'Personal and party advantages were the motivating forces for the passing of the 1867 reform bill.' Discuss.
'Personal and party advantages were the motivating forces for the passing of the 1867 reform bill.' Discuss. In 1867 a Conservative government passed what was a fairly radical Reform Bill, enfranchising a further 1.2 million adult males. This was only a year after the party had campaigned against a less radical bill put forward by the Liberal government of the time. Obviously there was either a change in the Conservative mindset brought on by either inside or outside pressure, or there were benefits for the Conservatives to pass such a bill themselves. It is certainly true to say that Disraeli and the Conservative party had much to gain from the Reform Bill of 1867, but it is also possible that public pressure compelled them to act quickly and radically. In 1846, the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, famously repealed the Corn Laws. This caused a split in the Conservative party, as Disraeli accused Peel of betraying the party. The Peelites; Peel, Gladstone and Graham, split off. June 1849 saw the Willis Rooms meeting. This marked the foundation of the modern Liberals, with the Whig-Liberal alliance. It consisted of radical and liberal MPs, and Peelites. In 1852 and 1854 Lord John Russell attempted to introduce a new reform bill into parliament, under the premiership of Aberdeen, a Whig. They were both withdrawn before being passed, as the Whigs thought they were too radical, and the radicals thought they were too conservative. Disraeli and Derby had already witnessed the divisive potential of the idea of electoral reform. Working-class campaigners became frustrated by the Liberals' backtracking on reform. During the Conservative government of 1858 - 59 Disraeli introduced a very partisan reform bill, to increase the number of voters in county seats. Reform initiated by the Conservative party was no new affair. However, in 1859 Palmerston became the Prime Minister, and this new government meant that the reform attempt was discarded. He was a conservative Whig, who remained in power until his death in 1865. His major achievements were in finance, with Gladstone as the chancellor. It was difficult for the Conservatives to oppose what was essentially a conservative government. Palmerston also had a confrontational foreign policy, which made him popular. The Conservative party was very weak at the time. Its members were unable to present themselves as a credible alternative. After 1846 they were mocked by the Whigs as 'the conservative party with the brains knocked out'. Their belief in protectionism was seen as out of date, yet this was their only distinct policy. There was great rivalry between
Disraeli and Gladstone, both obviously the rising stars of their respective groups, and very ambitious. Lord Derby was also weak, seeming unenthusiastic. Outside of parliament, there was some feeling that reform was a good idea. In 1864 the National Reform Union was created. This group advocated the householder franchise. It was middle-class. The working class had felt particularly disappointed by 1832, so movements began to appear. The Northern Reform Union was set up in Newcastle in 1860, the Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot Association was set up in London in 1862, and the National Reform League was created in ...
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Disraeli and Gladstone, both obviously the rising stars of their respective groups, and very ambitious. Lord Derby was also weak, seeming unenthusiastic. Outside of parliament, there was some feeling that reform was a good idea. In 1864 the National Reform Union was created. This group advocated the householder franchise. It was middle-class. The working class had felt particularly disappointed by 1832, so movements began to appear. The Northern Reform Union was set up in Newcastle in 1860, the Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot Association was set up in London in 1862, and the National Reform League was created in 1864. The latter pledged to fight for; 'the extension of the franchise to every resident and registered adult male of sound mind and unconvicted of crime.' After Palmerston's death, Lord John Russell became the Prime Minister. He saw the advantage to electoral reform. The risk of it was that it was a very contentious issue in the party. Eventually, under pressure from the radicals, Gladstone introduced the Representation of the People Bill in March 1866. Gladstone proposed that in the boroughs, the right to vote should be extended to householders in property worth £7 per annum, and in the counties, the vote should go to householders, with or without land, in property worth £14 per annum. This meant a potential increase of about 400,000. It may have included some working class. The proposals were, however, very moderate. Russell hoped they would satisfy the public, encourage new voters to vote liberal and hold his alliance together. The effect was actually the opposite. The radicals had actually wanted a householder franchise and a secret ballot, the latter of which would have displeased the landowners. The landed Whigs, feeling the bill was too radical, broke out and revolted openly against the government. Their leader was Robert Lowe, and they were named the 'Adullamites'. They called the lower classes; 'ignorant and drunk'. The Conservatives also objected to the bill. The Adullamites were their natural allies. Disraeli formed a temporary alliance with them, to oppose the bill and get rid of the government. There was a vote on the bill in May 1866, and it passed by 5 votes. The Adullamites and Conservatives demanded that the vote in the boroughs should not be based on rents but rates paid on having the house, meaning the vote would be given to more conservative householders and taken away from lodgers and compounders. On 18th June 1866, the amendment was passed. The government lost its majority and resigned. The Queen asked Derby to form a new government. It was under this government that the 1867 Reform Act would be passed. Many historians have questioned the reasons for the Conservatives passing a much more radical reform bill in 1867 than the Liberal bill which they opposed in 1866. Many modern historians have looked to the theory that it was purely for personal and party advantages. To Derby and Disraeli it seemed clear that if the issue of reform could be kept alive it would continue to undermine the unity of the Liberals and would also help the Conservatives to create a new progressive image for themselves. As over Catholic emancipation and the repeal of the Corn Laws, a Conservative government would have a better chance of getting such a Bill through the House of Lords, and in the Commons it would be a chance to outplay the opposition at their own game; to 'dish the Whigs'. Disraeli himself seemed to make it clear to Derby in 1866 that his main aim was to outmanoeuvre the Liberals; 'We are entirely unpledged upon the subject [of Parliamentary Reform]. But if no notice is taken of it in the Queen's Speech, or no subsequent announcement of measures is made by the Leader of the House of Commons, it is probable that an amendment of a general character may be carried, which will replace the question in the hands of the late Government, and they return to power not more embarrassed by the Radicals than before.' The historian M. Cowling believes strongly in the idea that the Reform Act was a the result of political rivalry; 'the action… was a battle within the political classes to sustain, support and achieve power.' There was a strong uncertainty about how the electorate would vote, and Derby described it as 'a leap in the dark', but the Conservatives, looking back over the last twenty years, may well have felt that they had little to lose. Derby explained that unless the Conservatives carry a Reform Bill, the Liberals would quickly be re-elected and would pass one themselves, saying that he: '…did not intend for a third time to be a mere stop-gap until it should suit the convenience of the Liberal party to forget their dissensions and bring forward a measure which should oust us from office and replace them there…' Of course, the bill might also divide the Conservatives, as the more staunch right-wing section of the party would probably find the measure unacceptable, but that at least would give Disraeli a chance to 'dish' his own right-wing rivals for the eventual leadership of the party. Some, like Lord Stanley, criticised Disraeli for having no political beliefs of his own but merely an opportunistic desire for power; 'Disraeli has no well-defined opinions of his own; but is content to adopt and defend any policy which may be popular with the Conservative party at that time.' Stanley also described him as being motivated more by his desire to surpass his rival Gladstone than his commitment to his party of beliefs; 'it is only human nature that he should look more to a personal triumph over a rival, than to the permanent effect of what he does on the party or the principle which he represents.' The historian Feuchtwanger agrees; 'the personalities of Gladstone and Disraeli were central to the Reform crisis.' The historian F. B. Smith agrees with both of the modern views that Disraeli was trying to surpass Gladstone and that he wanted to gain a better position for himself in the Conservative party: 'He saw Reform as but one more pawn in the game against Gladstone, and as the mine the old Tories could use to destroy his leadership. On both counts there was much to be gained by passing a Bill quickly.' However, earlier historians looked to the threat of violence and pressure for reform that the public put onto the government to explain the reasons for the 1867 Reform Act. The working class renewed their pressure because their position had suddenly worsened with the onset of a period of depression. A wave of speculation, encouraged by the Limited Liability Act of 1862, led in May 1866 to the failure of one of the greatest financial houses in London, Overend and Gurney. This involved the collapse of many other enterprises and the consequent growth of unemployment was accompanied by a rise in food prices, due to a bad harvest in the autumn and an outbreak of rinderpest among cattle the previous year. Consequently it was hardly surprising that a number of mass demonstrations were held in London shortly after the appointment of the Conservative government, when the failure of Russell's reform bill had heightened the excitement. The most serious episode took place in July 1866. The National Reform League proposed holding a large meeting in Hyde Park, and although the new Home Secretary, Spencer Walpole, prohibited this, the League went ahead with its arrangements. When the processions reached the park the gates were locked, and after some protestations Beales and the other leaders agreed to accept the situation and tried to move on to Trafalgar Square. Many of their followers were less compromising and when the gates proved impregnable, they tore down hundreds of yards of railing and occupied the park until ejected by troops and police. The historian Royden Harrison placed great importance on the National Reform League and this kind of action; 'It was surely the presence of the Reform League which stopped the players crying off as they had done so often in the past.' However, to say that the Conservative decision to embark on further parliamentary reform was inspired by fear of revolution would probably be untrue. The unrest was too shapeless and local, and the leaders themselves anxious not to break the law. It was also very disorganised, with no political effectiveness, as F. B. Smith points out: 'The actual disturbances and the League's isolation from the mob presaged the Reformers' failure to convert the votes of the mob into a viable electoral power and of the mob's failure to translate its aspirations into effective parliamentary action.' Lord John Manners believed that Beales and his associates were 'more frightened than those whom they have frightened', and on the whole, there is very little evidence that Conservative policy was particularly influenced in this way. F. B. Smith believes that Disraeli himself was not at all worried by the threat of revolution; 'Disraeli remained outwardly unpeturbed by the Riots and they did not impel him towards introducing a Reform Bill.' However, some importance should be given to the public pressure, as the Queen was very much worried by them and her concern influenced the government, as F. B. Smith describes: 'The Queen had a clearer sense than her Ministers of the strength of popular feeling and the necessity to maintain social harmony. Her agency gave the agitations a much greater influence in the counsels of the Tory Government than they would otherwise have possessed.' Therefore it is probably correct to say that personal and party advantages were the motivating forces behind the passing of 1867 Reform Act, although the public pressure should not be totally discounted. It is useful to look at an opinion such as that of the historian P. Smith: 'Derby and Disraeli and their followers, in 1867, did not determine to trust the people, or to put their faith in a Conservative democracy. They did what they felt they had to do, to satisfy the popular agitation, reconcile the upper strata of the working classes to the established political system, and 'dish the Whigs''. In this way we can take the view that although the Reform Act was probably a party political decision, and also a chance for Disraeli to improve his position in the Conservative party, it was also perhaps slightly down to the public pressure. Personal and party advantages were certainly the strongest forces being the passing of the 1867 Reform Act, but not the only ones. Bibliography 'The Making of the Second Reform Bill' by F. B. Smith
