UNO and Kashmir:
United Nations made to reconcile the conflict between India and Pakistan, its successes and failures, the causes behind the failures, and the prospects for the future. I will attempt to show that the UN failed to bring about a lasting solution to the problem because the UN has very limited abilities when the parties to a conflict have very differing views and are unwilling to compromise on their positions. Even diplomatic efforts under Chapter VI of the UN Charter by major powers interested in the conflict’s resolutions are insufficient in cases where the powers are unable and/or unwilling to exert a lot of pressure on both parties to give and take. The UN has more powers under Chapter VII, but such involvement requires a level of commitment on the part of major players in the UN which is rarely seen, and in the case of military middle powers such as Pakistan and India, the use of brute force is never really an option. Under UN mediation, a ceasefire was agreed upon on January 1 1949. It is important to note here that the original petitioner to the UN was India. However, the later delaying tactics and disregard to the UN process may lead to the conclusion that India used the Security Council apparatus to obtain a temporary respite in the military campaign that was not going according to her liking, and once its military forces were firmly established in the region, it saw little need to continue a serious debate over the Kashmir issue at the UN. Of course, the Indian side accuses Pakistan of using the US to cut its own military losses. The fact of the matter remains that the perception of both sides is that the UN was a mechanism used to further their own narrow national interests, and that the other side was playing the same game.
The 1947/48 Indo-Pak War over Kashmir ended with a ceasefire mediated by the United Nation. This body became involved in the Kashmir dispute when the India government appealed to the UN to tell Pakistan to stop meddling in the State—legally Indian Territory following Hari Singh’s signing of the Instrument of Accession. The Indian complaint was based on Article 35 of theUN Charter whereby any member could bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace. But, instead of condemning Pakistan, the Security Council responded by establishing a Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which had the dual function of investigating the facts and exercising any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties. Thus, in effect the UN acknowledged that the Kashmir dispute was an international one and not an internal Indian affair. The UNCIP did eventually succeed in implementing ceasefire, on 1 January 1949, and an UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) was set up to monitor the ceasefire line.
So much for ending hostilities. With respect to permanent resolution of the conflict, the UN’s line virtually from day one was to leave it to the Kashmiris themselves—the future status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined in accordance with the will of the people. Having decided a free and impartial plebiscite was the best way to establish what this was, the UN turned its efforts to creating the conditions for such an exercise to be carried out.
The major stumbling block was demilitarization. In order to guard against ‘intimidation (coerce) and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled’ it was deemed necessary for both Indian and Pakistani troops to withdraw from their respective halves of the State. India---which was already beginning to rue Nehru‘s referral of the dispute to the UN—was particularly reluctant to withdraw its forces from Kashmir (even though it would be allowed to leave a minimum force). It rejected the demilitarization proposals submitted by General Mc Naughton, President of the Security Council, in December 1949.
In 1950, the UNCIP__a body whose members often could not agree among themselves was replaced by a single UN Representative, the first of whom was an Australian, Owen Dixon. Dixon soon concluded that there was little hope of reaching agreement on demilitarization of the entire state. He therefore took a new approach in his report, submitted to the Security Council in 1950 that of holding regional plebiscites. Dixon put forward two main proposals: 1) holding a plebiscite through the entire state, one region at a time, or 2) only holding a plebiscite in regions which were doubtful those that would definitely vote for accession to India or Pakistan would be allocated to those countries without a vote. The latter plan, in effect, confined a plebiscite to just the Vale of Kashmir. Confident that Sheikh Abdullah could secure the Valley for India, Nehru favored the second plan; for the same reason Pakistan rejected it (though officially the claimed it was because the State should be considered as a whole; it could not be partitioned). Following Dixon‘s failure, the UN tried twice more to get India and Pakistan to agree on conditions for holding a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. Frank Graham was appointed UN representative in 1951, he stayed in the post until 1953__and Gunnar jarring in 1957. Both were unsuccessful.
After this initial decade of keen involvement in Kashmir, having reached a stalemate, the UN pretty much stepped out of the picture. However, it did leave a very important legacy: the Security Council resolutions declaring the Kashmiri people should decide the future of the State.
USSR as Mediator and Tashkent Declaration:
Once the ceasefire was put into effect an uneasy truce prevailed. Neither the United States, preoccupied with Vietnam, nor Britain was in a position to pressurize India to negotiate a settlement over Kashmir, which would be favorable to Pakistan. India was certainly not going to give up through diplomacy what Pakistan had failed to secure in war. Swaran Singh, the Indian Foreign minister, had declared in General Assembly that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that its future was not negotiable. Bhutto’s veiled threats in the General Assembly and Security Council that Pakistan would have to withdraw from the UN unless the ceasefire was made conditional on a resolution of plebiscite issue went unheaded. In 1965 Kremlin had changed from its Khrushchev _era attitude of being strongly pro-India on the issue of the Jammu and Kashmir, to a more neutral (at least in statement; it was still supplying New Delhi arms) stance under the leadership of Alexei Kosygin. The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was formally brought to an end by signing the Declaration at Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed it on behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them
Even before hostilities had started, on 20 August 1965, Kosygin offered to act as mediator in negotiations between Pakistan and India .At the time both the parties had rejected this offer. However. When it was repeated on 17 September with Tashkent suggested as a possible meeting place, Shastri accepted almost immediately, and Ayub Khan some months later (on 25 November). Talks between Kosygin, Shastri and Ayub Khan were scheduled to start in Tashkent on 3 January 1966.Initially, and indeed until virtually the last moment there was little hope of the talks generating any kind of agreement- the two both parties’ positions were simply too far apart. However both India and Pakistan perhaps realized that failure in Tashkent could result in renewed hostilities, with unpredictable consequences. Hence on 10 January they did sign an agreement the Tashkent Declaration. This was less an agreement ending the Kashmir dispute, as one allowing it to be pushed to one side so that the two countries could resume relatively normal relations.
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.
The Tashkent Declaration faced domestic opposition in both India and Pakistan. In the former it was felt Pakistani ‘aggression’ had not been sufficiently condemned. However, the death of the Lal Bahadur Shastri just hours after signing the Declaration ‘invested (it) with an aura of sanctity’ amid muted criticism. The public perception in Pakistan (thanks to army and government propaganda) was that the war had been going well- the ‘invaders’ had been successfully repulsed from Lahore-that even agreeing to a cease-fire had been a mistake. Sitting down to negotiations and agreeing terms with an enemy which could have been defeated in battle was, therefore, adding insult to injury! Ayub Khan never recovered from the setback dealt to popularity by the 1965 War and Tashkent; with in a few years! He was overthrown in military coup led by Yahya Khan. Despite domestic opposition, both sides did respect the terms of the Declaration at least as far as practical measures were concerned. Prisoners-of-war were repatriated and by 25 February 1966 their forces had withdrawn to their pre-5 August. However, respecting the ‘spirit’ of the Declaration (resolving disputes peacefully, promoting friendly relations) proved more difficult.
USA --Efforts as Mediator
USA had not played any significant role in the Indo-Pak dispute on the Kashmir. USA’s behavior over Kashmir issue always in the state of fluctuation. Sometime she favors Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir by saying that “Kashmir is territorial dispute between Pakistan and India that should be resolved under the Charter of UN”. As recently Bush’s administration forced Pakistan and India to negotiate with each other and seek for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. Earlier she also has forced two contending parties to negotiate in the Agra between Vajapai and President of Pakistan Pervaiz Musharraf. And sometimes totally denied to mediate and taking part in resolving this issue.
All this we concluded from the various statements of the State Department on the various events.
The United States would have an 'intense' and 'sustained' interest in South Asia, but it had no intention of mediating on the Kashmir issue, US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwell. The United States would have an 'intense' and 'sustained' interest in South Asia, but it had no intention of mediating on the Kashmir issue, US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwell. Blackwell said the US was closely watching the implementation of promises made by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in last month's speech, including India's demand for extraditing terrorists.
"Implementation is the key. We will continue to look towards the many steps required for this," he said. On the Kashmir issue, Blackwell said: "The US position on Kashmir is very simple. We are not going to mediate on the issue. We want Pakistan and India to talk about it." He also said the US had no intention of setting up military bases in India, as the era of any country having many military bases around the world had ended”
He ruled out any mediation on the Kashmir issue. Addressing a press conference in Mumbai, outgoing US ambassador to India Robert D Blackwell said, "There will be no American roadmaps. No American game plan. No American substantive proposals.” The Bush administration did not have any hidden hand behind the Srinagar speech," Blackwell said. "We have not put pressure on Indian government...we only made our preferences known.
Congressman Gary L. Ackerman (N.Y), co-Chairman of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, today commended the Clinton Administration for its leadership in ensuring that the recent Group of Eight summit urged Pakistan to withdraw its forces from inside the Indian Line of Control in Kashmir. Ackerman warned Pakistan not to misinterpret or misjudge the sentiments of Cologne declaration on Jammu and Kashmir, "It's a clear and stinging rebuke of Pakistan's unacceptable military misadventure. Islamabad must undo this act of aggression. "He then added. "The G-8 call shouldn't be mistaken as some sort of an invitation for international or third party mediation of the Kashmir issue. That's not what it is. It's a simple and direct call for Pakistan to pull its forces from India's sovereign territory."
Secretary of State Colin Powell repeated U.S. calls for Pakistan to prevent infiltration activities into Kashmir, for India to exercise restraint, and for both to consider the consequences of taking military action. "I hope that as they examine the situation ... they will exercise maximum restraint while we wait and see what is happening over the line of control. And I still feel there is a way out of this crisis and it need not result in war," said Powell, speaking May 30 on the Lehrer Newshour television news program.
Pakistan welcomes mediation, pressure, facilitation, encouragement or any such other role of the United States and the rest of the international community in resolving the Kashmir issue, Khurshid M Kasuri, the Pakistani foreign minister. But always opposed the US’ role as mediator, because India will not concede to direct US intervention on Kashmir since it sees itself as a contending great power.
The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, started his official working visit to the United States by saying that to have peace in South Asia, it was critical for the Kashmir issue to be resolved; and that it could not be done unless there was third-party mediation or facilitation.
“Bilateralism has failed and, therefore, there is a requirement for mediation or facilitation in resolving the disputes between India and Pakistan,”
Conclusion
As we see the record of the mediation on the Kashmir issue, we conclude that Pakistan has always been seeking for the Third-party involvement (mediation) over Kashmir issue with India. That we colclude that from the certain statements of Pakistani’s leaders, like
The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, started his official working visit to the United States by saying that to have peace in South Asia, it was critical for the Kashmir issue to be resolved; and that it could not be done unless there was third-party mediation or facilitation. Bilateralism has failed and, therefore, there is a requirement for mediation or facilitation in resolving the disputes between India and Pakistan.
Khurshid M Kasuri, the Pakistani foreign minister, said Pakistan welcomes mediation, pressure, facilitation, encouragement or any such other role of the United States and the rest of the international community in resolving the Kashmir issue.
But question is that why Pakistan opt for mediation and why not India.
India will not concede to direct US intervention on Kashmir since it sees itself as a contending great power and also says mediation on Kashmir dispute as degrading India’ independence while as the same time jeopardizing its integrity. India itself considers as “Tiger of Asia” and “regional superpower of the South Asia”. She is in good position to negotiate on the bilateral channel. India did not want to expose the Kashmir Dispute on the international arena but rather saw it the internal affair of her. She always has been violating the Human Rights of the people of Kashmir and not employs the UN ‘s resolution of “self-determination” and plebiscite in the Kashmir. Why Pakistan Always has been crying for third-party involvement and mediation because she is not in a good position to negotiate on the bilateral levels. It is very necessary to negotiate on the bilateral levels there should equality on both sides at some extent.
The record of the international mediation (Third Party role), or meditative interventions in regard to the Kashmir dispute is clearly mixed: These interventions achieved both some successes and some failures. Among the successes were the cease-fire and truce agreements. Although the successes were small in number but the have some weightage, because the cease-fire in the 1948-49 was also acted upon by the efforts of the UN as the role of the mediator, and also the war of 1965 was ended by the efforts of the mediation, this time USSR played the role of mediator because USA was engaged in the Vietnam war.
I concluded that the role of Third-party or mediation is much required in this time. Pakistan, being the frontline state in the war against terrorism state, it is the heydays that Pakistan should be persuaded the international community and especially to the USA to mediate and will play the role of the Third-Party over the Kashmir Issue with India.
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14 http://www.stimson.org/southasia/? Sn=sa20020116299
Iffat, Opcitt, pp.123-124
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/? Sn=sa20020116299
Blackwell Rules Out US Mediation On Kashmir Issue, , (11/06/03)
Ibid
Transcript: Powell Says Kashmir Crisis "Need Not Result In War", (31/05/02)