Some reform items of Meiji Modernization also helped spread militarism throughout the country. In 1871 feudalism and class distinctions were abolished. Japan became a centralized unitary單一 nation-state. Compulsory education was introduced in 1871. Feudal samurai were disbanded解散 in 1876. All the people paid loyalty to the emperor only. Conscription徵兵制 was implemented in 1873, which spread Bushido武士道 to males of all sections界別 of the population.
Militarism derived its constitutional foundation from the 1889 Meiji Constitution. The Army and Navy were personal forces of the Emperor, in no way responsible to the Diet國會. The Army and Navy Chiefs-of-Staff總參謀長 had direct access直接覲見 to the Emperor. The Diet had no say in military appointments and the military budget. Furthermore, a decree詔令 of 1900 stated that only in-service現役 army generals and navy admirals將軍 could be appointed Ministers of War and Navy陸、海軍大臣. Hence, the Cabinet could not be formed unless the Army and Navy provided nominees被提名人 for those ministerial posts部長職位. In other words, the Army and Navy could blackmail勒索 civilian politicians文人政客 to carry out their warlike好戰的 policies.
During the Meiji era, the Genro元老 of the Privy Council元老院 were the actual rulers. They were prestigious具威望 enough to command both the Army and Navy. Yet by the 1920s all the Meiji oligarchs寡頭 had died and both Emperors Taisho大正 (1912-26) and Hirohito裕仁 (1926-89) were weak. Nobody could control the Army and Navy, but they acted in the name of the emperor.
The success of Japan’s foreign policy in 1894-1919 justified支持 her overseas aggression and raised the prestige of military personnel. For example, Japan defeated China in 1895; she gained an indemnity of 200 million taels両銀 and Taiwan. Defeating Russia in 1905, Japan not only monopolized壟斷 Korea but became one of the greatest powers in the world. In 1919 Japan got Shandong山東 and the German island colonies in the Pacific. She even became a permanent member of the Security Council of the League of Nations國際聯盟安全理事會常任理事國. Thus, Japanese people were convinced of the militarist demands for overseas aggression. Military personnel were their rightful理所當然的 leaders. Besides, industrialization necessitated需要 Japan’s expansion for the sake of由於 raw materials, markets and places of investment.
Failure of party government during the 1920s also discredited令人不再信任 parliamentary democracy代議政治 in Japan. H. Wray says that the political parties of the Taisho era were “opportunistic, self-centred自我中心, and limited in their conception理解 of democracy and allegiance忠於 to its principles”. Party politicians were corrupt, and too closely with the Zaibatsu財閥, for example, Seiyukai政友會 with Mitsui三井 while Minseito民政黨 with Mitsubishi三菱. Scandals醜聞 happened usually. Frequent changes of the cabinet led to government inefficiency. Parties relied mainly on big landlords and big enterprises for financial support, but turned a deaf ear不理會 to the grievances悲苦 of peasants and poor city dwellers城市人. To suppress the labour movements工人運動, the party government introduced the Peace Preservation Law保安法. The only achievement of the party government was the introduction of universal manhood suffrage全男普選 in 1925.
Neither was the party government able to solve Japan’s serious economic difficulties in the 1920s. Many people suffered from the 1923 Great Earthquake大地震 and 1927 Bank Crisis; yet the party government did nothing to remedy挽救 the situation. Many small farms and petty bourgeoisie小資本家 went bankrupted破產. The Great Depression經濟大衰退 of 1929-33 was a fatal blow致命的打擊 to Japan’s already worsening economy. In 1931 Japan’s exports fell by 50%, and there were 3 million people unemployed. Moreover, peasants suffered from the failure of rice crops in 1932. However, party politicians were concerned關心 only about seeking personal or factional派系 interests. In particular, the desperate絕望的 rural situation annoyed激怒 the Army of which the conscript soldiers mostly came from the countryside.
Both the Army and Navy were antagonized被激怒 very much by the moderate溫和 foreign policy of the party government. Based upon Shidehara’s幣原喜重郎 “Good Neighbour睦鄰 Policy”, in 1922 Japan returned most of Shandong to China, and accepted a lower warship ratio compared to the US and Britain. Japan’s naval inferiority弱勢 was further confirmed確定 at the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930. The Japanese Navy considered this to be a national grace恥辱. In 1927-28 Japan’s party government stood neutral during Jiang Jieshi’s蔣介石North Expedition北伐,. The Japanese Army feared that the established gains既得利益 in China might disappear if China became united and grew strong. Besides, the US Exclusion Act排外法案of 1924 hurt Japanese national pride.
The existence of ultra-nationalist secret societies added fuel to the rise of militarism in Japan, too. For instance, the Black Dragon Society黑龍會 and the League of Blood血盟 fanned up煽動起 sentiments of Japanese racial superiority and thus encouraged overseas aggression. The most influential militarist intellectual was Kita Ikki北一輝. He advocated提倡 the cause主張 of “Showa Restoration昭和維新” to substitute取代 the inefficient party government with military dictatorship. Some army men set up Sakurakai櫻會 (Cherry Society) to agitate爭取 for militarism. They got many echoes響應.
The weakness of collective security集體安全制度 helped account for the rise of militarism in Japan. The League of Nations just paid lip services沒實際行動 to stop Mussolini’s aggression to Corfu科孚, Fiume阜姆港 and Somaliland索馬里蘭, which encouraged Japanese militarists to follow an expansionist foreign policy.
The Shenyang Incident of 1931九一八事變 showed the initial初步 disobedience不服從 of military men. The Guandong Army關東軍 invaded Manchuria without the consent同意 of the Tokyo central government. In the “May 15 Incident五一五事件” of 1932 Premier Inukai犬養毅 was shot to death by naval officers and army cadets軍校學生. Frequent political assassinations暗殺 and use of various terrors made party politicians submissive屈服. In 1940 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association大政翼贊會 started militarist rule formally in Japan.
