Yet in reality these wars were largely either the result of inherited expectation or were forced by an aggressive line adopted by the British Imperial presence overseas. In 1878, in Afghanistan, the hard line recommended by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, was taken in order to secure British interests in the East against an increased interest by Russia. Whereas South Africa was a situation mostly inherited by the previous Government, presided over by Lord Carnarvon, to create a federation of British interests in the Cape, rather than any Disraeli driven strategy to expand the Empire.
The famous purchase of the Suez shares from the almost bankrupt Khedive of Egypt was, once again, an opportunist act, not simply to protect the route to the India, as the Jewel in the Crown, but an act expected of a great Imperial power, and in particular, as a political statement to France. For Disraeli, the Empire was a means of spreading the peculiar glories of aristocratic rule and the English constitution, with the Empire as a benevolent despot. But more importantly, Disraeli also used this as a means of attracting working-class voters at home. He knew that the Empire could distract people from domestic issues and that pride in the Empire could act as powerful force for the good, in terms of his own political gain.
Gladstone, on the other hand, was a political idealist with strong convictions and a deep rooted respect for religion. Gladstone saw an opportunity to exploit what he saw as a reckless, foreign policy, intent on domination regardless of the cost and irrespective of civil liberties. This, in part, will have contributed to the Liberal victory of 1880. The pre-election campaign focussed on Disraeli’s war-mongering expansion of empire, taking issue with what Gladstone saw as the principles of foreign policy: the preservation of peace and justice (with economy), the avoidance of needless engagements, the acknowledgement of ‘equal rights for all nations’, to maintain the ‘concert of Europe’ rather than taking divisive action, and to encourage the ‘freedom’ of nations and individuals’. Above all, Gladstone accused Disraeli of using these romanticised overseas actions to hide issues of important domestic policy. The acquisition of Cyprus in 1878, following the Congress of Berlin was presented by Disraeli as another success, another example of securing the route to India, whilst Gladstone saw it as an illustration of a flawed policy, stating that this link had no historical or cultural basis, and that the relationship would be one of subordination and suppression. In this, the conflict of two opposing ideologies can be seen.
But the greatest criticism of Disraeli was the lack of detail involved in his imperialist polices. Disraeli would be content with sweeping hand gestures of promoting British interests abroad but would leave the detail as to how this would be managed to others; a victory for style and presentation rather than substance. And it was this that Gladstone loathed the most.
The categorisation of opportunist and idealist could be applied to Disraeli and Gladstone respectively. Disraeli as the arch imperialist, who presided over a period of rapid expansion and bloody conflict, but without ever articulating a vision for the future, found himself in a position where the ground work for imperial expansion had already been laid. In this, Disraeli contributed little other than to exploit these circumstances for his own political gain. Gladstone, on the other hand, talked about the fraternity of nation states, the preservation of equal justice and human rights, at a time of great competition and instability. Imperialism was a popular cause and security of our interests abroad, in particular India, could not ignored. And whilst Gladstone’s effort to discredit Disraeli was to be expected, it might be unrealistic to expect that Britain could have pursued a significantly different policy during the period 1874- 1880.
