The notion that the Fourth Reform Act was the key reason for Labour growth after 1918 would be a misinformed viewpoint to subscribe to. Michael Hart elaborates on this in his article “the Liberals, the War and the franchise” where he points out that areas of “low enfranchisement” before 1918, such as Birkenhead, Manchester, Cardiff and Swansea, still remained Liberal Majorities after 1918. So what else allowed the Labour Party to consolidate itself as the new opposition? A possible answer is apparent in the following statement; “After 1918 Labour was the party best able to exploit industrial unrest and to propose radical solutions.” The end of the Great War brought with it the problems of demobilisation and conversion of the British economy back to peacetime production. Fall in demand for coal, ships and steel accompanied by the Coalitions obsession with balancing budgets and cutting expenditure (Geddes Axe) saw a colossal rise in unemployment throughout the 1920’s. The unemployment experienced “never fell below a million during the 1920’s in the old industrial heartlands of South Wales, the West of Scotland, Lancashire, Tyneside and West Yorkshire.” The unrest experienced in these industrial areas transferred superficially into safe Labour regions because many of those who suffered loss were affiliated with a Trade Union and Labour had come to be known nationwide as the political representation of the Unions.
The Labour Party developed substantially during the First World War gaining experience in office and enjoying significant responsibility in ministries including education and labour. Arthur Henderson occupied a position on Asquith’s War Cabinet but, after Lloyd George took over leadership, was forced to resign in light of the “Doormat incident” and went on to pioneer the development of the party constitution, policy aims and reorganisation of the Party’s structure. Henderson, with the help of Sidney Webb fused together the socialist and Trade Union elements of the party so that membership did not have to be through a Trade Union, instead it could be made directly to the Labour Party. The new executive gave a significant amount of influence to the Trade Unions and incorporated them into the party on a permanent basis. The socialist element of the new constitution was defined in Clause IV committing the party to “the common ownership of the means of production,” an element that Phillips believes brought much support to the party from “those wage earners who remained in civilian life” during the War. The increase in wages and job security brought about by the War was interpreted as the product of nationalization under the ‘war economy’ and “workers naturally wished such control to continue, and were drawn to the Labour Party as the champion of nationalization.” Phillips argument is reasonable, however it was the Wartime government, comprised mainly of Conservatives and Liberals, which took control of the five major production industries and this factor could alternatively account for the sweeping majority in favour of the Conservative coalition in 1918 albeit the Conservatives had no desire to continue public ownership after the War.
Before 1931 James Ramsey MacDonald demonstrated the importance of personalities in history by contributing to the rise of Labour after 1918 and arguably transforming Labour from a party of protest to into a party of politics before and after the War. The illegitimate son of a female house servant, Macdonald became leader of the Labour Party and later the first Labour Prime Minister in 1923, but after 1931 came to be hated and reviled in the party he allegedly sold out. Regardless of his popularity, Macdonald conducted himself and his party in a moderate manner after the war in a successful attempt to ease concern and dissolve suspicions that the party had radical and revolutionary potential. C.J. Collier discusses how “Macdonald realised that he had to make Labour appear respectable and non-threatening if he was to win over middle as well as working class votes.” Macdonald needed to dispel Tory Propaganda if Labour were to establish themselves as moderate and although he faced set backs like the Zinoviev letter in 1924, his first office with Labour had demonstrated their competence in handling the day to day responsibilities of governing without pursuing radical policies that some backbench MPs had hope he would. His appointment of a moderate chancellor in Phillip Snowden helped demonstrate Labours modest nature and as Laybourn points out, “Snowden was a Gladstonian liberal in his economics, committed to free trade, returning to the gold standard, and balanced budgets,” going on to state “nationalization and major social reforms were to be distant objectives.” MacDonald did pursue some social reforms and in office he gained popularity for legislation increasing pensions and unemployment benefit and for the Wheatley and Greenwood Housing Acts which pleased many ex-servicemen who had felt let down by the Coalitions prudent public spending plan after the War.
Another moderate in the Party and a socialist by heart who played a vital role in construction the party, Arthur Henderson, also demonstrated the Party’s credibility in 1920 when he objected to Communist involvement with Labour, concerned of the “fundamental and insuperable differences between the two parties.” Members of the party, notably MacDonald, came under scrutiny from Communists in 1921 after any agreement between the two became inconceivable. Communists targeted MacDonald’s war record and branded him “a broken-down political hack” placing Labour “amongst the forces of capitalism” and Communists claim this was a key factor in Labours defeat at a by election in East Woolwich in March 1921. Moore agrees, “This may well have been the decisive factor” in the defeat in March but Labours opposition to a Communist element in the Party continued and on the whole gave them more credibility as a party committed to parliamentary reform and change through legislation not revolution.
The rise of the Labour Party after 1918 coincided with the unprecedented decline of the Liberal Party and some historians claim that as early as the 1918 election Labour had already overtaken the Liberals as the main party of opposition. Primarily a split in the Liberal ranks, that Roger Moore claims signifies the start of Liberal trouble, was the centre cause of the decline. He writes “by the middle years of the War the Liberals were clearly dividing into followers of Lloyd George and those of Asquith, and Lloyd George’s decision to continue with the coalition arrangement after the war perpetuated the split.” Indeed Phillips supports this view adding, “The Liberals electoral organisation had unquestionably suffered from the resultant ill-feeling and uncertainty.” The “coupon” election returned 136 Liberals to office, however “many of their seats were held by courtesy of the unionists and several were in industrial areas where the electoral support was being rapidly eroded by Labour” as Moore continues. In support of Moore it was clear that industrial Britain after 1918 rapidly became Labour strongholds. For example the industrial heartlands of Western Scotland, the coalmining constituencies of South Wales, not to mention Lancashire and the fishing town of Jarrow where more than 90% unemployment was experienced, became increasingly inclined to vote Labour in light of Liberal failings.
Regarding the view that Labour was responsible for destroying The Liberals, Phillips claims after the fall of the 1922 Coalition “it was not until another two years, and two elections had passed that Labours destruction of the Liberals was complete.” After a brief term in office (Jan-Oct 1924) MacDonald was eager to fight another election. Although MacDonald knew the October election would not bring another Labour government into office, he hoped that given the Liberals instability and inconsistency, the election would spell the end of the Party as a credible opposition. From the results of that election it is clear that MacDonald’s presumptions were justified because The Liberal vote fell from 29.6% to 17.6% and their share of seats in Parliament fell to a pitiful 40 whereas Labour with 151 seats had consolidated their position as the leading opposition in Westminster.
Of course we cannot blame the decline of the Liberals completely on the Labour Party as there were significant political factors underlying their growing insignificance in British politics, for example the temporary solution that Irish home rule brought after 1921 hit the Liberals hard due to the loss of consistent support they had received from Irish Nationalists before 1921. Also the increasing irrelevance of core Liberal policies, to name a few; laissez faire governing, balanced budgets, free trade, disestablishment, temperance reform, non-sectarian education and the gold standard, all saw the Liberals slipping into the realms of insignificance between the wars. The growing awareness of class-based politics after the War saw The Liberals being squeezed out of a political system that was rapidly becoming a contest between workers and employers.
Moore talks about the contribution of the Conservative Party adding to the rise of Labour, and he states that, the Conservative input in Labours rise was “highly significant”. Indeed Moore talks about Maurice Cowlings claim, “the Conservative leadership took a conscious decision ‘to make Labour the chief party of opposition.’ ” He also continues to discuss how Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin set out, after the fall of Lloyd George from the coalition, to promote the Conservatives as “the party of resistance” against the growing “threat to the existing social order posed by the rise of Labour.” Moore discusses how after 1922 Baldwin “devoted a significant part of his time to securing what Leo Amery was to call ‘the right solution’ that is for The Liberal Party to disappear by one section joining with and diluting the Labour Party and the other section coming into line with [the Conservatives]”. Although high politics in the Conservative Party may have indirectly helped Labour achieve second party status after 1918, it would be safe to say that even without this element Labour would still have made the gains it did, and Moore admits in his conclusion that “Labour would have advanced in these years whatever the Conservatives decided to do”.
There are many factors involved in accounting for the rise of Labour between 1914 and 1923 but the question of significance still remains unresolved. The rise of Labour was rapid after 1918 and we can safely conclude that it was due to many factors that this occurred. Growing social tensions, unemployment, The Representation of the People Act, Labour ministers war time experience, important personalities in the Labour Party, Trade Union growth, the Liberal split, Clause IV, the list goes on. One important event underlies each of these factors, that being the War. “But for the First World War, [enfranchisement] would have been worth much less to Labour” as Michael Hart points out; “The War caused the Liberal Party to break up intellectually” state Clarke and Tanner. Without the war Henderson would not have gained experience working in a cabinet, Trade Unions would not have grown on the same scale and state intervention would not have evolved as it did, let alone display its unprecedented success. The First World War produced the perfect conditions for Labour to grow and with good leadership, sound policy and perhaps a bit of good fortune, the Party successfully established itself as one of the premiers of the two-party British electoral system.
Bibliography
Laybourn, Keith., The Labour Party 1881-1951, (USA, 1988), pp. 78-92.
Laybourn, Keith., The Rise of Labour, (UK, 1988), pp. 47-67.
Moore, Roger., The Emergence of the Labour Party 1880-1924, (UK, 1978), pp.162-195.
Pelling, Henry/Reid, Alastair., A Short History of the Labour Party, (London, 1996), pp. 1-47.
Phillips, Gordon., The Rise of the Labour Party 1893-1931, (London, 1992), pp. 26-39.
Websites:
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Laybourn, The Labour Party 1881-1951p.79
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party 1893-1931 p.36
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party 1893-1931 p.38
Laybourn, The Rise of Labour, p.19
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party 1893-1931 p.36
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.188
http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1918_1939.php
Pelling and Reid, A Short History of the Labour Party, p.39
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1893-1931 p.29
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1893-1931 p.29
Collier, The Rise of Labour, Jstor p.1
Laybourn, The Rise of Labour, p.58
Laybourn, The Rise of Labour, p.58
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.179
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.179
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.179
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.179
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.181
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1893-1931 p.37
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.181
Phillips, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1893-1931 p.
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party1180-1924, p.184
Hart, The Liberals, The War and the Franchise, Jstor article, p.821
Laybourn, The Rise of Labour, p.20