So what did national unification change? Essentially, it represented a large amount of change taking place within European states, such as economic through the expansion of commercial industry, industrial which changed demography and infrastructure, and political – the impact of the modern state upon existing patterns of authority.
After all, national unification occurred at about the same time as Industrialisation, but to focus solely on this as a cause for unification and the subsequent emergence of nationalism is too narrow, because it was, “about politics, and politics is about power”, i.e. control of the state. All these encouraged mobilisation and the breakdown of local barriers and the general attitude of non-involvement at a political level. Penetration of market relationships also helped to break down local isolation, and the control of the local elites (in particular the highly gentrified election system). This provided a point of entry for outside political groups as well as compelling some of the people affected by the intrusion of markets to turn their attention outwards. All these changes were characteristic of mobilisation, general changes which made it possible or necessary for politicians to forge links with large parts of the population previously uninvolved in the political process, for example in political representation. It also marked the beginning of states unifying in order to look outwards – regional and local orientated societies becoming not only more centralised, but more aware of politics, leading to what Sperber refers to as the ‘explosion of political participation’ that took place throughout Europe in the 1840’s.
To ascertain whether nationalism, as either an intellectual philosophy or a political movement was more important as a cause (before) or product of (after) national unification, it is useful to study specific countries. Two countries that were the most prominent in this movement were Germany and France, both undergoing drastic political reorientation as a result of unification, and in their own ways affecting the politics of Europe as a whole, and not just within their own borders.
France’s political outlook had changed drastically in the 200 years before the Great War of 1914. Through revolution, the state had replaced the King as the source of political legitimacy and the will of the nation, i.e. the people, and this was the justification of their acts. Therefore enemies of France were the enemies of the people, implying some sort of ideological national unification. However, this had not been the cause of the initial revolution, which was in effect a bourgeoisie, commercial middle class freeing itself from feudalsim, and not a rebellion of the people. However, what this produced through unification of the people under a common political cause was not only the mobilisation of mass population, but an awareness of France as a unique and remarkable state, something still prevalent in modern day political France, and referred to as ‘l’exception francais’. This unification ideologically, along with the advent of the industrial state meant that the return of the monarchy in 1814 and 1815 renewed national sentiment through associating the new monarchy with the enemies of the state – enemies of the people. Hence, the Bourbon Government was overthrown 15 years later, and this act was hailed a national revolution.
Post Bourbon France was therefore even more strongly nationalist than it had been before 1815, but nationalism was a product of the first revolution, absent through the persistent segregation of the population, the emphasis being on the majority middle class. However, the sentiment that was produced through the idea of the republic and the political mobilisation of the people through the state came to strengthen the French perception of identity, and was vital in the overthrow of the Bourbon government and the protection of the nation. The importance of the growth in post revolution nationalism can largely be seen in the domestic policy of the government and the attitude of the governed in the latter parts of the 19th century. The national theme manifested itself in many contexts, hostility to the outside world coming through rejection of foreign goods in the commercial market, and foreign workers in industry. The finger was even pointed at the government and the Jews, accused of threatening the ‘patrimonie’ of the state, especially by the extreme left wing, Bonapartists, Republicans and Socialists. In effect it became nationalism in the extreme, affecting domestic and foreign policy for years to come; essentially an extremely important product, both strengthening and creating problems, arising from ideological, national unification.
Whereas in France national unification was more ideological and political, it took a more practical form in Germany. The physical manifestation of unification was in uniting the conglomerate of German states that had made up the Holy Roman or Habsburg Empire (governed for centuries by the Habsburg family), and producing a centralised, cohesive state. The lack of nationalism in Germany pre-revolution was partly a factor of the isolation of the German states, whether large and powerful such as Prussia and Austria or the small City states of Hamburg and Frankfurt. However, there had been a growth of liberalism throughout the Empire; initially a German intellectual movement concerned with freedom and uniqueness, it came to be adopted by politicians and parliaments – even strong military leaders such as the young Bismarck adopting it. This may have laid the foundations for nationalist acceptance, a framework and move towards an unified ideal that made nationalism all the more attractive not only to politicians and state leaders, but the population of Germany. This again brings in the notion of mobilisation, and the catalyst for this was a factor that Breuilly identified as an effective motivator – war. What started as peaceful and co-ordinated revolution under the Frankfurt National Assembly the summer of 1848, soon became war against Denmark when German autonomy was threatened through their occupation of Schleswig Holstein. Prussia and several smaller states sent armies to help Schleswig, endorsed by the National Assembly (at that time arranging the inclusion of German states into one, centralised entity). When Britain and Russia intervened and forced armistice and concession, there was a general uprising in favour of a war that had not only won public support, but began to compound nationalist sentiments. In September 1848, the National Assembly was encouraged to intervene, and voted to go against Prussia, but refused to put this into action, sparking fighting seen only in France in the Parisian June Days.
The fighting in Frankfurt was part of a wider movement in Western Germany against this, as it was seen to be compromising German autonomy and free will, both concepts laid down by the liberalist movement. This revolt was a loss for conservative German constitutional monarchists, bringing into question their programme to create national unity through the co-operation of individual German states. What this rebellion created was ideological and physical unification through war, and the effect of having to unite for a common cause. As with France, the intervention of foreign powers only served to compound this, making them the enemies of the German people, however geographically fragmented they were at the time. Even if this did not succeed in quite the same capacity as the conservative Frankfurt National Assembly had envisioned, but the mass uprising in response to a political development is characteristic of the growth in political involvement and identification that not only marks national unification but the growth in nationalism. This prevailing sense of a united German people had been developing at least intellectually since the Lutherian Reformation, with a backlash to Papal domination in the Empire. However, 300 years later, it appeared, much strengthened, in the 19th century to be a co-ordinated and mass political statement that went on to affect foreign policy especially in the late 19th and early 20th century, and laying the foundations for the Great Wars, as it had done in France.
In both France and Germany’s cases national unification came at a time of intense change not only for them but for the rest of Europe, essentially embodying everything from ideology to infrastructure. It is therefore clear that nationalism as a movement was very much a product of national unification. Without a definite entity upon which to concentrate their ideals upon and to elevate as a unique and independent, there could be no focus or principle to a nationalist movement. Post-unification, its part in the formation and reinforcement of the newly consolidated state was fundamental in shaping both domestic and foreign policy in the turbulent 20th century.
Bibliography
Breuilly, John – Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993)
Sperber, Jonathan – The European Revolutions (1848-1851). (Cambridge, 1994)
Sheehan, James J – German Liberalism In The 19th Century (London, 1978)
Tombs, Robert – Nationhood and Nationalism in France (London, 1991)
Breuilly, John – Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993)
Breuilly, John – Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993)
Sperber, Jonathan – The European Revolutions (1848-1851). (Cambridge, 1994)
