Delegated legislation effectively allows ministers to draft and implement legislation that is immune from parliamentary scrutiny (ibid. p218). Added to this is the increasing influence of EU directives in Irish politics. In 1994 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statutory instrument that amended existing Irish legislation by confirming the transposition of number of EU directives into Irish law (ibid pp. 218-219).
In Ireland, a frequent criticism of mainstream political parties is that there is little divergence between their policies. A contributing factor to this might be the government’s consideration for the opinions of opposition parties in the Dáil during the initiation stage of bills. It’s a welcome example of substance before style in politics. “Irish governments try to find a consensus within parliament for their proposals and are willing to take on board constructive suggestions from the opposition” (ibid pp. 219-220). However, it is pragmatism rather than the Dáil itself that compels ministers to accept amendment proposals.
The Dáil has a limited input in the five-stage bill process. A government minister proposing a bill will usually have the support of the majority of the house, which makes for debates of little serious consequence. For example stage two is where a vote on the bill is taken following a debate of its content. Gallagher (2004: p221) described these debates as “highly predictable affairs”, which are more concerned with scoring political points of opposing sides of the house than actually altering the shape of the bill.
Perhaps more strength comes from the legislation enacted by the Dáil, than the actual strength of the Dáil itself. Connolly (p. 345 in Coakley and Gallagher [eds] 2004) writes that legislation such as the Comptroller and Auditor General Act, 1993 has made the government more accountable to the Dáil and to the public. Further to acts such as this, the Dáil has three main methods of scrutinising government behaviour: debates, parliamentary questions and committees (Gallagher 2004 p227).
Debates are limited in what they achieve in terms of impacting on government behaviour. For example, debates of no confidence are routinely defeated, and opposition TDs use the occasion to publicly criticise the government, as they know their chances of actually removing the government are miniscule (ibid.). Furthermore, while it is the Dáil that debates and enacts legislation, it is the cabinet that decides what it will debate and the time allocated to it (Connolly 2004 p337).
Parliamentary questions are similarly limited in their impact, by the guidelines within which these questions must work. Answers as well as questions must be put down in advance-four days for oral and three days for written questions. This contributes to the ritualistic nature of the parliamentary sessions (Gallagher 2004 p227). The form that the answers take could hardly be described as an example of the Dáil exerting its muscle. According to Gallagher (ibid. p228) the highly politicised nature of question time leads to ministers giving as little away as possible in their answers. “The culture is one of concealment, not openness.” The Freedom of Information Act 1997 has proved to be a far more powerful investigative instrument than a parliamentary question (Connolly 2004 p348).
Committees represent the most effective way in which the Dáil scrutinises and impacts on government policy. During the committee stage (stage three of five) of the process for passing bills through the Dáil, the opposition can give their opinions on the bill in the hope that the government will consider their proposed amendments. However, the eleven member committees are weighted 6-5 in favour of the government (Gallagher 2004 p231). There is obvious room for improvement in the committee system.
Shaw (1979 cited in Gallagher 2004) writes “if a committee can consider the bill before it is taken up on the floor, the chances of the committee influencing the outcome tend to be greater than when the lines of battle have been predetermined in stage two”.
Policy, pressure and lobby groups also have a say in the formation of policy-something that the Dáil can do little about. A number of economic and social agreements have been negotiated with unions and interest groups almost without reference to the Dáil (O’Hailpin, E. and Connolly, E.1999 p128). This creates a political climate where everyone bar the parliament itself has a say in the formulation of policy (ibid.) The Dáil and its members however, is a magnet for policy groups seeking publicity and information. What this means is that if a TD reneges on a commitment, the pressure groups will alert opposition politicians, so effectively policy groups do increase the accountability of Dáil members (Ibid.p131).
The continuing prevalence of policy groups and the inability of the Dáil to regulate against them within the Irish political system has brought with it some negative aspects too. Donations from business companies to the largest and most influential parties have proved controversial. The climate of evasion evident in the Dáil debates has been sustained during numerous tribunals into the financial transactions of Dáil members. Just one example of the findings of the tribunals was the revelation by the Flood tribunal that former minister Ray Burke had received corrupt payments from a number of builders (Murphy 2004 p372).
Coalition governments have become the norm in recent Irish politics. Following the creation of the Fianna Fail-PD coalition government in 1997, the Department of Equality and Law Reform was merged with the Department of Justice (Connolly p331 2004). The Dáil has no input into this process, which leads to the effective prioritisation and demotion of some departments over others.
While the Dáil has been a target for criticism, its role within Irish politics has to be viewed in the context of the overall Irish political system. While it is frustrating and somewhat disheartening to read of the parliament’s weaknesses, only the naïve would argue for the Dáil to have a large increase in power. For example, anything that constituted interference by the Dáil in the way a government formulates policy would be far less desirable than a so-called weak democratic institution. It would be undemocratic of the Dáil to interfere in such matters.
While noting this, it should also be noted that there is a democratic deficit within the Dáil system. As Gallagher (2004, p238) writes, the committee system could have a real and meaningful impact on legislation if it were to discuss legislation before it goes on to full parliament.
Finding a balance between running a democracy and regulating the procedures of that democracy will never be achieved to a degree which at once pleases the government, the opposition and political analysts. Investigative journalism and pressure groups will ensure that politicians are scrutinised because that is their job and their agenda. The job of the Dáil is somewhere between spectator and referee: monitoring political activity and intervening only when necessary. While the Dáil will never be strong, it is adequate. And while it is weak, it is simplistic to dismiss it as so. And for many, the feeling that we are ruled democratically is more important than having a particularly strong parliament (Norton cited in Gallagher 2004).
Reference List:
*Connolly, E. 2005. The government and the governmental system IN: J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds.) Politics in the Republic of Ireland. Great Britain: Routledge. pp. 328-352.
Connolly, E. and O’Halpin, E.1999. Parliaments and Pressure Groups: The Irish Experience of Change IN: Norton (ed) Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe. Great Britain. pp. 124-145.
*Gallagher, M. 2005. Parliament IN: J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds.) Politics in the Republic of Ireland. Great Britain: Routledge. pp. 211-241.
*Murphy, G. 2005. Interest groups in the policy-making process IN: J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds.) Politics in the Republic of Ireland. Great Britain: Routledge. pp. 352-384.
Norton, P 1990b. ‘Conclusion: Legislatures in perspective’ in P. Norton (ed.) Parliaments in Western Europe IN Parliament. Great Britain: Routledge. pp. 211-241.
Shaw, M. 1979. ‘Conclusion’ in J. Lees and M. Shaw (eds.) Committees in Legislatures: a Comparative Analysis IN Parliament. Great Britain: Routledge. pp. 211-241.
*Please note that no exact dates for when each chapter was written were given in the book Politics in the Republic of Ireland, even though the book has been republished four times. The inside cover says that the book was most recently republished in 2005, so for the sake of consistency, all references from this book are dated 2005.
