Should the President face cohabitation, his powers develop in a different way than if his term of office coincides with a Parliamentary majority for his party. The result of cohabitation is, broadly speaking, to limit the President to powers proscribed to the office under the constitution. That is to say, his role in foreign and defence policy. The emergence of cohabitation as a real political possibility in the 1980s has led to a strengthening of the constitution in many ways. President, government and parliament have had to fall back upon the actual provisions of the constitution itself, and heave had to use it more thoroughly to provide answers to the new conditional problems posed by cohabitation. Within France this development has led to a strengthening of the constitution within the system. This has been evident in the way that the constitution has continued to provide an unchallenged framework for the institutions of government in France, and the flow of political orientation and the shifting balance of power within this framework have been possible without a challenge being posed to the constitution itself.
The apparent return to constitutionalism prompted by the advent of cohabitation might be seen as a positive step in French political history. If we assume that it makes for a weaker presidency, we must also qualify this by saying that it makes for a more constitutional presidency. Whether the system of government is more balanced is more difficult to say, for it is still possible for a President to be elected in conjunction with a majority for his party in the Parliament. We might say that the system of government at least remains sufficiently stable to have widespread support. The French populace are largely in favour of cohabitation, and do not see it as a negative effect of recent politics. However, the French people continue to assert their belief in a strong president, and the fact that they can reconcile this desire with support for cohabitation suggests that the advent of cohabitation has not robbed the President of all his powers. During periods of cohabitation the President remains a key figure in French political life. He maintains his crucial role as head of state, and the dignity which accompanies this role is by no means diminished in periods of cohabitation. The power of the President in foreign and defence matters remains great, and his assent is still required to make law. The great importance of Presidential elections demonstrates well how the Presidency remains a core component in the French Political system, and the parties still seek the office of President above all else.
In periods of cohabitation, the executive effectiveness of the President and his staff is obviously weakened. In the first period of cohabitation the staff of the President were excluded from close contact with the ministries. In the second period of cohabitation this deliberate limitation was less evident, but the effectiveness of the Elysée was still limited. It is important to differentiate in this way between the three cohabitations. The different circumstances surrounding each of them, and the varying political climate of the day shaped the nature of the different cohabitations in distinct ways. In the first cohabitation of 1986 – 1988 the concept was a new one, and no one was entirely sure how the system might continue to function. The strong left-right animosities of the period led to a particularly adversarial atmosphere between the Prime Minister and the President. In contrast, the latest and current cohabitation of 1997 has seen not only the full acceptance of cohabitation as a norm of the French political system, but also a more co-operative relationship between President and Prime Minister. The current President has enjoyed considerable freedom of action, and there have been no notable large-scale rifts between Prime Minister and President. Since the first cohabitation, some of the schisms between the left and right wings of French politics have receded, such as the issue of privatisation that came to divide President and Prime Minister in the 1980s. In part this rise in co-operation is due to factors of personality rather than politics or constitution, but such changes nevertheless serves well to illustrate the differences between the three cohabitations.
I believe it to be important to bare in mind that cohabitation is by no means a permanent feature of the French political system. Rather, it has been a reaction to the errors, or perceived errors, of the President and his party. Thus, the President might be said to have weakened his own position before the electorate weakened it further by voting for the opposition party in Parliamentary elections. Before the President can face a cohabitation, he must have damaged the public’s faith in him as a ruler who deserves a compliant Parliament. Even should a President come to power in a period of opposition government, he can call a general election to ask the electorate to endorse their presidential selection by granting him a majority in Parliament. If this cannot be achieved, then we can presume that the President has weakened his own position and lost at least some of the confidence of the electorate. The occurrence of cohabitations is therefore a result of electoral ill-confidence in the President. The effect of cohabitation, imposed upon the President by the public, is a warning that he has failed to fulfil their expectations. The third cohabitation is perhaps the best example of such voter inflicted punishment of the President. Chirac’s attempt to gain an even larger majority in Parliament in the wake of a great many manifesto policy reversals following his election resulted in a electoral defeat of his party in Parliament. The resultant cohabitation may thus be seen to have originated in the ineptitude and weakness of the President rather than as a new and unrelated period of Presidential rule.
The power of the office of the President can be affected by many factors other than the existence or otherwise of a Parliamentary majority for the President’s party. The power of the office is an exact emanation of the President’s own personal position. The President and his staff are strongest when they are successful at uniting all concerned in the government machine, especially the Prime Minister. This task can be accomplished within period of cohabitation, albeit with more difficulty than in time of a parliamentary majority. The personality of the President, the issues of the day, and the general political atmosphere all have an impact upon both Presidential power and the balance of government. This is significant in that the nature of government in times of cohabitation is determined by many other factors than simply the fact that cohabitation is the current political situation. On its own, cohabitation is not all-defining in the political system. The ability of the French constitution to adapt without alteration to the advent of cohabitation in government, and the willing acceptance of cohabitation by the French people is evidence of the fact that by itself cohabitation does not define the nature of government in France. The continuation of stable government with strong leadership throughout the majority of the 1990s has demonstrated that the President can still take a very active lead in politics, and the advent of cohabitative governments is not a precursor to a decline in Presidential power in France.
In conclusion, the advent of cohabitation has made weakness in the Presidency more easily noticeable. In effect, a cohabitative government is a structural manifestation of a weak President who has at least not fully convinced the electorate of the validity of his programme. However, the President is not rendered impotent by cohabitation, and rather than in indictment of the office of the President, a cohabitation represents a constitutional shot off the bows from the electorate. The President has not been robbed of his ability to exercise strong executive power, but he has lost the ability to do so when the public do not endorse his parliamentary party. The system of government as a whole, if not made more balanced by the occurrence of cohabitation has certainly become more constitutionally aware in nature as a result. Increased faith in, and attention to the wording of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has been a result of cohabitation, and the way in which the constitution has so well risen to the challenge is in itself a factor that has contributed to stability and balance in the French political system.
Ministerial staff were instructed by the Prime Minister to refuse telephone calls from the Elysée, since all contact was to be routed through the Prime Minister’s office.
