The first substantive debate (one which expresses a definitive view) of each session is the debate on the Queen's speech which sets out the government's programme for their term in office. If approval is lost at this stage then by convention the prime minister must either resign or call for a re-election. 'Motion's of censure' (motions by the opposition expressing no confidence in one of the government's policies or minister's) are very important times when the prime minister must respond professionally and convincingly. Each session there will also be opposition when the opposing parties can choose topics for debate. The topic will invariably be of topical interest and and possible one which the opposition feels they may be able to embarrass the government over. There are twenty days in total, which are allocated as opposition days per parliamentary session, seventeen of which are given to the largest opposition party (the conservatives) and three of which are given to the next largest party (the liberal democrats.) These days are used by the discretion of the opposition party in question. At the end of each business day (10pm) there is a half an hour adjournment period where by convention, backbenchers raise topics and win a place by ballot (because there is a great demand for this limited time) except the Speaker chooses on one day per month. However, these debates are often badly attended. There are also debates before the adjournment of each recess; this is parliament's Christmas, Easter, Spring and Summer breaks where a whole day is spent discussing issues raised by private members. Backbenchers are also given time to scrutinise financial measures after a 'public expenditure bill.' In addition to the above it is also possible in very unusual circumstances that an MP will be granted an adjournment motion "for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration,” via the speaker. If permission is granted the matter is debated for three hours (usually the next day) in what is known as an 'emergency debate.' However, typically permission is granted for less than 5% of applications (this also includes multiple applications of the same matter.) In December of 1999 Westminster Hall was opened up for debates. This is a parallel chamber open to all MPs and is intended to encourage constructive rather than confrontational debate. These meeting are watched over by a deputy speaker and no votes are cast during the session. During its term in office a government must show that it can win a majority for all of its policies and actions. The present convention is that a government is expected to resign in two cases: Firstly if they are defeated on an express motion of confidence or on an important issue which the Government says it is treating as a matter of confidence and secondly if the government suffers a defeat on a central issue of policy. Although conventionally resignation is seen as the thing to do in these two situations it is unlikely that a modern day prime minister would actually resign. Between April 1972 and February 1978 governments suffered 50 defeats on votes, yet only tried to reverse a quarter of them. To me this smells like complacency and insouciance towards the belief in their own legislation and about defeat, which encourages back bench freedom. Many backbenchers nowadays feel comfortable voting against their party because they know there will be no redress for it. Much of Blair's legislation on terrorism is likely to be blocked by parliament yet he is still trying to push it through. Ultimately the commons has power to control government by withdrawing its its confidence. However, because of party discipline, the House of Commons indirect control over policy and administration is more important, and this is the case now more than ever. Despite labour having a 160 seat majority in the house of commons, the government only managed to pass an anti-terror bill this week by 1 vote. This tells us that the previous residual conventions such as voting with your party are dying out, which is giving the Commons greater powers to scrutinise government policies and administration.
The next method of scrutinising government policy through the house of commons is by directly questioning ministers. On a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday minister's answer MPs questions during 'Question Time.' The prime minister's is asked questions every Wednesday when the house is sitting. There are two different types of questions, which are called starred and unstarred. Starred questions are oral questions, which are asked face to face. The advantages of starred questions are that they attract publicity and that supplementaries can also be asked (for which a minister can have no warning and can therefore be caught off guard), while the disadvantage is that there is never the time to answer all the questions, but nevertheless the MP must stay in their place in case their name is called out at some point. Unstarred questions require written answers which require the minister in question to publish their written answer in Hansard – on average there are roughly three times more written answers than non-written, and despite the disadvantages of not having the same levels of publicity attached to them they do have the advantage of generally being longer and more involved. MPs can use question time as a way of revealing government intentions and also to raise grievances, which may have arose in their constituencies. Despite question time being a seemingly priceless way of holding the executive to account, many would argue that in fact it is not quite the tool that it is perceived to be for MPs. Firstly, the UK does not have a system of open government, the consequence being that due to the 'Official Secrets Act 1989' it is an offence to disclose or obtain wide categories of government information. Therefore, the only information that is released is information that the government wants to release, which of course is as little as possible. The Act puts MPs in a difficult situation because while they are restricted from asking informed questions, ministers have all the facilities of Whitehall to provide an answer. Another major problem faced by MPs when asking questions is that it must relate specifically to matters which that minister is responsible for. The big problem is that there are few specific responsibilities for the prime minister and so questions directed to him usually concern his days engagements and then the real question has to be asked in the supplementary. Another problem is that questions must not infringe on an area known as 'closed questioning.' Issues will come under this category depending on their sensitivity – for instance ministers will never answer questions concerning areas such as phone tapping. As a result of these fundamental problems many observers regard questioning as a device with little validity. Oral questions are often seen as a way of scoring 'political points' rather than stopping mistakes and mismanagement on the part of the executive. However, generally written questions are seen as a more effective tool, as they confirm themselves to specific areas and therefore fulfil the objective of scrutiny more fully.
The final method of scrutinising the executive through the legislature is by using select committees. These committees consist of MPs whom meet away from the floor of the House in a smaller debating chamber with the task of considering specific government policy and administration. The system was introduced in 1980 for the pure objective of improving scrutiny of the work of the government. The committees are empowered to take evidence and report to the House Of Commons on their conclusions. The committee system allows specialised groups to carry out tasks that the House or government, acting as a whole, could not carry out effectively. As well as select committees there are also standing committees, which examine legislation in detail as it passes through the house, and there are backbench committees which provide a forum where MPs from individual parties can meet to discuss party policy in particular areas, but as its the select committees which examine government policy and in turn can hold the government to account, their the ones which I will concentrate on. The oldest select committee is the 'Public Accounts Committee,' which examines whether public money has been spent for the purposes intended by parliament. The select committees are each connected to a government department, so for instance the health committee is attached to the government department of health. The main purpose of select committees is so they can obtain reports for a certain matter, which they can forward to the house of commons, whom can use the report as a way of scrutinising a particular piece of government policy or administration. However, unfortunately the Commons rairly debates committee reports, which can often let the government off the hook. Overall it could be said that committees have been a limited success. On the one hand they have made parliament more effective by giving backbenchers the means to scrutinise government in a systematic way, but on the other hand the make up of the committees still stays the same (the governing power having most MPs and so on,) and therefore the balance of power between the executive and the legislature has remained the same. Despite this select committees do work as an effective tool at enforcing ministerial accountability as there is nowhere else where ministers are questioned so clearly and thoroughly.
Very similar opportunities for criticism and examination of government policy, which have been discussed above, are provided in the House of Lords at daily question time and during debates. The House of Lords is a very important body, as unlike the Commons it is an unelected body and its members can therefore concentrate their energies on their work rather than worrying about staying in power. It also has a lot more time to look over legislation compared to the Commons, which means it can scrutinise policies more vigorously. The powers of the House of Lords to reject legislation have been massively restricted by the Parliament Act of 1911 and 1949. The Parliament Act of 1911 stopped the Lords from vetoing any public legislation that originated in and had been approved by the Commons, and restricted their ability to delay such legislation to one month for "money bills" (dealing with taxation) and two years for other bills. The 1911 Act was amended in 1949 when a new Act was passed, which cut the time the Lords were allowed to delay legislation from three sessions over two years, to two sessions over one year. In 1945 the Salisbury convention was introduced, which stopped the House of Lords from opposing legislation, which was in its second reading and also promised in the governments election manifesto. However, this convention was introduced at a time when Clement Attlee's labour government won a landslide victory and had clear policies to introduce. After the 2005 election both the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives indicated that they no longer felt bound to the convention as a result of decreasing voter turnout and the low share of the vote held by the government, and that as a result would not support proposals such as id cards, despite being for frontal in Labours manifesto. After the Parliament Act of 1911 certain types of bills could be presented for royal assent without the approval of the House of Lords. In a convention that originated before the Parliament Acts the House of Lords is also restricted insofar as financial bills are concerned. The House of Lords may neither originate a bill concerning taxation or Supply, nor amend a bill so as to insert a taxation or Supply-related provision. Despite this the House of Commons will usually allow the Lords to amend bills concerning financial matters. Unlike the Commons the Lords does not have any control over the term of the Prime Minister or government. While the Lords has been made more representative with the removal of most hereditary peers, creating a situation whereby no party has overall control, every time it flexes its muscles, the government dismisses it for being unelected. Some would say that we need a second chamber which can effectively scrutinise and delay legislation based on a proper system of checks and balances and that the Lords is not it.
As I hope I have demonstrated there are a number of ways in which the legislature can hold the executive to account, but all of which come with their pitfalls, respectively. The Queen's residual powers to hold the government to account seem impressive in theory, but in practice they would never work. The House of Lords along with committees have that extra time to fully check and scrutinise policy and administration, but unfortunately their efforts are often in vain. It is the House of Commons which holds the full bulk of the power, and rightly so as it is an elected body, which has been put their by the people, us. However, could it be that there are not sufficient checks in place to stop the executive from passing any legislation it chooses; after all it is the case that the powers of the upper house have been stripped bare over the last century. What I think is clear is that although the means for sufficient scrutinisation are in place the extent to which these means are exercised are somewhat lacking.
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