Another reason is that it provides strong government based on clear political agenda. Even though governments today can be termed ‘largest organised minorities’, voters are aware that under the present electoral system they are electing a government with a defined programme. The doctrine of the mandate based upon the manifesto of the governing party is rightly regarded with suspicion but at least it is a rough yardstick by which the Governments performance can be judged at the next election. This is possibly one of the reasons that the Major government was not re-elected after it broke manifesto promises because of their dire economic situation.
One of the main features of the present electoral system is the close relationship between MP’s and their constituents, including those who did not vote for the winning candidates. This aspect of our representative system should not be tampered with lightly. The MP besides being a representative is also a source of information, an ombudsman and redresser of grievances. Any form of PR will almost certainly affect these much relied on roles adversely.
One of the many charges against the simple plurality system is that it encourages the practice of adversarial politics and the dire effects that flow from this. But again this should be seen in the context of clear policies offered and the victorious party being made accountable for these policies. Also it could well be said that adversarial politics is simply a reflection of the volatile mood of the electorate who prefer the alternative policies offered rather than a fudging, compromising amalgam of them.
The main alternative offered by the opponents of the present system is some form of proportional representation (PR). The most popular versions, Single Transferable Vote (STV), the Alternative Vote (AV), the Additional Member System (AMS) and its variation favoured by the Hansard society Commision (HSC). While they differ in the mechanics and degree or proportionality they usually advocate their case by emphasising the following points:
Representative fairness; the List System is the only once which will give a pure correlation between votes cast and seats won but since it discounts the element of the MP’s personality and worth and puts a premium on representation by party, it is usually ignored by PR proponents. The other forms will not give a true representation but they a certainly better in this regard than the present system. Women, ethnic minorities and other minority groups will have a much more likely chance of being elected.
Next is the Constituency relationship, is the single-member constituent relationship really so wonderful? Did Finchley’s forty nine percent non-Conservative voters feel linked to Mrs Thatcher or Sedgefields population to Mr Blair? Since there is no residential qualification for British MP’s can it always be said that voters believe in the abiding concern of MP’s for their constituents? There are numerous examples of MP’s having been rejected in one constituency, securing a seat in another. In fact multi-member government level district council wards are usually represented by three members.
In some PR systems e.g. Germany, single member seats are retained but even if multi-member constituencies are adopted the Irish experience tends to show that it is quite possible to strengthen the connection between MP’s and their constituents who have the luxury of being able to choose amongst the three to five available. It might well be that MP’s in multi-member constituencies can effect a division of labour and responsibilities.
One of the prominent charges against PR is that the intricacies of the voting procedure compared to the simple one in the plurality system will deter and confuse voters. From the experience of other countries like Ireland there is no evidence to support this contention. Voters soon adjust to the simple mechanics of placing the candidates in ranking order. The only complexity is the counting procedure behind the scenes but this, of course is immaterial with the use of computer technology today.
There is an assumption by the opponents of PR that coalitions and hung parliaments are inevitable is this system is adopted and the resultant consequences must be undesirable. There is a case to be made out for coalition government if the consensus reached does indeed comprise the moderate, centrist policies of the major parties. In any case even the present system can throw up indecisive results. In eight out of the past twenty four elections in Britain no clear decision was reached. In many countries like Sweden, Germany, Austria, coalitions have produced stable governments and in others like Spain and Greece PR has resulted in a majority single party government.
Nor is it necessarily true that coalitions must result in crisis and delays. In Britain between 1945 and 1975 there were more general elections and more changes in fiancé and foreign ministers than any PR countries including those mentioned above.
It is generally contented that PR encourages the growth and entry of small extremist parties into the legislative. Apart from the difficulty of defining ‘extremism’ and the assumption that such views should not be represented in Parliament, it is possible to do so by creating a specific threshold of percentage votes. In Sweden it is four percent and in Germany is five.
As a member of a European Community where most member states practise some form of PR, should not Britain come into sync? It is ludicrous that Britain should be the only EU country which persists with the plurality system for elections to the European Parliament. If Britain thought PR was apt for the short lived power sharing assembly in N.Ireland in 1973 it should be good enough for the rest of the U.K.
In conclusion, the strength of the case for retaining the present system of elections is that it places effectiveness, stability, stronger government above a concept of fairer mathematical representation.
Electoral systems should reflect the particular strengths of the country in question. What might be construed as suitable for continental countries with different historical and political traditions, is not likely to be easily drafted onto the British political system. There is little evidence that Britain’s many economic and social problems can be laid at the door of ‘first past the post’ and pre-occupation with electoral reform will simply divert attention away from much more pressing needs. The denial of democratic rights to smaller parties was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights in 1979 when the Liberal Democrats presented their case.
