It was the weakness of the provisional government that brought the October revolution about rather than the strength of the Bolsheviks. Do you agree?

Tom Wallis 12WH

The revolution of 1917 saw the fall of the Tsar and his system of autocracy. A Provisional government was set up, consisting of the Tsar’s former members of the Duma or representative assembly. This government was only in power for a few months. At first sight it may seem that it was the strength of the Bolsheviks and Lenin that brought the downfall of the provisional government. However, on closer inspection one can see that it was a combination of the Bolsheviks strength and decisive actions coupled with the weaknesses of the provisional government that led to its demise.

During 1917 the political system of Russia, and the political opinions of its public, had begun to change. The First World War was taking its toll with the casualties running into millions and food shortages reaching crisis levels all across Russia. Presided over by the Provisional Government, who had little support and even less real power, the people of Russia became restless. In October, the animosity between Government and populace came to a head, and a revolution put Lenin's socialist Bolshevik party in power.

After the abdication of the Tsar in 1917, Russia was left virtually bankrupt. It was decided that the Russian people should democratically elect a new Constituent Assembly. Until an election could be organised, the Provisional Government, made up partly of ex-Duma members, was placed in control of Russia. With a failing economy and escalating inflation it seemed the provisional government’s only option was to continue to fight in the war in the hope that the allies would offer help in rebuilding Russia and replenishing the economy. This decision was unpopular, putting the provisional government in an unstable position. At this point Lenin was not even in the country, it seemed he would not be able to take advantage of the provisional government’s unpopularity at this point.

Large delays prevented the election of a constituent assembly to replace the provisional government. The government stayed in power far longer than was originally planned, by October their failings had resulted in leaving them little real power and almost no public support.

In July 1917, Kerensky became war minister. Although staying in the war was a contributor to the weakness of the provisional government, Kerensky; through his strong personality, determination and skill at speaking, gave the government strength.

Arguably the largest factor in the public unrest was the fact that the Provisional Government insisted on Russia continuing to fight in the First World War. Millions of Russians had been killed, a large percentage of them “peasants in uniform”, that is farmers who were untrained and unprepared for what awaited them. The professional conscripts of the Russian army had been wiped out in the first conflicts with Germany, leaving no choice but to fill their positions with peasant recruits. With so many farmers fighting or already dead, coupled with severe inflation due to lack of government control of the economy, huge food shortages swept across Russia.

The Bolsheviks constantly criticised the provisional government for not calling a constituent assembly. This criticism highlights the provisional government’s lack of legitimacy (it had not been voted into power) as well as one of the problems it faced. Perhaps if an assembly had been called the Bolsheviks would not have seized power as easily. It is almost certain that the Bolsheviks would not have gained a majority in any assembly as was shown later on; once the Bolsheviks had seized power, they called a constituent assembly in 1918 and gained just 23% of the vote, with the SRs at ...

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It can be argued that many of the problems that Russia faced over this period were not those of the Provisional Government. The end of autocratic rule brought new hope to millions of Russians, but it also left behind it the problems that had led to its demise in the first place. These factors, particularly the food shortages and the war, were not the fault of the Provisional Government, and therefore they were not entirely accountable for their outcomes. The Government was not, after all, expected to be permanent as they were supposed to be a stop-gap between the Tsarist regime and an elected Constituent Assembly. Therefore in many ways it did not have the capability to carry out large-scale reform.

There is some evidence to show that the provisional government was trying to win over the people; once the government was in place, all political prisoners were freed, an eight hour day was introduced for industrial workers and the Tsars secret police was abolished. However, on the other hand the Provisional Government made no real attempt to solve many of the problems it faced (such as food shortages, a disobedient army and general lawlessness), and created many of their own.

As well as the lack of public support, the Provisional Government was almost powerless in political and military terms. The Soviets, elected by workers and peasants, were generally elected against the Government and had almost complete control of the army and many transport links, making military control by the Government practically impossible.

Another blunder on the part of the Provisional government was its plan to tackle the escalating crime levels in Russian towns by reorganising the police system. The existing system was disbanded, but a new structure never came into effect, and left many areas of Russia with effectively no organised police presence.

No government can stay in power if they do not have control of the army. The provisional government had little or no control of Russia’s army. The soldiers were ordered to set up committees to have control over all weapons and other equipment, leaving the provisional government all but powerless. However, they did gain some vital support during the July Days. The Bolsheviks led protests demanding the over throw of the government. These protests were poorly organised, many Bolsheviks were in disagreement, undecided as to what to do; wait or support the demonstrations. This lack of organisation resulted in blood shed and the Bolsheviks lost much support. Kerensky took the opportunity to “blacken the Bolshevik name”, to attack the Bolsheviks credibility, thus increasing the power of the provisional government.

The Bolsheviks soon hit back however, they were permitted to reenter Russia in order to defeat General Kornilov. The provisional government was simply too weak to prevent Kornilov from taking control of Petrograd. The Bolsheviks defeated Kornilov; they were now seen as heroes by the people making them stronger than ever. The provisional government’s reaction to this was to attempt to ban the party, an extremely bad move as this greatly reduced its already diminishing support. Instead of the desired effect, the destruction of the party, it meant they received support and popularity grew.

The Kerensky offensive and the Kornilov affair were two of the Provisional Governments worst mistakes. After the Kerensky offensive it became clear that not only was the Government ignoring Russia's pleas for peace, but that they were making military decisions rashly and incompetently, at the expense of Russian men.

In an attempt to pacify some of its adversaries, the Provisional Government also made a series of blunders that drastically backfired. The first was the decision to release a large number of political prisoners and to invite Trotsky back from exile, with the view that this would calm those who rallied for free speech and political opinion. However, this (predictably) was not the case. The return of so many Marxist and socialist minds was a sign to many that the time had come to take action, and helped to make political groups more organised and generally more active. The membership of the Bolsheviks rose, and again people lost faith in the Government in the face of its naivety.

Kerensky and the Provisional cabinet were also resented by the public because they had not been elected into office; many suspected that the Government members were attempting to delay the Constituent Assembly elections for as long as possible so that they could retain their positions.

Faced with an incompetent and weak government, increasing food and fuel shortages, and the lack of police or army presence, much of the country turned to desperate crime. In the country, peasants seized land as fast as they could, often looting and burning the large, stately mansions of landowners as they went. In the towns, where daily bread rations for workers had dropped from 675g to 110g in just seven months, the situation was reaching fever pitch. N. Sukanov, living in Petrograd at the time, recalls “destruction of homes and shops… unauthorised arrests, seizures and beatings up were recorded every day.”

Although, as the historian Darby states, many people were simply “turning to the Bolsheviks not because they were…committed to Bolshevism, but because they had become dissatisfied”, the Bolsheviks also strongly appealed to a large proportion of Russia, particularly in the weeks leading up to the revolution as the country became more dissatisfied and unsettled. Support for the party grew from 200,000 members in August 1917 to 340,000 in October 1917, and Lenin's April Theses had become the political bible for many of the party's Marxist followers.

The situation rapidly worsened: “…robberies and housebreaking increased… week by week, food became scarcer…towards the end there was a week without bread at all.” (John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World). The Bolshevik party, with Lenin’s pledge of “bread, peace and land” was one of the few realistic alternatives to the Provisional Government; the Bolsheviks took full advantage of the people's unrest and the Government's weaknesses.

Control of the army and soviets allowed the Bolsheviks to be in a position of immense power, particularly with the assumed backing of the public. Lenin also took the opportunity to return to Russia, aided by the German government who realised that if Lenin came to power he would take Russia out of the war, with the view to initiate a revolution as soon as possible.

The Bolshevik leadership, including Trotsky, was at first extremely wary of launching into a revolution with the country being so unstable. Kamenev and Zinoviev in particular wanted to see the results of the long-awaited Constituent Assembly elections, believing that both economically and socially Russia was not prepared for a Bolshevik revolution.

Lenin’s return to Russia in April 1917 achieved even more support, largely due to popular slogans such as, “Peace, bread and land” and “All power to the Soviet.” The fact that Lenin returned time and again to lead the Bolshevik party (he had gone into hiding and been exiled many times before) was testament to his determination. Lenin played a huge part in bringing about the seizure of power in 1917, he ordered his party to seize power and after much deliberation and inactivity still there was little done. Lenin urged as immediate a change as possible. The Bolshevik members were greatly outnumbered by the three other main socialist parties in the Congress of Soviets by 638 to 105, and Lenin was realistic about the party's chances of winning power in the ever-looming Constituent Assembly elections. If the people had voted, then the new party in power would have far more support and power than the Provisional Government, making the chance of a successful Bolshevik revolution slim. After avidly explaining his opinion, a vote carried out within the Bolshevik leadership decided that an armed rising was inevitable and that the time for it had come. Lenin’s fantastic leadership not only got the Bolsheviks into power but also kept them there; it was his willingness to sacrifice ideology for the good of the party that kept the Bolsheviks alive.

The revolution itself was conducted surprisingly quickly and with almost no violence, partly due to Trotsky's detailed planning, and the provisional Government's swift abandonment of the Winter Palace, aided by blank warning shots fired from a moored naval ship, the Aurora. Kerensky fled to the American Embassy and then to Europe, Russia was finally in the hands of the Bolsheviks. By 27th October 1917, after just four days, an all-Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars was in place, with Lenin as chairman.

Although the Bolsheviks' public support, Lenin's appealing manifesto and strong leadership were important factors in the Bolshevik's success, their main advantage was Lenin's determination to seize the opportunity that he saw before him. The Bolshevik's had missed a number of opportunities in previous months; October may well have been their last chance if Lenin's prediction of the election's outcome was correct. It was the failings of the Provisional Government, rather than solely the appeal of the Bolsheviks, that provided this opportunity, had the Provisional Government not been so appalling in its leadership, the Constituent Assembly elections would have taken place as planned, and the Bolsheviks would have remained a marginal party in the Congress of Soviets.

The Bolsheviks successfully capitalised on the Government's diminishing power and support, this should not be denied as an achievement. However, as has been shown, their success was due as much to opportunity and luck, and the failings of the Provisional Government, as to the Bolshevik Party's power itself. In 1917 almost every person in Russia knew that change needed to happen quickly. The Bolsheviks were the result of that change because they saw the opportunity to exploit the situation.