In domestic affairs, Salisbury’s chief concern was the maintenance of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Salisbury was by no means indifferent to the many genuine grievances of the Irish Catholic peasantry against the absentee landlords of the Anglo-Irish Protestant ‘Ascendancy’. Indeed, he introduced important measures of land reform that went further in satisfying the cry for ‘tenants’ rights’ than anyone might reasonably have expected from a great Tory landlord, to the lasting displeasure of the aristocratic element in the Irish Unionist ranks. He was, however, determined not to allow agitators to exploit popular discontent for the purposes of separating Ireland from England. Salisbury combined the allaying of grievances through reform with the repression of seditious and treasonable organisations.
Salisbury was not like many imperialists, who sometimes wanted to absorb every available piece of land as an end in itself. With the African colonies he was quite happy to retain a presence on their coastal areas but took little interest with the interior of these places. He did not wish to over-extend Britain’s global commitments. If a territory was to be added to the Empire then there should be a sound reason for doing so. This outlook and strategy were based on a response to the expansionist and envious activities of Russia and France. Salisbury’s foreign policy was simple and clear cut: when dealing with strong powers at first use diplomacy, but at the same time recognise that such a policy is only effective if supplemented by military force and the will to use it.
As with Palmerston, Salisbury adhered to the principle of no natural allies, no natural foes. Permanent foreign agreements he disliked. He dealt with the various powers on the world stage by using a different approach each time, always flexible and pragmatic. For example, he achieved a highly satisfactory political victory in 1898. This concerned what is known as the ‘Fashoda’ incident, when a certain Colonel Marchand of France decided that he wanted to plant the tricoleur all the way across Africa from west to east. Faced with Salisbury’s resolution to go to war if necessary, the French decided the following year to abandon their territorial ambitions in the Nile valley, this region having recently been conquered by Kitchener’s victories in the Sudan.
Although he was never a universally known Prime Minister (as Disraeli or Gladstone were), Salisbury presided over the closing period of the nineteenth century, when Britain and its empire, although still formidable, were beginning to face challenges from other great powers: France, Russia, the United States and Germany. A less level-headed leader could easily have blundered into a war with any one of these nations, even over ‘small’ incidents like the French incursion into the Upper Nile or Russian activity in the East.
Salisbury was not a demagogue. Nor was his an idealistic style of leadership. He was a ‘management man’ - though an effective one.
He appreciated that a combination of skilful diplomacy and reserves of military strength were fundamental in order to preserve Britain’s power on the world scale. The Boer War (1899-1902) cast a shadow over his declining years and covered the last three years of his fourth and final premiership. The Boers could not be dealt with in the same way as the political representatives of Paris, Berlin or St. Petersburg. A different approach to the problem was needed to solve this unique situation. Salisbury died in 1903 before this could be fully realised.
The rights and wrongs of the South African war are complex. The hostility of President Kruger of the Transvaal to British interests and his personal bellicosity, combined with his policy of seeking German intervention in South African affairs at a time when Germany was well established in East Africa and South West Africa, would have troubled the most pacific British government. No small measure of war guilt is attributable to ‘Oom Paul’s’ unrealistic Boer ultra-nationalism, egotism and reckless overplaying of his hand, not to mention his tendency to underestimate Great Britain very badly. He dragged his reluctant kinsmen in the Orange Free State into a war which could in the end have only one outcome, so bequeathing a legacy of suffering and misery to his Volk, which he purported to love. He was a forerunner of other twentieth century politicians of his type, who ultimately brought nothing but misfortune upon their peoples. Faced with such a man, what else could Salisbury have done, but assert British interests by force, when diplomacy failed?
The methods used against the Boer civilian population reflect no credit on British arms, but were implemented by the military commanders on the ground, not the government far away in London. Joseph Chamberlain was, moreover, far more directly involved in the events leading up to the war than the Prime Minister. Indeed, Salisbury called the South African war ‘Joe’s war’ and regarded it as an unhappy object lesson in the dangers of imperialism, about which he was ambiguous. Temperamentally sympathetic to all expressions of patriotism and national sentiment though Lord Salisbury was, he was never a man to allow his heart to rule his head in matters of state and was ever cautious of the dangers of imperial overstretch. He therefore had grave reservations about the policy of imperial expansion that filled both Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain with such enthusiasm, so demonstrating that even great and wise patriots do not necessarily agree on all important issues.
It is at the least highly arguable that Lord Salisbury’s more cautious policy has been proved right by unfolding events in the twentieth century, though had Great Britain not abandoned its policy of ‘splendid isolation’ from continental alliances and entanglements, we might have retained our empire, overextended though perhaps it was.
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In 1888 the government passed the Local Government Act, which created County Councils that were responsible for local administration. The following year the British South Africa Company was granted a Royal Charter to colonise an area in central east Africa that ultimately became Rhodesia with its capital at Salisbury [now Zimbabwe and Harare respectively]. Salisbury attempted to avoid alignments in European affairs, maintaining the policy of what was later called “splendid isolation.” Colonial affairs, however, brought difficulties with some of the European powers.
- an Anglo-German agreement in 1890 resolved conflicting claims in East Africa: by the agreement, Great Britain received Zanzibar and Uganda in exchange for Heligoland
- a treaty with Portugal in 1891 gave Britain further rights in East Africa.
- the Fashoda Incident of 1898 brought Britain and France to the verge of war but ended in a diplomatic victory for Britain.
- difficulties with the Boers [Dutch settlers in southern Africa who had attempted to escape from British rule] resulted in the Boer War of 1899-1902
- Salisbury conciliated the United States at the time of the
- Venezuela Boundary Dispute (1895)
- the Spanish-American War
- the Panama negotiations
In 1891 his government passed an Education Act that introduced free elementary education but the general election of 1892 resulted in a small majority for the Liberals; Salisbury resigned and Gladstone formed his fourth and last ministry, retiring finally in March 1894 to give way to . Rosebery's ministry was defeated in 1895 on a vote on the Army Estimates and Salisbury formed a coalition government with the Duke of Devonshire and Joseph Chamberlain until an election could be held. Chamberlain had taken a substantial number of Liberal MPs over to the ranks of the Conservatives because they disagreed with Gladstone's attempts to give Home Rule to Ireland. Having split the Liberal Party in the 1880s, Chamberlain went on to do the same to the Conservative and Unionist Party in 1903.
This ministry passed the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1897 and a Local Government Act for Ireland in 1898. In the reconstructed administration of 1900 there were so many of Salisbury's relations holding office that it was nicknamed the 'Hotel Cecil'. During this part of the ministry, relations with the Boers living in the South African Republic (the Transvaal and the Orange Free State) deteriorated over the rights of the "foreigners" to vote: Paul Kruger had no intention of allowing the Boers to be outnumbered by other settlers. In October 1899 the Boer War broke out, ending only in May 1902 with the Treaty of Vereenging.
As his health failed, Salisbury handed over the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne; in July 1902 he resigned as PM on the grounds of ill health and was succeeded by his nephew, Arthur Balfour.
