis
had previously campaigned against the Young Plan and people had laughed, but now the Nazis
could say the Young Plan had contributed to the economic crisis and people would give their
support to the Nazis. The Nazis offered employment to all with their policy of public works and
promised to create jobs for the unemployed. People saw the Nazis as a symbol of strength and
before without the economic depression, the people had no need to look at the Nazis policies
seriously, as they felt secure, but now they seriously considered them. Therefore, during the
economic crisis the Nazis gained a lot of support from desperate German’s, in 1932 they became
the largest party in the Reichstag and this was arguably all because of the economic depression.
The Nazis operated a non-changeable policy scheme, where their twenty five policies could not
be changed and hadn’t been changed since Hitler became leader of the party. Therefore, this
suggests that it wasn’t the Nazi parties policies that had made them so attractive to German
voters because otherwise they would have risen to power sooner as the policies had always been
the same. It instead suggests that the economic crisis made the Nazis popular because people
were more willing to vote extremist in times of depression and the Nazis policies only then
became appealing. Without the economic depression, Hitler would never have gained mass
support and hence would not have become Chancellor. However, the issue of propaganda is
more of a factor in Hitler’s rise to power, because without the pre-1929 Nazi party developments
people would never have been aware of the Nazi party and if the party had not campaigned
against the Young Plan, then he could not have claimed that he was right all along with so much
effectiveness. Although the economic depression allowed the propaganda machine to bring
visable results forth at last, the Nazis could have made gains in support following any Weimar
mistake. The economic depression also would not necessarily have led to such massive support if
the Nazis had not been indoctrinating people with their message for the previous ten years.
The economic depression worldwide brought about the collapse of international trade.
Foreign investors in Germany withdrew their funds and many Germans sent their money abroad
in order to save it from being lost by the collapse of the German banks. The banks did collapse
and businesses were destroyed. Capital was lost and the middle classes or mittelstand, self-made
men, who owned small businesses did not have enough capital to tide them over a depression so
their businesses collapsed first. The mittelstand was the most affected section of German people
by the economic depression, and they were also the section of people who gave the highest
percentage of support to the Nazis- this is a correlation between the effects of depression and
Nazi support. This shows that the economic depression radicalised the mittlestand on the largest
scale as they were the most desperate segment of society, and this supports the idea that the
economic situation was the enabling factor in Hitler gaining the support required for him to rise
to power in 1933. Without the economic depression, the Germans would never have been
attracted to Hitler’s inert policies. Although propaganda and policies were important, it can be
argued that Hitler needed some issue to capitalize on and the economic depression provided this
sound opportunity to highlight the Weimar inadequacy and gain popular support. However,
without the propaganda and Nazi organisations developed before 1929, the public would not
have been aware of the Nazis to the same degree so they may have voted communist instead, or
the upper and middle class may not have turned to the Nazis after Bruning’s budget if the SA
hadn’t created such an anti-communist image. Therefore, the conclusion is that the propaganda
machine and pre-1929 party changes eventually created the increase in support for the Nazis in
the period of 1929-32 which gave Hitler the necessary political leverage with which he was able
to be involved in power-broking.
Another idea in why Hitler became Chancellor in 1933 is that of the government
inadequacy. The Weimar Government was relatively new and had not built up party identification
with voters, so it was easy for them to lose support as the voters were more likely to be volatile.
The economic depression brought about this opportunity for the Weimar Republic to lose
support, and they did, and a government with no support is unable to rule effectively. Failure to
compromise within the Muller Government in 1930 brought about the collapse of the Grand
Coalition as KD Bracher states
“To be sure, the transition from parliamentary democracy to one-party state began with the overthrow of the Grand Coalition in the spring of 1930-that is, with the failure of the wings of the coalition to master the problems of political compromise.”
The issue they fought over was unemployment benefit. The socialists on one wing were fighting
for increased or stable benefits for the working class, but the Nationalists on the opposing right
were fighting for reduced benefits so the middle and upper class could pay reduced taxes. The
two branches of coaltion could not meet and agreement and the result was devastating as Sir J
Wheeler-Bennet suggests:
“The result was parliamentary bankruptcy, the increasinf discredit of democratic institutions, and the relapse of power to the bureaucracy.”
The result of this inability to compromise was that no Chancellor of Germany afterwards until
Hitler could gain a majority in the Reichstag, and Germany had to be ruled by decree, effectively
an elected dictatorship. The collapse of the democratic coalition explains how easy it was for
Hitler to gain support, government inadequacy and continual elections led to decreased support
for the Weimar Republic and people wanted strong central government like the ‘Glorious days of
the Kaiser’. Therefore, the people of Germany were more attracted to parties such as the Nazi
party who promised just this. The inability of the coalition to compromise meant that the Nazis
were given an easy path to power, because the coaltion was split, and an individual party could
become stong as no two parties were willing to join together to reduce the power of individuals.
The Government inadequacy is therefore seen as an important issue as to why Hitler became
Chancellor in 1933 as if the Government had been strong and compromised, there would not
have been a break down in internal politics and no new party could have risen the ranks of power
so easily. However, economic depression was a more important issue in Hitler’s rise to power as
without the depression, the government would not have been highlighted as ineffective because
the same government had run prior to the depression and it had not collapsed, so the economic
depression was the enabling factor. However, it was Hitler’s popular support caused by the party
changes pre-1929 that was the most prominent enabler, because if the Nazis had not previously
made themselves well known, no one would have voted for them as no one would know who
they are or what they represented without having to research, and in desperate times people go
for the most obvious alternative.
The Government’s other inadequacy was the inability to find a solution to the
depression of 1929-32. Germany was not improved between the period of 1929-32, but instead
took a downward path. The Muller Government was unable to propose anything promising for
the economy by March 1930 and although Bruning did act in a way that was beneficial to the
economy, he was not able to gain support in the Reichstag and was thrown out of Government
in May 1932, before he was able to benefit from the improved economy himself in terms of
public support. The budget he proposed was very damaging to electoral support because the
socialists felt betrayed and turned to vote extremes, and then the middle classes also voted
extremes to counteract the increased communist support. Therefore, even though the budget did
in the long term help the economy, it was very damaging as it increased Hitler’s support from
negligible prior to 1929 to 107 seats by 1930. The failure of the Government to remain strong
and appoint a leader who did not have to rule by decree because of lack of support was vital in
Hitler’s becoming Chancellor. If a coalition of parties had led the Reichstag and effectively dealt
with the economic situation together, the depression would have soon been over and the
government would have been strong because of it. Instead, however, they failed to remain
together and failed to deal with the crisis so the public turned to extremist support and this
greatly helped Hitler. The failure of the Schleicher and Von Papen governments led to more
support for the Nazi party, their support peaking in the 1932 election with 230 seats in the
Reichstag. Every Chancellor had to rule by decree. Without lack of Government stength, there
would have been no need for a strong alternative leader. However, opposing this theory on why
Hitler became Chancellor is the fact that no other western power responded to the economic
crisis any differently than the Weimar Republic, and no other Western power collapsed and saw
the rise of a facist dictator, so this suggests that it was not inadequacy within the government that
led to the empowerment of Hitler in 1933, otherwise, dictators would have sprang up all around
Europe. Instead however, the only dictator to arise in Europe was Hitler. This suggests that the
Government inadequacy was not the important issue and neither was the economic depression
because all other European countries dealt with the same issues, but instead the Nazi party
changes prior to 1929, and the way the Nazis used the depression to their advantage was the
main issue on how Hitler became Chancellor. If Hitler had not spread his word and alternatives
around Germany, then the Nazis support would have been limited in growth, as people would
have not had much knowledge of the party.
A huge mistake by the Weimar Republic was their failure to realise the true extent of the
threat of Nazism. The socialists and communists in Germany refused to form a government after
the 1932 election because they believed that the Nazi support was decreasing, as the Nazis had
lost 4% of their vote in just four months. They did not think that the Nazis could ever come to
power as they were losing their majority. Had the KPD and the SPD indeed made a coalition
government and had Hindenburg laid aside his desire for Nationalistic Government in the name
of having an elected stable government, the Nazis may never have gotten into power. In Britain,
a coalition Government of the Labour party and the Conservative Party, two opposite parties,
was formed in order to have a united front against extreme parties during the depression. If
Germany had arranged a similar coalition in a united attempt, than perhaps Hitler would not
have become Chancellor, but instead the parties thought that Hitler would not get into power
and if he did then he could be controlled. When Hitler did become Chancellor it was on the
belief of Hindenberg and Von Papen that he could be controlled. A cabinet of nine nationalists,
three Nazis and Von Papen was formed and hence Hitler could not pass any laws without first
gaining the support of Papen. However, once in power, Hitler proved everyone wrong, and the
failure of the Weimar Republic to predict that appointing such a radical extremist willing to use
violence to gain support was a bad idea. In this case, the Government inadequacy was a very
important issue in Hitler becoming Chancellor in 1933. The economic depression, propaganda
and other Government inadequacies had laid the Nazis in a very good position for coming into
power, and at the crucial point in recognising that Hitler was dangerous, the Weimar Republic
failed and let down Germany. Had the Government formed a compromising coalition like
Britain, Hitler would never have been able to take advantage of the weak opposition, despite his
popular support, because evidence shows his popular support was decreasing and soon the Nazis
may not have been the largest party in the Reichstag. In this way one can conclude that the
failure to recognise Hitler as an uncontrollable force was the largest factor in Hitler’s rise to
power in 1933.
Nazi Alternatives were a reason why Hitler gained popular support. Hitler believed in
survival of the fittest and had the SA parading around the streets in marches acting as a symbol
of safety and protection in times when Germany was in severe decline. This militant approach
was going against the current ideas that all armies should be demobilised in order to restore peace
and in a civilized society. It also reminded people of the glorious days of the Kaiser, and they
associated military strength with National strength. This increased the desire to return a strong
central government to Germany, especially during the depression, and so Hitler’s support grew.
Hitler also offered people to blame for the loss of the First World War, for example he labelled
the government who had signed the Versailles Treaty ‘the November Criminals’. He also blamed
the Jews as an entire race, and people like having someone to blame because they like revenge,
and the Jews were an easy target. The upper and middle class both already held grudges against
the Jews because leaders of the communist uprisings in 1918-1919 (Rosa Luxemburg and Kiel
Liebknecht) were both Jews. They associated troublemakers with the race already so hated so
Hitler found it easier to persuade people they helped to lose the war. These alternative ideas
increased support and increased support is omnipotent when it comes to gaining power in
government. Therefore, these ideas were a factor in Hitler becoming Chancellor, although they
were not so much important as the organisations set up to promote them. Without an efficient
propaganda machine the Nazi alternatives would never have been able to be promoted in such a
way that Hitler could make gains in terms of support using them. For example, harnessing the SA
as a militant organisation against the communists, or campaigning against the Young Plan with
their belief on the November Criminals. In this way one can conclude that the pre-1929
organisations were the most important factor in Hitler becoming Chancellor.
Another new alternative idea the Nazis brought about was the youthful vibrant image
Hitler had. Hitler had charisma and was a genuinely good orator, and did publicity stunts such as
flying around Germany in planes during Presidential elections. Compared to the 78 year old frail,
slightly senile Hindenburg, Hitler was a dynamic alternative. Hindenburg could not move people
anymore because he represented ‘old’ and ‘boring’ whereas Hitler represented ‘new’ and
‘exciting’. When things started to go wrong for the Weimar Republic the Nazis were prominent
and offered easy solutions. People weren’t bothered about who they voted for because any
alternative was better than what their current government could offer. The Nazis offered to get
out of the economic depression and restore the glorious days of the Kaiser at a time when 5.6
million people and their families were all looking for a way out. Hitler’s alternative public image
was not a major factor in him becoming Chancellor in 1933, although it may have secured a few
floating voters who would have been undecided otherwise, if Hitler had had nothing new to
offer.
In June 1932, Hitler reached the height of his popular support, support which he had
gained from all areas previously discussed on this essay. However, by November 1932, Hitler had
lost 4% of the vote and his support was visibly declining. So far the presumption has been that
popular support leads to a government coming to power, however, if popular support was the
most important factor in Hitler’s rise to power, he would have come to power in June 1932, and
not November 1932. One must therefore consider the conservative interpretation of history, that
the main reason for change at any point in time is the leadership, because the leadership makes
the final decision.
In June 1932, when Hitler gained 37% in the Reichstag, he demanded to form a
government in Germany that comprised mainly Nazis and Hitler for Chancellor. However,
Hindenburg, who despised Hitler’s politics and had been heard to call him the ‘Bohemian
Corperal’ was unwilling to meet Hitler’s demands and so a government was not formed. After
the 1932 November elections, and Hitler’s support started to decrease, however, he was
appointed Chancellor. This was arguably as a direct result from behind the scenes political
intrigue.
It was ultimately Hindenburg’s decision to appoint Hitler Chancellor, and the reason for
Hindenburg;s change of opinion on Hitler becoming Chancellor was because of the influence
other people had on him. Von Schleicher was unable to form a government by January 1933 and
had to rule by decree, and an alternative needed to be found to make Germany stable. Von
Papen despised Von Schleicher because it was Schleicher who had manipulated Hindenburg
against him, and thus, Von Papen was willing to do anything, including rule under Hitler, in order
to get his revenge, as Lord Bullock states:
“There was no love lost between them, but both showed themselves willing to sink their differences if the could get the better of von Schleicher.”
Therefore, von Papen met secretly with Hitler to propose plans for forming a Nazi and
Nationalist coaltion government.
At the same time that Papen was conspiring with Hitler, Hindenburg’s main body of
advice, the ex-army leaders, were persuading Hindenburg that Hitler would be a good leader
because he was in favour of militant power. Hindenburg’s own son, having met and become in
favour of Herman Goerring, also tried to convince Hindenburg that Hitler would be a good
leader. The president was old and senile and therefore easily persuaded by his friends into
agreeing with von Papen into allowing Hitler to become Chancellor, on the conditions the Nazis
could be easily controlled. It was of general opinion that in a cabinet of only three Nazis, nine
Nationalists and von Papen, that Hitler could be controlled. Hitler’s manipulation of the
Reichstag later proved this wrong, and hence it was essentially the mistake of the intriguing
leaders of Germany for appointing Hitler Chancellor.
Hitler, having previously demanded that any government he form consist mainly of
Nazis in certain positions, surprisingly accepted von Papen’s proposals on forming a government
to which the Nazi party looked severely disadvantaged. This was a clever political move from
Hitler because if he had demanded more, he may have lost his chance at being chancellor, and as
the party’s funds were very low after all the election campaigns, and as the party’s support was
low, Hitler may never have had another chance at power. His willingness to form a coaltion
government as a last resort saved the Nazi party, and the unwillingless of the socialists and
communists to from one, destroyed democracy.
Therefore, from this information, one can conclude that it was not popular support that
led to Hitler being appointed Chancellor in 1933, but political intrigue. Although all the other
issues were important in gaining popular support so that Hitler would be considered for
Chancellor in the first place, without clever political manipulation and compromise from both
Hitler and von Papen, the Nazis would never have come into power because their popularity was
on the decline. The reason Hitler came into power in 1933 was because von Papen and
Hindenburg were ignorant in thinking Hitler could be controlled, and because of Hitler’s
willingness to compromise along with von Papen’s craving to get back into power to annoy
Schleicher. Another important reason in addition to this is the Muller Government’s inadequacy
of being unable to compromise and sort out the economic depression, because if they had there
would not have been several Chancellors with no support ruling by decree, all of whom
contributed to the need for a strong leader like Hitler. The inadequacy opened way for Hitler to
manipulate himself to power. Therefore, in conclusion, political intrigue is why Hitler was
appointed Chancellor in 1933, because if it had been on popular support, Hitler would have been
in power in 1932.