Assess the Extent to which the Different Powers Prepared 'Their' African Colonies for Independence.

Post independence the state of Nigeria has propelled itself into one of the main political and military regimes in the West African region, as shown by its many peacekeeping duties in surrounding areas. Yet Nigeria is not that strong from an internal viewpoint. Successive military juntas throughout the last forty years have left a country with no true political exercise. Although it is seen to be rich because of its oil interests it is still in a poor economic condition due to the years of excessive military dictatorships. Socially the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has led to many local governments introducing strict Shari laws which, in the last few years, caused lots of tension like the riots that followed the Miss World competition being held in Nigeria in 2002.

To say that this is true of all British ex-colonies would be a lie. One of its better post colonial successes would be that of Botswana. The reasons behind this can be easily explained. During colonial times the effect of British imperialism was minimal and did not destroy inclusive pre-colonial institutions. Post decolonisation in 1960 Botswana, in a political sense, inherited a Westminster parliamentary system along with a legal system based on the British legal framework of precedence whilst incorporating tribal law and customs. Botswana, like Nigeria, had a huge economic resource in its diamond mines which attracted a lot of foreign investment which in turn provided a resource wealth to stop any dissent within the political spectrum. This wealth was consolidated by strong British educated leadership of Botswana under Presidents Khama and Masire, both of which realised the dangers of excessive loans from the IMF and the World Bank.

Unlike Nigeria, Botswana did not deal with foreign affairs but worked on internal issues such as racial tolerance which led the way for attracting a young black talented workforce from apartheid South Africa. Along with this Botswana was lucky in that it only had one main ethnic group and therefore there was less social tensions. Even though it is, like most of Africa today, savaged by the AIDS epidemic it has grown amazingly. Infant mortality rates are lower than the sub-Saharan average while Calorie intake and education levels are much higher than average. Between 1965 and 1995 Botswana was the fastest growing country in the world and in 2001, per capita, its income was twice as high as the average Asian Tiger economy.

When looking at the way the French dealt with preparations for their colonies’ independence there are a couple of clear and distinct elements to start off with. For instance it is interesting to note that out of all the ex-colonial powers France is the only one to still have a distinctive African policy and in some ways have not really left. In saying that, Tony Blair has recently attempted to switch Britain’s focus to Africa, albeit to take eyes away from the Iraq question. Getting back to France, many historians and political analysts identify French decolonisation in two separate sections; Northern Africa and ‘Black Africa’. The French protectorates in North Africa moves to independence were more a move from nationalism to nationhood than simple decolonisation by the French. Colonial rule was natural to the French public and Morocco, Tunisia, and particularly Algeria were mere extensions of the metro pole. Algeria, in retrospect, was seen more a part of France than a colonial possession. It was the first of the North African protectorates to be colonised and was firmly etched on the French romantic mind where many painters, poets, adventurers and novelists would describe this part of the French ‘Orient’.

The attachment to the protectorates did spread further than romanticism. In relation to the rest of Africa, excluding the apartheid south, these Northern states had excelled themselves underneath French rule and the French did not wish to lose places they had a distinct hand in the transformation and modernisation of, not to mention the risk to the huge amount of French nationals there. They wished for limited political autonomy for the natives and believed that Europeans should, in all circumstances, partake in the running of if not being the sovereign power. Post 1950 however there was successive national fronts and no matter which way the French interpret it, the general belief is that they were forced to give up sovereignty. This can be shown by the independence of Morocco and Tunisia occurring within two years of each other in 1956 and 1958.

In dealing with this issue you cannot help but relate to the issue of the Algerian/French conflict. A bloody and vicious war fought over the separation of Islam and Arabic from the state and the French government’s protection of the French settlers, which stood at roughly one eight of the Algerian population. The significance of the length, and its utmost irony, is that French decolonisation began and ended with Algeria. The conflict was so significant that it almost resulted in revolution on the streets of Paris. When Algeria became a sovereign state in July 1962 it was a result of compromise between the FLN and France which again shows how the French wished to hold on in some way, shape or form in its colonies. In this case the French maintained interest in the Algerian oil fields whilst gaining a naval base at Mels-el-Kebir.

In dealing with ‘black’ Africa de Gaulle appealed to leaders in the Western and Equatorial countries to join a new federal community. Any of those who did not would have, in de Gaulle’s recognition, have voted for immediate independence but also the ending of any further French assistance. Again we see the desire for the French to maintain some autonomy in its colonies. Most African leaders did realise the force of this argument except Sekou Toure and the people of Guinea, so in turn de Gaulle ceased all assistance to prove his point. However Toure’s independent and proud republic survived and began a wave of independence fever across French ‘black Africa. Although most states managed to get some sort of self-rule whether through the community or independence you could see the maintenance of bonds between the colonies and France. The mixture of Bilateral treaties, inter-State organisations and French francs kept most state relations in check and a number of military agreements left mobile forces based permanently based in most of its former empire.

An example of how much the French have maintained links to the old empire can be seen in the French national football team. Arguably the second best, if not the best, team of the world it has a team made up from all parts of the former colonies. Seven of the 1998 World Cup winning team were not of French origin. The current world player of the year, Zinedine Zidane, is considered France’s finest player ever yet he was born in Algeria. Arsenal and French striker Thierry Henry came second in the world player competition yet his parents are from Morocco. Aside from football another link between France and her former colonies is the constant sight of French peacekeeping troops on the post colonial landscape.

For example in the Ivory Coast the French have currently 4,000 troops on peace keeping duties there, with not one blue United Nation helmet in sight. They monitor a shaky ceasefire and protect the 15,000 French nationals there. The Ivory Coast conflict violence is example of how the French have tried to maintain their interests and how it has backfired right into their faces. French investors still play a significant role in the Ivory Coast’s economy, to the irritation of many. This agitated population, which includes many government ministers, believe that the French foreigners benefit at the cost of the local people. Anti-white feelings are new to the Ivory Coast, becoming widespread after an army mutiny in 2003 and culminating with the murder of a French journalist. Xenophobia has also split into ethnic tensions with a North/South divide that perpetuates the country. Since the economic downturn, largely because of political instability, the ethnic or immigrant ‘card’ has been exploited by certain politicians and shows the lack of good political foundations that should have been laid down by the French in 1960.

As seen before with the French wishing to maintain substantial links with their former colonies we can see the same with that of Belgium. The public opinion about the colonies in Belgium was that they were not that fussed, however the white population in Africa believed there should be a broadening of African responsibilities. However they were not going to be successful at all. In the Belgian Congo the first moves towards independence were made from inside Belgium with a plan for ‘emancipation’ to be unveiled over a period of thirty years. A committee recommended an elaborate pyramid of representative Councils, with complex systems of indirect election to neutralise the hazards of Manhood suffrage. However in a background of African Pan-nationalism these initiatives failed before they could start and as post-WWII growth began to stall in the mid 1950s, Belgium started to realise that her colonies could be more a burden than a benefit. The Belgians did not want another Algerian style conflict on their hands and forwarded fifteen years of decolonisation into an 18 month period, culminating in 30th June 1960 as Independence Day.

There had been no particular assets left by the Belgians in the Congo but in the decade preceding there had been efforts on an educational and spiritual level. Two universities had been established in Lovanium and Elisabethville, however the primary education was mostly in the missionaries hands than anyone else’s. From the point of independence civil order began to break down as many differing groups vied for power. Belgium had retained many military bases in the Congo and did emerge from them to stop disorder only to be reluctant to the new president Lumumba, who had initially called for the severance of all Belgian links on Independence Day. The fate of the Congo was left to the United Nations after the withdrawal of Belgium and became a battle ground for the western and soviet blocs as the cold war began to intensify.

Another element of Belgium rule in central Africa that would be necessary to analyse would be that of Rwanda. With the events in the Congo in the background you could see a sort of mirror image appearing except for the fact the Belgians reversed the social order with devastating consequences. The Tutsi elite, being the minority, were overthrown by the Hutu majority with the assistance of Belgian armed forces under the direction of Colonel Logiest. As Tutsi villages burned he stood back and admired the processes of ‘self determination’ and ‘social revolution’ at work. What was to follow would be thirty years of racial dictatorships resulting in the genocide of 1994.

Finally I will deal with the role of Portugal in dealing with decolonisation. When speaking of Portugal you can again see a colonial power not wishing to give up in face of huge political and economic factors. As our question asks to what extent the Portuguese prepared their colonies for decolonisation it is easy to they did not prepare at all. In fact they did not have any intention of relinquishing their empire and decolonisation had to be brought about by force. Like Algeria with France the colonies were primarily seen as an extension of the Portuguese nation and represented a time when Portugal was one of the great colonial powers of all time. Along with this you had the fact that forty per cent of Angola’s imports and a third of Mozambique’s were provided by Portugal. Under Salazar industrialisation in Portugal was taking off and the economy was now being based more towards Europe, this was further compounded by Portugal’s admission to the European free trade area. However with the former beliefs in their minds the Lisbon governments became more determined to defeat the armed resistance movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In a strange series of events, especially in Angola where even the Cuban army became involved, Portugal was not powerful enough to keep control and lost her last colony, Angola, in 1974.

In conclusion when we look at the styles of the four main imperial powers in Africa we can see four distinctive elements. Britain was in favour of ‘indirect rule’ and managed disengagement. Indirect rule was ruling through existing structures and were very much hands off with the local elite simply being transferred with a few exceptions. France, in learning from its mistakes in Algeria and Indochina (Vietnam), by the 1960s pulls out very quickly but, like Britain, left a French educated elite and since then has had a very active African policy. In many respects I think most people would agree that they haven’t really left at all. Belgium seems to have panic as policy. At the first sign of nationalistic rustlings they freak out, try poorly to sort things out and pull away and leave a huge mess that the UN usually has to sort out in the following years. Portugal follows the way of intransigence and flight when dealing with her colonies. As mentioned Portugal itself was bordering on poverty and the colonies were healing for the national moral. When disputes broke out they fought until they could do no more and were forced to leave, militarily and economically ruined. Again a political, social and economic mess was left in their wake. With foresight, not many colonies were properly prepared.

Bibliography:

• Betts, B. F. ‘France and Decolonisation 1900-1960’ (Macmillan 1991)
• Darwin, J. ‘Britain and Decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the post-war world’ (Macmillan Education, 1998)
• Gourevitch, P. ‘We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families’ (London 1999)
• Grimal, H. ‘Decolonisation: the British French, Belgian and Dutch Empires 1919-1968’ ( Routeledge 1978)
• Hargreaves, J. D. ‘Decolonisation in Africa’ (London, 1996)
• McIntyre, W. David, ‘British Decolonisation, 1946-199: When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall?’ (London 1998)
• Morris-Jones, W. H. and Fischer, G. (eds.) ‘Decolonisation & After’ (Frank Cass 1980)

Internet Articles:

• Scott A. Beaulier: ‘Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical role of Post Colonial Policy’   (20/02/2004)
• BBC News: World: Africa: French Fears in Ivory Coast   (22/01/2004)

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