Asian Values in Singaporean Perspective.

GCSE Politics

Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen

Lecturer: Prof. Mark R. Thompson, PhD.

Working Paper: Stephan Ortmann

Wednesday, April 02, 2003

“Asian Values” in Singaporean Perspective

Erwin-Rommel-Str. 59 R 6006

91058 Erlangen

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Magister HF: Politikwissenschaft

1. NF Amerikanistik

2. NF Englische Linguistik

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Singapore is one of the so-called Tiger States, or economic miracles of Asia, a small city-state that has been able to modernize in little more than half a century. While other nations in the neighborhood struggled economically, Singapore adopted an economic plan of austerity, liberalism, and trade that made it especially interesting in the eyes of Western companies who saw in Singapore the window to a large Asian market. This economic miracle occurred, as nearly every analyst has noted, because of the management of the ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has governed the country since 1965 without interruption. In the course of the PAP’s leadership the democracy in Singapore was restricted in an effort to maintain its power. Thus today Singapore can no longer be considered a liberal democracy and many have labeled it an authoritarian dictatorship with one ruling party. The long time leader, Lee Kuan Yew, would not deny this description as he considers liberal democracy as is practiced mostly in the West as something that is contrary to Asian culture and he often argues that the West and particularly the US is trying to force Singapore to accept the West’s ideas. To support his thesis he points to the problems of Western society such as the high divorce rates and high numbers of crimes. He also outlines the shortcomings of other democracies in Asia, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Out of Lee’s assertion of a distinct Asian form of government arose a discussion over “Asian values” versus “Western values” and Singapore was for a time a leading advocate of this idea. Many both in the West and the East attributed the success of these Asian countries to these “Asian Values,” and later these “Asian values” were blamed for the economic crisis in the 1990s.

There are three questions that this paper will try to answer. First is what really constitutes “Asian values” in the eyes of Lee Kuan Yew, the advocates, and the critics. It should be noted that since the Asian economic crisis, Lee Kuan Yew has refrained from using “Asian values” because many critics especially in the West have faulted the crisis on these values. In his new book, From Third World to First – The Singapore Story 1965-2000, he points out that his view of “Asian values” is indeed more an idea of Confucian values. This comes in light of those critics who have pointed out that there cannot be a unified concept of Asian values although Confucianism has influenced most Asian countries to some degree (Sandschneider, 2001). Despite the obvious problem of “Asian values” as a generalized pattern for Asia, people in Lee Kuan Yew’s government saw the need to emphasize “Asian values” in the past. (Mauzy and Milne, 2002, p. 57). On the one hand “Asian values” were seen as a way to create first an Asian but second and more importantly a Singaporean identity that would be distinct from the West. As one of the most Westernized countries in Asia, Singapore is struggling to define itself and the need for a national identity can be seen in the problem of emigration of a larger number of highly trained experts. From Lee’s latest book one can assume that this attempt was not successful and thus today “Asian values” are no longer on the top of the agenda of Singapore’s government.

In a completely different perspective Lee Kuan Yew must have also seen the negative side of “Asian values”, or Chinese culture. He writes: “Western critics have attributed this collapse to what they term 'Asian values': cronyism, guanxi, corruption, backdoor or under-the-counter business practice” (Lee, 2000, p. 347) Here he turns it around and claims that the West saw the negative side of “Asian values” as the fault for the economic crisis but it seems clear to me that Lee’s policies in Singapore were designed to limit the problems of cronyism, guanxi and corruption. Guanxi is one basic principle of social relationships in China and could be seen contrary to Lee’s vision of a corruption free nation that is attractive to international investors. Lee often points out that Singapore is one of the most corruption free countries in the world. This, of course, has to be seen in light of the large majority of Chinese living and working in Singapore. Corruption is not a problem that is unique to China or Chinese culture but, at least in the eyes of Lee Kuan Yew, the patterns of social relationships in China were not conducive to a corruption free environment unless the government tightly controlled the system. This would, of course, exclude the possibility of a democracy as the kind of restrictions that Lee saw necessary could not be implemented in a liberal democratic system.

Last but not least, “Asian values” were designed to give Singapore’s government and the PAP with their undemocratic practices legitimacy. Despite the Western critics, Singaporeans supported the idea of “Asian values.” Some outside critics have also pointed out that in their opinion the PAP would still remain in power even if the system would become more liberalized. Furthermore, the idea of “Asian values” in Singapore as a unifying national ideology has despite the danger of alienating a large portion of the population long been replaced by the promotion of “Confucian values.” Nevertheless, the PAP has used their vision of an Asian democracy, based on Confucian ideas, to strengthen their own leadership and in view of Singapore’s continuing economic success a transfer of power in Singapore today seems as remote as ever.

2. The Definition of “Asian Values”

Many have stressed the problem for a clear definition of “Asian values” as the discussion easily becomes politicized and a serious argument becomes difficult to be made. Lee Kuan Yew never liked to use the term himself but many in Singapore have used it to distinguish Singapore from the West. The term itself seems to indicate that there are values that are distinct from other parts in the world but as many have pointed out there cannot be values that only Asians adhere to. It is obvious that in former times European societies used to adhere to similar values. One case in point is Germany under the Kaiser or later Hitler where respect for authority was often an argument Germans made against liberal ideas from Anglo-Saxon countries. Respect for authority, which was defended as an “Asian value,” therefore existed in Germany before the end of World War II as well as in many other now liberal democratic nations (Thompson, 2000). There are, however, historical differences. One cannot forget that the German value system was only brought down by the trauma of a devastating war. Practices and cultural heritage make it difficult for a liberal democracy to evolve in Asia but of course not impossible.

The other argument about the universality of Asian values is also a justifiable criticism and it would be a grave mistake to generalize too much when it comes to cultural similarities and differences. In Asia one can find many different cultures but most researchers have noted the underlying influence of Confucianism on the East Asian countries of Japan, the Koreas, China, Vietnam as well as Singapore, which is more than 76% inhabited by people of Chinese origin. Confucianism, if seen as a religion, does not exclude belief in other religions, which has to been seen in contrast to many other religions. It is more or less only a social philosophy that had been the official doctrine in China for more than a thousand years and thus left a deep imprint in the cultures of East Asia. The idea that Confucianism supports authoritarianism more than Democracy has been made but the opposite argument can also be made. The latter argument, however, requires a reinterpretation of the Four Classics as well as later Confucian writing.

The critics of Singapore’s government highlight the human rights abuses, the limits on free expression and other personal freedoms and they note that dissent within Singapore has to be measured. However, Singapore still has free and fair elections, opposition parties, technically free media, etc. and some opposition to government policies can be voiced but the threat of prosecution, the major weapon against dissent in Singapore, always looms over the journalist or politician like a Damocles sword (Mauzy and Milne, 2002). Lee Kuan Yew has contended that Singapore cannot be a liberal democracy because of Confucian values, which comprise such aspects as more respect for authority or the importance of the family but critics have pointed out that other Confucian countries such as Taiwan and South Korea have been successful in adopting liberal democratic practices.

It needs to be pointed out that when one speaks of “Asian values” it more or less refers to traditional values, and in the Chinese context they are based on a mix of Neo-Confucian ideology and a grown social system that still persists in those parts of Asia that have been more or less influenced by Chinese traditions. In Indian and Malay societies somewhat similar traditional values can be found such as an emphasis on family and traditional values. At this point these different cultures have found a common ground and the discussion over “Asian values” started (Rodan, 1996). Thus if we see “Asian values” as the conservative or traditional viewpoint of the societies in Asia we can avoid the divisiveness of the argument.

Quite distinct from “Asian values” but sometimes confused with it is Asian culture and Asian history, which cannot be neglected in any serious sociopolitical study of various Asian political systems. There is nothing in Asian culture that supports a Western style Democratic system, which bases itself on the individual and individual rights. The concept of individual rights has solely developed in the West and in China social relations were derived from family relations. Most researchers of Late Imperial China have noted this clear distinction between the interpretation of laws in the society in Anglo-Saxon societies and Chinese societies. Just one example is Matthew Sommer’s Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial China where he explains the punishment of sexual crimes in that period and his analysis concluded that not the rights of the individuals were at issue in these law cases but the relation these people had to their environment. For instance a rapist was punished in relation to the woman’s chastity. A woman who was chaste, or in other words obedient to just one man, her husband, had more rights than a woman of debased social position or one who engaged in extramarital sexual intercourse. Thus there was no rape in marriage, a husband had the absolute right over his own wife (Sommer, 2000).

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Francis Fukuyama, a critic of “Asian values” has, like many other Western critics, a superficial idea of what constitutes Confucian political thought. He writes, “Confucianism, with its exam system that opens up prospects for social mobility, can be highly meritocratic” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 310). Here he neglects the fact that the exam system is actually not a Confucian idea but was only introduced in the Sui Dynasty in 606 AD and initially did not last for long. Only in 1384 Emperor Taizu decided to reinstate the official examinations based on Zhu Xi’s interpretation of Confucian thought, which became the official interpretation until the abolishment of the examination system. Fukuyama also writes that “the Confucian family system provides a certain protected sphere of private life that is relatively free of state intrusion” (p. 310). Here he omits that the state itself is seen as a family and that the small family was always been seen in a hierarchy subservient to the higher family. While the husband had all his rights to his wife and his family, the individual family had to subordinate to the next higher authority. During different times of Chinese history there was state intrusion into the family especially in the area of what constitutes moral behavior. This shows that any wish in making traditional Asian culture more receptive for Democracy can only fail, which does not mean Democracy cannot develop, based on either values that have developed in recent history and were influenced by Western thought or a re-interpretation of classic thought.

While making clear that Singapore is an ideal Confucian society, Wei-Bin Zhang also argues that more democratic freedoms would not alter this but insure that Singapore remains such a society. As Mencius said to King Xuan of Qi’s question about the royal line: “If the ruler has great faults, they should remonstrate with him. If, after they have done so repeatedly, he does not listen, they should depose him” (Mencius 5B:9). Today this idea of being able to insure that the father remains honest to the son can be maintained through democratic principles. However, this type of democracy would not resemble a western democracy, as regime change would only occur when the father, the state, neglects his responsibilities of caring for his children, the citizens.

In an ideal Confucian society the benevolent state leads without much intervention and by setting a role model it creates a state full of harmony. The government should therefore never use violent measures against the people. Mencius said: “When one uses force to make the people submit, they do not submit in their hearts but only because their strength is insufficient. When one uses virtue to make people submit, they are pleased to their depths of their hearts, and they sincerely submit” (Mencius, 2A:3). Albeit hierarchy is part of the Confucian ideology this does not mean the state is allowed to use force to achieve its goals. This could be interpreted that in order to insure that the state is not using force democracy is needed.

This kind of reinterpretation is only needed, of course, if Asian countries continue to try to achieve a Confucian state. It is more than evident that many Asian countries and the people living there have long given up on fundamental principles of Confucian thought and a shift in the mentality has occurred. The question concerning Lee Kuan Yew, however, is not a cultural argument as much as an argument against modernization, or Westernization, of Singapore’s values. He links liberal democracy that includes a free press, for example, with the perceived moral degradation in the West. In this concept the government is seen as family and therefore liberal democratic practices are rejected.

However, without trying to judge either way by attaching labels, the West has transformed more since the beginning of the Reformation than has Asia, or more correctly China. For some people, mostly from the West and sympathizers of the West, this has been called a lack of modernization on behalf of Asian countries such as China or Singapore. For others, like Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir bin Mohanad of Malaysia, the liberalization in the West is seen as moral decay and a destruction of venerable values in society such as communitarianism, filialism, and respect for authority. This, in their eyes, constitutes Asian culture, which is distinct from Western culture. Thus the leaders of Asia are trying to retain an old value system that is not really distinctly Asian but has not deteriorated as much in Asia as it has in the West (Mauzy and Milne, 2002, p. 57).

3. The Creation of a Singaporean Identity

Lee Kuan Yew’s “soft authoritarianism” thus is not the result of “Asian values” but Asian culture, or more specifically the culture influenced by Confucian thinking, which supports a more paternalistic form of government. There personal freedoms are restricted in a perceived benefit for the people. The proponents of “Asian values” often point to the contrast in the West where there has been a decay of the society. Divorce rates and crime rates are much higher in Western liberal societies. One has to admit that an authoritarian society is able to control cultural changes better than a country in which everything is free. Singapore, for example, bans pornographic sites in order to restrict the negative influences that come with it. However, in the modern world and with the spread of the Internet these “negative” influences will become even harder to contain and the Singaporean government has begun to relax these restrictions in recent years. Evidence of this can been seen in the admission of nudity in movies that are considered art and which specifically targets art lovers. Moreover, Singapore today is already one of the most Westernized countries in East Asia and the conservative view of the government constitutes an attempt to contain the spread of Western thinking both in its own self interest and, at least from their point of view, to protect the people (Mauzy and Milne, 2002).

Members of the Singaporean government propagated the idea of “Asian values” as an attempt to create a Singaporean identity. Singapore is a multi-ethnic society that has, according to Daniel A. Bell, “by and large failed to develop an overriding attachment to the nation” (Bell, 1997, p. 9). In August of 1988, Lee disclosed his idea of unifying values for Singapore. For him the family became the “basic building block in society” and he elevated this idea as one of Singapore’s Shared Values. “Preserving the society’s cultural ethos was not just a matter of culture. For Lee, it was a question of survival. Singapore society succeeded because it was quintessentially Singaporean. Lose that, and all will be lost” (Kwang, Fernandez, and Tan, 1998, p. 191). The difficulty lay especially in the problem of bringing together the different ethnic groups in Singapore.

Therefore Lee increasingly saw Singapore’s identification in contrast to the West, and since he could not base Singapore’s identity on solely Chinese values he searched for some encompassing value system that could include all the different ethnic groups in Singapore. He himself admitted: “I have said openly that if we were 100% Chinese, we would do better. But we are not and never will be, so we live with what we have” (Kwang, Fernandez and Tan, 1998, p. 181). This common identity therefore could not develop spontaneously but had to be consciously created by the government. The value system was supposed to include a meritocratic individualism combined with an identification with traditional Asian roots and values which would come from ancient India, China, as well as the Malay world. Therefore the “melting pot” idea was rejected outright and the different cultures were supposed to be equally important (Kong, 1990).

In 1972 Lee made the assessment that a majority of ethnic Chinese in Singapore now felt more as Singaporean than as Chinese but that “a portion can still be manipulated” by the Chinese communists (Kwang, Fernandez and Tan, 1998, p. 180). This has to be seen in light of Lee and his friends who were born in Singapore and had received a Western education. At the outset of the PAP we can see an uneasy agreement between Communist sympathizers and Social Democrats. The leaders of the PAP, however, where English-educated Chinese who on the one hand wanted to create an Asian country that was independent of their former colonial powers but on the other hand also rejected the idea of Communism. Since the Communists won the revolution in China many Chinese in Singapore also turned toward the Communists partly because they still saw themselves more as proud Chinese than anything else (Bloodworth, 1986).

The question of national identity, however, that needs to be answered is how the people of Singapore feel today. A 2001 Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (SAS) Survey conducted by the Ministry of Community Development and Sports (MCDS) in Singapore resulted in the finding that nearly all interviewees claimed they were proud of their country and considered Singapore their home. It also found that a larger number of young Singaporeans were unhappy with current racial and religious relations between the different ethnic and cultural groups, which more clearly hints at the problem of a truly Singaporean identity. This survey, however, cannot answer whether Singaporeans really have developed a unique Singaporean attitude, as the questions were too direct and clearly not aimed at truly finding out whether Singaporeans have a unique identity. A more revealing study was conducted by Chang Han Yin of the National University of Singapore, which showed that 12% of ethnic Chinese youths would choose Caucasian as their ethnicity if they could (Richardson, 1999). This seems to show that Singapore is indeed developing its own identity but one that is more based on those despised Western cultural elements.

In 2002 Ooi Giok Ling, Tan Ern Ser and Soh Kay Cheng from the Institute of Policy Studies conducted the most comprehensive study in order to determine the question of national identity. Their study concluded “that we (Singapore) have made strong progress since 1990 in building a national identity shared by our multi-ethnic society” (Ooi, et al., 2002, p. 7). This study also showed that Singaporeans reject a national culture, as was attempted with the promotion of “Asian values.” Only 42% of all Singaporeans favor the idea of a national culture and 61% of Singaporeans consider it important that people know what ethnic group they belong to. This does not mean Singaporeans also reject a multi-ethnic society, quite on the opposite. 80% support having people from different races live in Singapore. The reasons for the sense of belonging however are rooted mostly in the fact that Singapore is a safe place, that ones family lives in Singapore and that there is racial harmony. However the fact that only 41% of Singaporeans feel they can have a say in government is a reason for some concern.

Furthermore, Lee admitted himself that the attempt to find “Shared Values” has failed so far and in order to create racial harmony multi-member seats were created in which at least one minority member had to be nominated, a move, which was disadvantageous to the opposition. The most obvious uniting factor in Singapore is, however, not the idea of family or any other aspect of Asian culture or even “Asian values” but the fact that every Singaporean has to speak English. While trying to remain multi-cultural, thus rejecting the idea of the melting pot, Singapore has tried to use the common language as a building block of a common Singapore. But the fact that there can still be seen discontent among the youth of Singapore seems to indicate that the different ethnic groups still are not fully integrated.

Despite the harsh criticism, the Singaporean government has increasingly emphasized Chinese or Confucian values as the shared values of Singapore. The media has followed in the government’s footsteps as an example from Singapore’s Channel News Asia shows. On January 18, 2003 they first showed an episode of CBS’s 48 Hours, which focused on the trial of a father who was accused of killing his newborn son. In the course of the trial the father’s attorneys pointed to the possibility that the 4-year-old brother was responsible for the infant’s death. This broadcast showed how dysfunctional some families in the US are. The interesting aspect was that the broadcast actually came from an American source. Following this program, Channel News Asia featured a peaceful village in the Chinese hinterland. There, so was the message, family values were still intact. This move toward a promotion of Chinese values has, however, not (yet) led to any considerable discontent among the Malays or Indians. According to the study conducted by Ooi et.al. the sense of commitment to the nation has risen the most among Indians and Malays, 50% and 44% respectively. This rate is considerably higher than that of the Chinese where only 39% feel they have become more committed than 5 years ago.

3. The “Negative” Side of “Asian Values”

“A command of mathematics, physics, and chemistry is not worth as much as having a good father [i.e. with connections]” (Yang, 1994, p. 8). This is an old Chinese saying that epitomizes Chinese social behavior. There is a cultural assumption that is shared by Chinese everywhere, from those living in either China or Taiwan to those living overseas such as Singapore, the United States or even Germany. Relationships are often maintained across long distances and the indebtedness one has to one person can easily be transferred to another. If a Chinese wants to find a room in Erlangen, Germany, for example but does not know anyone there but he knows a friend who knows someone there, then it is almost assured that he will get a room. Thus these connections help you get what you could not get otherwise and this practice can also be found in political relationships and thus permeates all of Chinese society (Yang, 1994).

Yang, however, points out that this behavior is not exclusively Chinese but can also be found in some countries of Eastern Europe, in black communities in the US, or in the middleclass of Chile (Yang, 1994, p. 7). Thus even though it cannot be considered uniquely Asian social behavior, it however is part of Asian culture. Lee Kuan Yew also notes the problem of guanxi when he writes about China and their wish to copy Singapore’s success. He wrote about the leader of a delegation to Singapore, Xu Weichang, then the vice minister of propaganda in China: “As for corruption, Xu expressed his doubts whether agencies like Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the commercial affairs department could deal with the large “grey areas” in a society like China where guanxi (personal relationships) was all-pervasive” (Lee, 2000, p. 647). Lee’s efforts in controlling corruption in Singapore show clearly that he was aware of the problem and that he was convinced that democratic practices would not work in favor of it.

Despite the claim that Asian culture is highly supportive of authoritarianism, a number of countries, which are still more or less traditional, have become liberal democratic system without losing their national character. This, in Fukuyama’s opinion, underscores the argument that functioning democracies are possible in East Asia. To say that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are “Western-style democracies,” as Fukuyama has done, is at best a misinterpretation (Fukuyama, 1998). On the surface these countries, are indeed functioning democracies but any analysis of these political systems will show serious flaws at least from the Western point of view.

The first East Asian country to become democratic is Japan. But in the course of history and heavily influenced by the United States, Japan became a country which is virtually controlled by just one party, the LDP. Despite those who have considered Japan only a pseudo-democracy, it can be considered a democracy with the minimum requirements of free and fair elections with free competition and a free press. However, as Herzog points out, the system has its flaws. One of the most important problems is that of corruption, which has been a large problem in Japan with a number of scandals in recent years that have rippled the nation (Herzog, 1990). Corruption has also become the major concern in Taiwan after the democratization and South Korea is equally plagued by the problem. Of course, corruption had always been part of the Taiwanese government but after the liberalization process, corruption also liberalized. Today Taiwan faces a large number of criminals in its own government that makes the fight against corruption next to impossible (Kuo, 2002). The problem of corruption is, of course, not unique to Asia and also a problem of many other nations, not only democracies, but in the eyes of the proponents of “Asian values” democracy is working in favor of corruption.

Lee Kuan Yew therefore concludes that democracy in Asia has not been successful in these Asian countries because of these problems and he writes in Global Viewpoint in 1995: “American principles and theories have not yet proven successful in East Asia – not in Taiwan, Thailand or South Korea. If these countries become better societies than Singapore, in another five or 10 years, we will adopt their practices and catch up” (qt. in: Kwang, Fernandez, and Tan, 1998, p. 206). Lee really sees democracy as a possible alternative but he also considers it harmful to Singapore at the moment. For the Western-educated statesman this is one way to justify his usage of the “Asian” or “Confucian” value discussion. The other of course is the need of his government for legitimacy. This as we will see in the following part is founded on the assumption of a combination of Confucian thought of a benevolent leader and that of a meritocratic and technocratic regime that tries to limit corruption and cronyism as far as possible.

5. “Asian Values” and the Need for Legitimacy

There are many definitions for legitimacy and the theoretical discourse has focused on the different aspects of this crucial yet controversial concept in political science. Max Weber may not be the first to come up with this concept but his conceptionalization of the term has been the basis for much of the later discussion of the idea of legitimacy. This basic notion is a combination of two essential features, the belief of those who govern that they possess the right to do so and in return an understanding among the people that makes them obey orders. This can be seen as the consent of the governed, actively or passively. This, according to Weber, constitutes legitimacy in the broadest sense. Because legitimacy cannot be seen as a static feature but more as a diachronically changing concept, it has to be seen as fluid and subject to change at any time. The belief of the people furthermore cannot be seen simply at one point in time but the roots, social customs and values, need to be analyzed as well (Alagappa, 1995).

This paper will try to see whether the two basic features of legitimacy can be found in Singapore and how strong they are at the present time. First there is the question about the belief of the governing elite to their right to staying in power. In regard to Asian values, Lee Kuan Yew and the governing elite have elevated ‘Confucian values’ as their ideology and the means of legitimizing their form of ‘soft-authoritarianism’. On the other hand, in the second part I will turn to the people. Do they agree with the government when it comes to Asian or Confucian values? Or is their idea of legitimacy slightly different, i.e. they consider the safety and the economic success as well as such concepts as public housing to be more important than the elites’ ideological justification for their government.

To claim power to be the only driving force behind any governing elite or dictator is to neglect the justification that the elite itself needs to maintain its right. In this regard the Singaporean government, here represented by the long-time Minister President Lee Kuan Yew, has used their interpretation of Confucian thought to legitimize their right to govern. As Lee Kuan Yew and the elite were initially part of a minority Western-educated Social Democrats and the country’s dramatic economic success was accompanied by a sharp Westernization the leaders feared that the country would lose its traditional character and become Western altogether. Of course one can assume that this Westernization would eventually also lead to more liberal ideas of politics, which would threaten the supremacy of the PAP’s one-party rule. Therefore Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP moved toward creating a distinction between the West and the East in order to create a model of politics that is distinct from the Western model as it allowed for economic freedom on the one hand but on the other discouraged the move toward more political liberalization.

The way Singapore would be governed, so Lee, had to be distinctly different because of what he himself later termed “Confucian values” or “ethics.” He sees Confucianism as the basis of his country and therefore in his version of Confucianism he depends on the ideology of the benevolent leader who takes care of his people. This is linked with the Confucian concept of hierarchy, which clearly distinguishes between those who govern and those who are governed. The right to govern here does not depend on the consent of the people but rather in the conduct of the ruler. The ruler will rule his people with humaneness, i.e. he will do what he thinks is in the best interest of the people.

Despite the fact that many have claimed that Confucianism can be interpreted to allow for democracy or the idea of right and wrong, a straightforward reading of the classic texts shows that this kind of interpretation is not the most obvious. Confucius’ Analects leave little doubt about his idea of an ideal government:

Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, “Let the ruler be the ruler; the minister a minister; the father a father; the son a son” (Confucius 12:11).

Here Confucius clearly distinguishes between the obligations of the ruler and the ruled. The basic idea behind Confucianism is that each person has a certain position in life. This same idea was reiterated throughout Confucian thought. Mencius said:

Therefore it is said, ‘Some labor with their minds, while others labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others, while those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them.’ The rightness of this is universally acknowledged in the world (Mencius 3A:4).

The second argument made in the Analects is that of hierarchy and obedience. As a son has to follow his father or a wife her husband, the individual had to follow the ruler. This did not mean that the ruler could be irresponsible, quite on the opposite the ruler had to do what was in the interest of the people. As Confucius points out the rulers of Yao and Shun were ideal rulers because they were governed by ren, a concept often translated as ‘humaneness.’ In the case of Singapore it is clear that Lee sees himself and the PAP as the ideal rulers according to this Confucian tradition. In a speech advocating a pay raise for the ministers in 1994 Lee said:

Can you have a good system of government without good men in charge of government? American liberals think you can, that you can have a good system of government with proper separation of powers (…) My experience in Asia has led me to a different conclusion. To get good government, you must have good men in charge of government. (Lee qt. in Kwang et. al. 1998, p. 337).

That this idea of Confucian ruler is taken seriously by the Singaporean elite can be seen in the repeated attempts to learn from mistakes and chart an ‘ideal’ course for the country. The measures to limit corruption and the meritocratic principle were seen as the responsibility of the ‘good’ government in the Confucian sense. In this regard Lee emphasizes that the Singaporean government took measures in fighting the economic crisis in the 1990s that were superior to its neighbors, which contributed to the fact that one was able to recover from the crisis almost unscathed. This, in the eyes of the elite, provides it legitimacy that is reflected at the polls where the PAP was able to recover votes.

Aside of Asian values, legitimacy from the government’s perspective can be seen in a number of other factors. The most evident is the way Singapore sees itself in relation to its neighbors, from which Singapore depends but from which it also likes to distinguish itself. The most ardent and uneasy relationship is with Singapore’s northern neighbor, Malaysia, which, since the split, has often been characterized as a “threat,” because for one Malaysia has power over Singapore’s water reserves. The rising of China is also seen as a threat to Singapore’s dominance and therefore intense economic ties are sought to guarantee Singapore’s continuing significance ironically through the same methods, i.e. guanxi, which Lee Kuan Yew has rejected for Singapore in the past.

The recent terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City has also become an issue in Singapore. The island nation has, because some terrorism suspects had come from there, reacted by raising their own awareness in this field. The most recent evidence for this is a website that warns of possible terror attacks in Singapore and gives the citizens guidance in how to react to the eventuality of a terrorist attack. Furthermore Singapore’s size makes the island nation especially vulnerable, with two Muslim countries as their neighbors, Indonesia to the south and Malaysia to the north. Some have alleged that the Singaporean government is creating this fear purposefully in order to maintain its strict limits on personal liberties and they support their argument with the fact that the government has declared any national problem a crisis, from seemingly mundane policy problems to more serious threats from outside (Clammer, 1997). Whatever may be the fact, it seems to create a feeling of nationhood that gives the government a certain, however immeasurable, degree of legitimacy. One outcome of this “culture of fear” is that the idea of strong government finds in Singapore the most support in any East Asian country, which David Hitchcock claimed in his study. The fear of the other person in the society seems to make Singapore’s citizens to accept draconian laws, a phenomenon which can also be found in the United States after 9/11 when it was shown that in response Americans increasingly favored restrictions of personal freedoms in exchange for more security.

This paper is more interested in the legitimacy that is derived from Asian or Confucian values. As has already been shown the generalized “Asian values” discussion has failed to achieve its goals and Singapore’s leaders have retreated to a more narrow definition. Confucian values with all its problems has become the ideology that Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP are now using in their defense of their authoritarian style. The problem with this shift, however, is the fact that a considerable number of Singaporeans are not Chinese and do not share these values. This would suggest that the idea of Confucian values does not create an important part in the perception of at least 20% of Singaporeans and thus it cannot be considered as a main factor in the Weberian model of reciprocity. The people do not accept the governance of the PAP because of Confucian values but because of other factors. The fact that free speech is contained furthermore does not allow the citizens to articulate the necessary acceptance for the government, something that is not out of the question if there were not any restrictions.

If there is one thing that gives the Singaporean government the most legitimacy it is the economic success. As one of the four Tiger States, also called a Little Dragon, Singapore has become one of the world’s leading economic centers and this feat was accomplished in less than half a century. After the short interlude of Singapore as part of Malaysia, the tiny island nation became its own independent state in 1965. In the meantime Lee Kuan Yew, as leader of the PAP, fought against communist factions in his own party. When he finally defeated the communists, he aligned his country with the West. This was accompanied by economic reforms that made Singapore the world’s second largest harbor and a leading trading post in Asia.

According to Peter A. Busch legitimacy can only truly be found if the citizens are supportive of the moral aspects of government. This of course poses are great difficulty to the Singaporean government, which is faced by a multi-ethnic population. Through social engineering and quotas the government has been able to create a remarkably high level of harmony between the different ethnic groups that today there are no longer any ethnic clashes. Despite the critics, Singapore has been able to create a “Singaporean identity” as has been shown before. This identity, Busch says, is one aspect in how to measure legitimacy in a nation. However, Busch’s own findings in his study of secondary school students show that, despite the fact that there is not a unified view of the Singaporean nation, the government has been able to use ethnic pride to their advantage. “Pride in one’s own group does not detract from national commitment and indeed seems to increase it for both peoples” (Busch, 1974, p. 50). Furthermore he argues that the idea of racial justice in Singapore is a central aspect of the individual’s allegiance to the nation as a whole. Despite problems such as the feelings of some Malay that they are inferior the study comes to the conclusion that the Singaporean government has been able to secure its legitimacy among the people through a number of means where “economic changes (…) are almost universally associated with the government and hence are readily given political meaning” (Busch, 1974, p. 133). Even though this study was conducted in 1974 it is not far-fetched to conclude that in 2003 the situation has not changed dramatically. Singapore is still economically very successful and ethnic relations are still controlled in order to create racial harmony. There are tensions, however, which Busch had already noticed in 1974 and this is an increasing emphasis on Chinese values at the expense of the other ethnic groups. In this regard a shift from “Asian values” to “Chinese values” can be seen as problematic. The leaders of Singapore, however, do not see it as a serious problem and so far there have been no serious ethnic tensions in Singapore.

We can conclude that “Asian values” did have a legitimizing effect until the Asian economic crisis because it furthered racial harmony. The abandonment of unifying Asian values, however, did not cause any serious racial tensions. The average Singaporean seems to be content with the relationships between the different ethnic groups despite the great emphasis on these distinctions and the accompanying rejection of the idea of the melting pot.

6. Conclusion

Rajaratnam, a leading PAP politician, once said that he had “very serious doubts as to whether such a thing as Asian values really exists” (Rajaratnam, 1977, p. 95). There is no question about the fact that the term “Asian values” is full of ambiguities and misunderstandings as well as politicized rhetoric. The first thing this paper tried was to define the meaning of these “Asian values” from different perspectives. If Asian values are defined as “values unique to Asians” then this cannot be a case. There is neither such a thing as an Asian nor is there such a thing as a unique value. As history has shown many other people have adhered to similar values. If “Asian values” are understood as venerable traditions of Asians then we can come to a better understanding. However the term “Asian” is still dangerously misleading. In the Singaporean context they were designed to mainly help create a unifying Singaporean identity but also to strengthen the government’s ability to govern the people. However, the Singaporean government sought to institute a Confucian state, which, however, cannot be considered an “Asian value” as Confucian thought is uniquely Chinese and neither Malays nor Indians have any bonds to this tradition. But we cannot neglect the political interests of any party, which is mainly to stay in power. Thus the concept of Asian values and later Confucian values was a given for this purpose. The government was able to legitimize its draconian measures in part because it said that the people would expect its government to protect the community, which is more important than the protection of the individual.

If “Asian values” are understood as the cultural heritage of a country we can try to understand yet another perspective of this complex term. It is generally accepted that no government can be the legitimate government if it does not find its roots in the cultural customs of a nation. In this regard the discussion over Shared Values has to be seen as an attempt to find a common basis for the Singaporean nation. Nevertheless it is only too convenient for Lee Kuan Yew to argue that liberal democracy stands in opposition to Asian culture. Despite the fact that the history and customs are not necessarily the most receptive for democracy, a number of still traditional Confucian states have become democracies, such as South Korea and Taiwan. The discussion in this paper over the negative side of “Asian values” has shown that certain measures were introduced to restrict negative influences of one or another cultural background. The attempt to contain guanxi, no matter how successful, has to be seen as one attempt to contain the perceived negative influence of this practice on the modern society of Singapore. Moreover the perceived negative influences of other cultures in Singapore were also part on the administration’s agenda, for example the emphasis on education, which is more important to ethnic Chinese than to Malays.

The final argument in this paper concerned the legitimacy of the Singapore government. According to the data of various studies in Singapore, we can assume the government enjoys great legitimacy among the people. The question in this context was, however, to what extent “Asian values” played and are still playing a role. As a concept of some over-arching general principle Asian values were intended to create a Singaporean identity, which in turn was supposed to increase legitimacy. After the economic crisis in the 1990s, however, the government largely abandoned “Asian values” and retreated to a narrower concept of “Confucian values.” This threatened the racial harmony in Singapore to a certain extent but according to recent research has not raised racial tensions. However, the government has found its own justification for maintaining an authoritarian style of government: the gentleman-ruler who espouses ren, humaneness. With this ideological foundation the government hopes to maintain in power and as long as this tiny island nation can remain as economically successful as today the legitimacy of the government is not threatened in the foreseeable future.

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Herzog also shows many other serious limitations in Japan’s democracy. They range from seemingly irrational misinterpretations of the Constitution to informal self-censorship of the press.

This paper will not delve into the discussion as to how this consent should be constituted (such as Ooserhout, 2002).

This is the government’s view as the election was heavily manipulated in the PAP’s favor. This could be seen as an indication that the PAP fears a loss of legitimacy.

This, according to Busch, had little impact on the legitimacy of the Singaporean government.