How far do you agree that it was Cavour's diplomacy rather that Garibaldi's ideas and actions which made the greater contribution to Italian Unification?

‘The events of 1860 should serve as an encouragement to all high endeavour amongst us of a later age, who, with our eyes fixed on realism…are in some danger of losing our ideals and of forgetting the power of a few fearless men may have in a world where the proportion of cowards and egoists is not small’

          However, Garibaldi is sometimes criticised by Conservative historians like Cesare Cantù for his narrow thought processes and his fondness for military solution. It is important to note that Cantù was writing in 1878, soon after Italy was united. Although modern historians are able to look at the issues more objectively, it could be said that Cantù’s opinions hold more weight as he stood back from the veneration at the time:

‘Not for this man the ordinary procedures of liberal government. The only methods with which he was familiar were those of armed insurrection. He could destroy but did not know how did build. Cattaneo once suggested to him …that he should issue certain decrees…he merely replied, “My sword will do all that has to be done ”’ 

          On the other hand, Liberal enthusiasts such as Carlo Tivaroni praise Garibaldi for his ability to learn from his mistakes on the battlefield. In 1848 Garibaldi was defeated by the French whilst valiantly defending Rome, by 1860 he can be observed carrying out miracles of both strategy and tactics. This shows that he had learnt a good deal between 1848 and 1859. Tivaroni was a distinguished historian who fought alongside Garibaldi in 1866. The fact that Tivaroni worked so closely with Garibaldi is likely to have given him an insight into the figures personality and the source can be judged as being fairly reliable because it is a first hand resource. Alternatively, it could be said that a bias may exist because of their shared military experiences.

         It is evident that Garibaldi played a crucial role in popularising the idea of unification, especially in the early years of the Risorgimento, before the premiership of another key figure in unification, Cavour in 1852.

         Cavour is set apart from most of the other key figures of the Risorgimento because he was not a revolutionary nationalist but an astute politician. Cavour was essentially a Parliamentary Liberal who was sensitive to international events and understood power politics. Cavour was able to see the situation in Italy more objectively because he had a hierarchy of loyalties, primarily with Piedmont, secondly with Europe and lastly with Italy. A number of historians such as LCB Seaman and Denis Mack Smith argue that the issue of unification was not even one on the Prime Minister’s political agenda until 1859. Through studying his letters, Seaman concludes that Cavour’s main aim was Piedmontisation and not the unification of Italy. Smith expresses the view that essentially unification was just a fluke under Cavour’s ministry. Although, these historians views are valid, it is important not to underestimate Cavour’s significance in Unification.

         When Cavour came into power it was clear that he was a realist and he realised that Charles Albert’s dream of ‘Italia fara de se’ (Italy will make herself by herself) was impossible and they only way that Italy would be unified was with the military superiority of a great European power, namely France. Cavour’s ‘inheritance from Azeglio was the conviction that Piedmont instead of trying to go it alone as she had in 1848-49, must at least secure either French or English help’. This illustrates that Cavour learnt from his predecessor mistakes and therefore he was able to formulate more realistic policies.

             One of Cavour’s major contributions to Unification was gaining international acknowledgment for the cause. He did so by encouraging Piedmont to join the Crimean War on the side of the British and French. Although Piedmont’s contribution in the Crimea was minimal, this event alone contributed much to the success of Unification. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1856 Cavour was able to alert European powers of Piedmont’s presence and consequently Italy’s significance in the international scene. Due to Piedmont’s entry into the Crimean War Cavour was able to forge a strong relationship with Napoleon III. This relationship became the foundation for the foreign allegiance that would act as the catalyst for Unification.

           Cavour astutely saw that it was French intervention that had helped Pius IX to prevent the Roman Revolt in 1848 and thus he realised that he could use France’s military strength to his advantage with careful networking. In 1858 negotiations between Cavour and Napoleon resulted in the Plombieres Agreement that became crucial for unification. It stated France would come to Piedmont’s aid if Austria was the aggressor. Seaman categorises this compromise as the singularly most important factor to Italian Unification. This view is valid because had it not been for the 1859 war against Austria, Austrian influence would never have been expelled from the peninsula. This illustrates that it was through Cavour’s diplomatic negotiations that unification became more realistic. It is important to realise that Cavour’s attitude towards Italy displayed how his flexibility allowed his ideas to develop in a fashion that was ultimately beneficial for Italy. Cavour’s actions led to the creation of the fundamental geographical foundations for a unified Italy in the formation of the ‘Kingdom of Northern Italy’. Although there is little debate surrounding the importance of northern unification the fact that Cavour ceded Nice and Savoy over to France was seen a great betrayal by Italians especially Garibaldi as it displayed a lack of devotion to the Italian cause. However, this deficiency on Cavour’s part was counteracted by Garibaldi’s enthusiasm to recapture his hometown, Nice and so he set off on his expedition to the South where he unified Naples and Sicily.

         Another of Cavour’s positive attributes that is forwarded by Denis Mack Smith was that he knew his own limitations and was aware of other figure’s opinions of him illustrated by the following quotation:

‘Cavour was much aware of the fact that he had come into politics with little experience of administration …this remained one of the main charges against him’.

        Cavour was highly sensitive to the political climate. His pragmatic approach even though unpopular with his contemporaries, was his strongest attribute and enhanced the Unification movement. In contrast, Garibaldi’s passion for unification blinded him to the stark reality of international sensitivities and this ironically led to his downfall. Jasper Ridley claims that Garibaldi was ‘a great commander but not a great general’. This reiterates the point that Garibaldi was a poor military strategist. Garibaldi’s ideas were somewhat anachronistic in that ‘his political doctrines like his militant tactics belonged to the age before the machine gun’. To some extent Garibaldi’s heroic, romantic image was a superficial mask, which was only able to deceive the ill-educated peasants, as he appeared more transparent to the politicians. It was Cavour who persuaded Napoleon that the capture of the South was legitimate by making excuses about pacifying Garibaldi and holding plebiscites in Sicily, Naples and the Papal States. This instance illustrates how Cavour was a great leader in that he was able to adapt to dangerous situations by taking control.

          Cavour was a political master; it can be argued that the full extent of his talents was not truly acknowledged till after his death:

‘Cavour’s former colleagues succeeded him as Prime Minister. All claimed to follow Cavour’s policy. All were honourable men… But none lasted very long, none had the vision, the courage, the strength of character possessed by their predecessor. Not one of them had his ability to manage parliament, nor his fertility of expedient in foreign policy, nor the sheer virtuosity in every branch of the political arts, which Cavour exercised and with which he put his inimitable stamp on the most glorious decade in modern Italian history’

          Although Garibaldi and Cavour were dissimilar their strengths and weaknesses were clearly balanced out and this resulted in positive dynamic needed for Unification. It is important to discover the complexity of their relationship as although Trevelyan, Smith and Woolf are in agreement that much hostility lay between the two figures, there is still debate surrounding the dynamics of their relationship. Traditional historians had believed that they worked together to unify Italy via the plan instigated by Cavour. On the other hand, Revisionist historians express the view that in reality it was impossible for two figures to have a good communicative relationship as they hardly ever saw eye to eye. The following direct quotation from Garibaldi’s conversation to Vecchi displays a subtle hint of his opinion of Cavour. It is of significance that Vecchi had fought with Garibaldi in 1848 and played an active part in organizing the 1860 Expedition. Therefore it is likely that Garibaldi trusted Vecchi and thus expressed a truthful opinion:

‘Human beings are divided into two types; the selfish ones who never sacrifice anything for the common good and the true patriots who freely sacrifice what it most dear to them for the benefit of others. The latter are always misunderstood, insulted and dragged through the dirt while the former rule the world’

          Cavour too clashed with Garibaldi and is said to have called him ‘a meddling political innocent’ and although ‘appreciative as he was of some of the great things Garibaldi had done for Italy, he was convinced that the man was fundamentally a menace and a nuisance’. Smith has argued, that Cavour felt threatened by Garibaldi’s increasing level power especially in September 1860 when ‘ the more territory Garibaldi gained, the greater would be the momentum of the revolutionaries…the more they would be able to speak on terms of equality with Cavour’   

           An instance where we see the relationship tested to the limit is during Garibaldi’s Expedition to the South. There is debate surrounding Cavour’s attitude towards Garibaldi’s expedition. Traditional historians believe that in public the Prime Minister opposed the expedition, to retain their French ally but secretly Cavour encouraged Garibaldi. The following quotation from a letter written by Cavour to Baron Ricasoli, The Tuscan Governor General outlines his opinion that showing support for Garibaldi could be dangerous. Significantly, the letter was probably not intended for any form of publication therefore it shows Cavour’s honest opinion:

‘To help him openly we cannot…I cannot hide from myself the inconveniences of so badly defined a line of action, but I cannot think of another that would not be far more difficult and dangerous’ 

This quotation teamed with the fact that Cavour only had secret meetings with Garibaldi, display the inability of the Prime Minister to condone the revolutionary in public, as he knew that association with such a controversial figure could be politically damaging.

        However, the Revisionist historians adopt the view that Cavour was actually extremely concerned about Garibaldi and his expedition because he was aware that foreign forces could have been drawn into the peninsula in order to defend the Pope, as was the case in 1848.

         There is much controversy surrounding why such a rift existed between these two great figures of the Risorgimento and whether it was just clash of personalities or something deeper. Thayer claims that the tension between Cavour and Garibaldi had its roots in their contrasting ideologies. Thayer was an American historian, known for making the most pungent and effective attack on Garibaldi. Therefore one can expect there to be bias in his writings in favour of Cavour. :

‘The indictment against Garibaldi goes deeper than his hatred of Cavour; it concerns Italy herself. National unification was achievable only through the cooperation of the two elements – The Monarchy and the Revolution… (Garibaldi) dictatorial by nature neither understood nor respected the prosaic working of a constitutional regime ’        

         Garibaldi himself recognised there was tension between himself and Cavour. He knew that people thought there was a rift but he clearly denied that he instigated it as is illustrated from the following quotation from Garibaldi in confrontation that occurred between the two figures in Parliament in 1861:

‘I must say further that I am entirely convinced that this dualism didn’t originate from me’

         Although it is important to allow for the various perspectives of different commentators it is clear that certain conclusions can be reached. The process of Italian unification was a balance of factors including the changing international climate and more importantly, the strong leadership of both Cavour and Garibaldi. Garibaldi provided the bravery and military expertise that was needed to catalyse Unification while Cavour provided the political realism and international diplomacy that was essential to the Risorgimento. It is clear that neither of these figures could have single-handedly achieved unification. If unification were left to Cavour alone, it is possible we would not have seen the unification of the South. However, Cavour did possess the necessary qualities for unification. He was an opportunist and a pragmatist and he was also able to protect Italian unity in times of potential danger such as in 1860.The Risorgimento required political expertise and international diplomacy, which were present in Cavour. Although Garibaldi was considered to be a military genius, this quality alone was not and never would be enough to protect Italy from the military superiority of foreign forces; this was evident in 1848 with Garibaldi’s Roman Revolt. For this reason, we cannot celebrate Garibaldi’s military input to the same extent as Cavour’s contributions to unification. Although he was unable to inspire the masses with the same revolutionary zeal as Garibaldi, it was Cavour that was the leading force in unification at least up till 1861 as he was able to manipulate the political arena. Thus, Cavour’s diplomacy did make a greater contribution to Italian Unification than Garibaldi’s. There is an element of debate surrounding the success of the Risorgimento, yet we should not underestimate this momentous event in Italian history, which was only made possible by this clash between Cavour and Garibaldi and the fact that they were both able to put their differences aside in order to achieve the common goal of Italian unification.            

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