How effectively and by what means can the legislatures in the UK and the USA hold the executive accountable?

Lucy Frith

The assemblies in the UK and the USA are bi-cameral in order to create checks and balances on the government and prevent executive dominance. There is a fusion of powers in the UK and so the government is in theory a parliamentary one as the executive is not separately elected. However, the idea of a parliamentary government is now largely a chimera as executive dominance of the legislature has created, in Hailsham’s words, ‘elective dictatorship’. The US government however is presidential and based upon Montesquieu’s principle of separation of powers with the legislature and executive being separately elected and independent of each other. Therefore the executive dominance experienced in the UK is avoided and so the legislature can more effectively hold the executive accountable.

This is a preview of the whole essay

In the UK in the twentieth century there was an increase in party ties and as a result of this, power shifted away from the parliamentary arena into the executive. Consequently MPs are less prepared to vote against their party, amplified by the increase in career politicians more concerned with developing a ministerial career, resulting in party in power being unwilling to criticise and hold accountable the party leadership. The loss of parliamentary influence over the executive was illustrated by the Thatcher government, which was able to push though major legislative change with little popular support. Butler et al have highlighted the failure of Conservative MPs to effectively oppose the poll tax due to the party whips “backed by the bloated pay roll vote embracing more than a third of all Tory MPs.” The poll tax further demonstrates the barriers in the way of the legislature when trying to hold to account a government with a large majority. The Thatcher government was only defeated on the 1986 Shops Bill – the third time in the twentieth century that a government with a majority has been defeated on the second reading. Indeed 95% of government legislation gets through due to lack of parliamentary scrutiny. However, there is a crucial need of the executive to have intra-party relations as ministers need the support of their own backbenches so there are continuous formal and informal interactions between them, allowing backbenchers to hold them accountable more successfully than the farcical point-scoring activity of ministers and prime ministers questions. These links exist in the Conservative Party through the 1922 Committee and for Labour through the Parliamentary Labour Party. Continual inattentiveness to the wishes of MPs would cause party problems. Backbench dissatisfaction is a key factor in explaining Thatcher’s resignation.

In contrast, parties in the US are largely amorphous organisations, allowing the legislature to more critical of the executive. Politicians often vote against the party and therefore the executive cannot get away with introducing unpopular legislation or relying on party support when it is needed such as in times of scandal e.g. Watergate affair. A weak whip system coupled with the fact that career advancement is not dependent on party loyalty as the appointment of a politician to the chair of a committee often marks the zenith of their career. However, Newt Gingrich Speaker of the House of Representatives (1995-1998) tried to strengthen party ties by placing new members of Congress who were the most committed to conservative principles on the most important committees. At the same time, Gingrich and other Republicans structured the work of the committees around the policies outline in the Contract with America and so ensured the passage of nearly all the proposals included in it. Furthermore there has been an increase in ‘party votes’ in recent years.

Butler, D., Adonis A. and Travers, T. – Failure in British Government: The Politics of The Poll Tax