Outside of Africa we have further secondary parties such as Belgium, whose city Antwerp is the diamond trading capital of the world. The US is also a secondary party, now for commercial purposes rather than ideological ones. It is predicted that Angola will provide 15% of America’s oil by 2010. Furthermore the USA, Russia and Portugal form a group called the Troika, who from the late eighties have been involved in attempting to broker peace alongside the UN.
The time period covered by this analysis will begin when the peace process started to collapse in July 1998. Although the violence continues today, a reversion to guerrilla tactics by UNITA in the first half of last year will mark the end boundary of this analysis.
3) Incompatabilities
The primary incompatibility between UNITA and MPLA concerns the issue of joint government. Following the failed elections in 1992, this is what the UN has been attempting to bring about. However after the fourth outbreak of war in 1998, it seems unlikely that the two parties will share power. MPLA will not allow UNITA into full power sharing until it demilitarises and incorporates its troops into the Angolan army or police force. So far UNITA has proved unwilling to do this.
The power-sharing problem also concerns the political leaders Jonas Savimbi and President Dos Santos. Getting them to meet has been an uphill struggle; both men refusing to leave their territories for fears of personal safety. Following Lusaka, Savimbi was offered the vice-presidency twice and after a prolonged period he turned it down. Savimbi has directly demanded that he should have power over at least some of the military and mining operations in Angola. This would be an impossible compromise for the MPLA, because it would give Savimbi too much destabilising power in the capital. However over the years of conflict it now seems that Savimbi would not have settled for anything apart from total control.
Non-party defined incompatibilities between MPLA and UNITA focus on the issue that despite peace being desirable as an ideal, the practical short term affects of peace on the two parties are difficult to resolve. Neither the parties nor their people have known anything but conflict since independence. Peace presents problems such as how one reintegrates the largest standing army in Africa back into civilian life. Furthermore the economies of the two parties have totally adapted to wartime conditions. Peace brings about the problem of accountability. The government has used the cloak of war to cover up its corrupt finances. However this cloak is not entirely opaque and it is obvious to the world that there is a great deal of personal embezzlement occurring within the MPLA elite. Furthermore the middlemen in the arms and diamond trades have a big interest in keeping a chief client in conflict.
4) Symptoms
The Government of Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), inaugurated on 11th April 1997, saw the introduction of some UNITA members into office. Despite this positive behaviour GURN significantly lacked the presence of Savimbi.
The UN frequently pressed both sides for the full implementation of the Lusaka peace process. However despite making numerous gestures over the following year, UNITA failed to follow through. Soon the attitude of conciliation turned to condemnation on both sides. UNITA talked of cruel barbarity from the Angolan government forces (FAA), while the MPLA accused UNITA of amassing troops. Both parties agreed in January, that the deadline for achieving Lusaka’s terms would be February 28th. However, inflammatory language and allegations quickly undermined any progress towards this lofty goal. One MPLA minister stated “February 28th will be just another date of no consequence,” while UNITA maintained that the FAA continued to brutalise its supporters, thus preventing demobilisation. These negative attitudes were complimented by negative behaviour.
Immediately after the formation of GURN, violent outbreaks occurred because UNITA failed to co-operate with the extension of government control when the FAA moved into regions under UNITA’s influence. This led to UN sanctions upon UNITA, despite the UN turning a blind eye on other violations of the cease-fire by both sides. For example it was reported that during the latter half of 1997 the government was increasing the amount of arms it bought. Furthermore the government was giving military support to help rebel movement in Zaire under Laurent Kabila, leading to the overthrow of the pro-UNITA president Kinshasha and the establishment of the DRC. This caused a major disruption in UNITA’s supply lines and limited its ability to hide troops behind the DRC’s border. Additionally UNITA was clearly not disarming adequately; 40% of the weapons and ammunition handed in were either in poor condition or unserviceable.
With this poor record of co-operation on both sides throughout 1997, the aim at fully implementing the peace process by the end of February 1998 was unrealistic. Despite common knowledge to the contrary, UNITA declared it had demobilised on March 6th. However the government accepted this statement and immediately legalised UNITA as a party, hoping to bring Savimbi to the capital, thus separating him from his troops. Savimbi of course was not willing to leave his secure position, without better status within the government, namely some military control. Government offers of ‘special status’ for Savimbi were all declined.
As had been the case prior to this time, both leaders failed to communicate, wanting only to meet each other in their own respective strongholds. The fact that there were numerous failed attempts to bring about meetings, caused more suspicion and distance to form between the opposing parties over the months before conflict seriously escalated.
March passed and UNITA continuously failed to meet deadlines, appealing for more time. It became clear UNITA was employing delaying tactics and that an explosion of violent behaviour was on the horizon. By June, the UN observers reported mobilisation of forces on both sides. The death of the UN special envoy to Angola, Alioune Beye, on 26th June in a plane crash, was the breaking point of the Lusaka peace process. It undermined mediation efforts and caused widespread insecurity – UNITA reasserted itself in several parts of the eastern province of Moxico.
5) Dynamics
Angola’s fourth civil war gathered strong momentum from July 1998, with UNITA making extensive advances from the outset. Immediately UNITA captured 68 areas that it had ceded to the government during the peace process. There was escalation of violence throughout the country; the most horrendous of which was a massacre in the mining village of Bula where 105 civilians were butchered. July also saw polarisation within GURN, when numerous UNITA members left the capital. Human Rights Watch reported that UNITA officials had been targeted and harassed since April. UNITA’s return to a war footing prompted the external factor of UN sanctions, freezing UNITA’s foreign bank accounts, banning its diamond exports and preventing UNITA air and water traffic. UNITA responded by pulling out of negotiations for two months, and in August the party became further polarised by ceasing to negotiate with the Troika, stating those nations were biased against it.
For the next six months the fighting continued to escalate, with the government struggling to gain any victories against a UNITA that had a military potential “far beyond what it had before.” In August, UNITA consolidated what would be its primary stronghold of Moxico province, while the FAA conscripted males aged 15-34 and targeted demobilised UNITA soldiers and officials.
September saw further advances by UNITA, with its progression in both Malanje and Uige provinces. UNITA received external assistance from DRC rebels in Uige. During October, fighting intensified in these northern provinces, spilling into Lunda Norte and Lunda Sol. Strategically these provinces were the chief diamond producing zones of Angola, and were thus essential for funding UNITA’s war effort. During this period there was significant polarisation with UNITA being suspended from GURN. However at this point a splinter faction of UNITA – the UNITA Renewal Committee (UNITA-RC) – was formed under the leadership of Jorge Valentim. This allowed the government to cut all ties with Savimbi’s UNITA, although Valentim’s movement received negligible support from UNITA members. In September the UN formally blamed UNITA for the present crisis; an external factor, which set the scene for the UN’s expanded efforts to undermine Savimbi’s UNITA regime.
By the end of the year, the violence had escalated to the level where it would stay for about a year. In December, prior to the government’s congress, the FAA launched a big air attack on the UNITA strongholds of Bailundo and Mungo. UNITA retaliated by indiscriminately shelling and forcing the government to withdraw from these cities. This caused full polarisation during the government congress. President dos Santos called for the withdrawal of the UN observer mission and the end of the peace process, as well as the total isolation of Savimbi. These requests were followed through when the government branded Savimbi a war criminal and rejected Lusaka in January.
During late December and early January two UN C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed in suspicious circumstances, causing a deterioration of relations between the UN and the two warring parties. The UN deplored the lack of co-operation by UNITA, and in a report, Kofi Annan stated that both the parties were to blame for the worsening situation. He stated that there was nothing left to do but to pull out the monitors and aid workers. GURN was also officially brushed aside by a cabinet reshuffle and President Dos Santos assumed full control over the FAA. This internal factor brought more cohesion to the MPLA, who were in an increasingly weak position sustaining further losses to UNITA and facing low cash reserves due to falling oil prices.
From this point, due to poor communications within Angola and, above all, the absence of UN monitors, the details of the violent conflict become sketchier. However it is clear that UNITA was on top for most of the year. There were atrocities on both sides. The UN condemned UNITA in May, for the indiscriminate shelling of Huambo, Kuito and Malanje. The un/under paid FAA troops also caused misery for many people, looting, raping in various communities. One report told of a man that had been shot in the legs for not immediately offering his possessions to government troops. By this time it was clear that the sanctions for restricting UNITA’s ability to sustain its forces were not working, and the UN launched an investigation into UNITA’s sanctions’ busting. This external factor sought to tighten the belt around those supporting UNITA’s illicit diamond trade by threatening to name and shame them. In August further external pressure began to limit UNITA’s room for manoeuvre. The leaders of fourteen countries from Southern Africa met as the Southern Africa Development Community, all voicing support for dos Santos, though not offering tangible military assistance.
The government sustained further defeats over August, and there were civilian massacres in Bie and Melanje. However the situation suddenly turned around in October when the FAA began to successfully secure the towns of Melanje and Bailundo. This defeat for UNITA was coupled with the external factor of De Beers, the world’s largest diamond trader, placing an embargo on Angolan diamonds. Another external development was the establishment of a UN office in Luanda.
The end of the year saw further successes by the FAA, who seized the town of Jamba, home to UNITA headquarters. Following this success the government reported that it had destroyed 80% of UNITA’s military capacity as well as cutting a key supply route. At this time too, the Namibian government began to actively support the MPLA. Over the first quarter of 2000, the government’s claims above seem justified. UNITA appeared disorientated, employing guerrilla tactics rather than large-scale military operations. As well as this internal factor, the UN sanctions’ busting report was published, severely criticising seven African states as well as Bulgaria and Belgium for allowing the trade of UNITA’s blood diamonds. This report intensified the problems for UNITA, making it harder to pass its diamonds through routes that had previously been non-problematic.
Over year 2000, heavy fighting became less pronounced and there was a certain degree of de-polarisation. President Dos Santos altered his hard-line attitude towards UNITA, by reaffirming the validity of the Lusaka Peace Process, and stating that Savimbi and his supporters would be forgiven if they renounced war. This was in reaction to the internal pressure of both an Episcopal letter from the Catholic Bishops of Angola and an Ecumenical open-air service in Luanda. However conflict continued in numerous areas, notably around the borders of Zambia and DRC, with the government quashing numerous uprisings on the borders.
September saw the beginning of high profile attacks by UNITA guerrillas, seeking international attention. Many of the attacks either targeted international structures or were at times when international officials were in talks with the government. In Soyo a Total/Elf/Fina oil well was destroyed.
UNITA was totally restricted to guerrilla tactics when it lost its last urban strongholds in October. This resulted in a major decline in conflict, despite numerous isolated incidences of violence still occurring. There are some key examples of this sporadic violence. During May 2001, and coinciding with a visit from the UN Secretary-General’s special advisor on Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, 150 civilians were killed in a series of attacks, as well as the kidnapping of sixty children from a Danish orphanage in Caxito. In July, coinciding with a visiting US delegation, UNITA blew up a train 130Km from Luanda, spraying bullets at passengers fleeing the burning carriages.
External factors constantly aimed to limit UNITA’s potential in 2001. The UN expanded its sanctions monitoring, seeing that the sanctions were beginning to take effect. However in April the UN Sanctions Committee issued reports stating that UNITA still had caches of hidden weapons throughout the country. There were some internal factors pointing to the significant de-escalation of conflict. Following a report by Savimbi that the FAA had routed his forces, the government declared the civil war had effectively ended. Significant also was the statement by President dos Santos, stating that he was not going to stand for the next election.
However UNITA clearly still had many weapons, and was not entirely dormant. The human cost of the war is hard to calculate, but was definitely colossal. The war was twice deadly; death resulted from fighting, but also from disease and hunger. This was aggravated by the huge number of internally displaced people, which peaked in 2001 at four million people (about a third of the population).
6) Power Relations
The power relations between MPLA and UNITA at least at the outset of the war were largely symmetric. However this symmetry changed from being balanced more heavily towards UNITA (1998-late1999) to being suddenly asymmetric with MPLA gaining more and more ascendancy (2000 onwards).
Militarily both sides were equally well equipped. However the large FAA lacked a good pay structure, causing troops to loot and almost enslave civilians in the areas it was occupying. This also led to the FAA having poor psychological resources, which was further aggravated by sustained military defeats through the initial eighteen months of war.
Economically both sides were particularly symmetric, earning hundreds of millions from oil industry (MPLA) and diamond industry (UNITA). To begin with low oil prices caused difficulties for MPLA, but this was resolved in 1999 by receiving $900 million in ‘signature bonuses’ from numerous oil companies for rights to explore and produce oil in blocks 31-33 off the shore of Angola. This money and the stable flow of cash from oil exports facilitated the government’s war effort. Conversely UNITA, despite making tremendous advances early on, began to find funding the war increasingly difficult with the belt around illegal diamond trading tightening, especially through UN sanctions’ busting investigations. Following the FAA’s success at taking Jamba (Dec 1999), key supplies were seized and supply routes were breached. This was a fundamental turning point, where the economic and military symmetry of the two sides was suddenly upset, with the government gaining the upper hand. Furthermore, the border areas where UNITA troops often retreated into, and hid weapons were becoming increasing vulnerable to government attacks.
While the FAA became psychologically stronger following their breakthroughs at the end of 1999, UNITA became weaker. This was compounded with the constant salvo of criticism ushering from the UN against UNITA’s actions, which gradually brought about more effective sanctions. This weakened the power relationship between UNITA and its trading partners such as Antwerp in Belgium. Furthermore the SADC meeting would have had a negative affect upon UNITA’s psyche, with all of the members casting vocal weight behind dos Santos.
7) Settlement Proposals
Despite the numerous third parties involved in the Angolan conflict, the UN has been the only one able to mediate and attempt to facilitate between the two warring parties. Throughout the conflict there was negligible dialogue between the two sides, who both desired an all-encompassing victory. It gradually became evident that this was not going to be possible. UNITA was weakened, but the FAA was unable to combat guerrilla tactics. Unfortunately the UN was not able to get an open dialogue rolling.
There were some positive signs. In June 2000 dos Santos stated that Lusaka could be re-validated, and that both Savimbi and UNITA would be forgiven if they renounced war.. There were defections, and the government actively welcomed UNITA deserters and placed them directly into the FAA. Some defectors were of high rank. However there was no sign of UNITA relaxing its attitude to peace
When the government did declare the effective end of the civil war, there was still no prospect of dialogue between dos Santos and Savimbi. Despite Savimbi stating that there was a ‘need’ for dialogue with the government, UNITA’s hit and run policy continued. During this time, Savimbi’s reputation throughout the world was so low that there was growing international consensus that he should leave the political scene.
It is easy to be idealistic when attempting to construct one’s own proposals for peace in Angola. Thirty years of war have meant that most people in Angola have known nothing but war, because the average age of mortality is around 45. I feel that the decision of President dos Santos not to run for the presidency again is a good one. It is a shame that Savimbi did not follow suit and stand down. The absence of these two elite antagonists will boost the chances for a multi-party government and hopefully democracy. However there is a lot more to deal with than individuals in government. More transparency in the government’s finances is required, especially in how it spends the revenues gained from oil exports. In this sphere the oil companies have a considerable amount of leverage to help the situation, since they can publish the amount of oil they extract from Angola, and how much they pay the government for it. Unfortunately most companies have been reluctant to do this, with BP being the only one to set this new standard of transparency. An amnesty on past corrupt activities, which have been obviously rife, might be the only way to persuade the potentially embarrassed government into bringing about transparency.
Furthermore there needs to be more attention to human rights issues in Angola. Even Angolan ministers point out the need for this to be addressed. The government must allow significantly greater press freedom if the country is going to become democratic. Most importantly there needs to be greater inclusion of the Angolan people into the decision-making processes. The last thirty years of top-down decision making has been disastrous for Angolans. Greater public involvement might bring about national reconciliation and peace building, but must be done without marginalising any one people – especially the Ovimbundu whom Savimbi previously represented.
In recent developments Savimbi has actually been shot dead by government forces (22nd February 2002). However a cease-fire has not yet been instated, despite government calls for UNITA to demobilise. Despite this fact, Savimbi’s death has brought about a new viable opportunity for peace. For the moment though, the dice are in the air and where they will fall is unclear.
Marcus Power, ‘Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economics of War in Angola,’ Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), No. 90 (2001) p489
Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) p15
Fernando Andresen Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, (London: Macmillan 2001) p20f
Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, ‘Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society,’ ROAPE, No, 90 (2001), p540f
Human Rights Watch World Report (HRWWP) 2002, p31f
Jedrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, ‘Oil & War in Angola’, ROAPE, No.90 (2000) especially p594
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southern Africa, December 2001-May 2002, p3
Christine Gordon, ‘Angola: between war and peace’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2000, p39ff
See Keesing’s Record of World Events (KRWE), entries for June 1997, 41671, August, 41759, October, 41850
‘UNITA resentment over UN sanctions decision’, KRWE, November 1997, 41899
‘Continued extension of state administration’, KRWE, December 1997, 41947
“Deterioration in prospects for peace”, KRWE, February 1998, 42052
“Renewed fears for the peace process”, KRWE, May 1997, 41624
“Renewed fears for the peace process”, KRWE, May 1997, 41624
‘Escalation of civil war’, KRWE, December 1998, 42656
‘Continued fighting’, KRWE, September 1998
‘Suspension of UNITA deputies and ministers – Divisions within UNITA,’ KRWE, September 1998 42477
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1195
‘Deterioration in relations with UN’, KRWE, January 1999, 42711
‘Government changes’, KRWE, February 1999, 42768
‘Moves to halt UNITA diamond trade by UN sanctions committee’, KRWE, July 1999, 43051
‘Intensified fighting’, KRWE, August 1999, 43902
‘Ban on Angolan diamond purchases’, KRWE, October 1999, 43187
‘UN report into sanctions’ busting’, KRWE, March 2000, 43445
‘Government offensive – Zambian concerns’ KRWE, May 2000,
The reports in the number of dead vary greatly due to the scarcity of information from rural areas. The lowest total number from the whole Angolan conflict is 500,000 and some sources state more than a million have died.
Jedrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, op. cit., p591
Steve Kibble & Alex Vines, op. cit., p543
‘Escalation of UNITA activity’, KRWE, May 2001, 44144
Steve Kibble & Alex Vines, ibid.
United Nations Statistics Division – Indicators on Health (page last checked 12/03/02)
‘Statement on re-election by president’, KRWE, August 2001, 44289
Christine Gordon, op. cit., p42