Overall the diplomatic plan was somewhat feasible when considering the number of NATO members and the political challenges with each. Diplomacy was focused on getting Milosevic to the table to agree to terms favorable to both sides. Serbia continued attacks against the ethnic Albanians and did stop briefly during the negotiations only to resume attacks yet again. The diplomatic approach utilized by the NATO was clearly illustrated by NATO’s actions and in some cases inaction as described in GEN Clark’s book. They intended to put pressure on Milosevic with the least amount of effort while other actions were resourced at a higher level.
Acceptability of the diplomatic plan is much easier when considering the overall cost. NATO risked very little initially when the first discussions with Serbia were initiated. As GEN Clark mentions “As NATO tried to muster leverage against Milosevic in the months before the ethnic cleansing reached a point that conflict became inevitable, our own deep-seated ambivalence vitiated our policies”.3 (419) The focus was on compromise within an undefined plan. During further diplomacy, NATO was forced to respond to violations at the risk of losing NATO’s credibility and in some cases the independent nation states survival at home.4 (422)
Suitability or adequacy of the diplomatic plan was not accomplished during the Kosovo campaign. Discussions were made early that the threat of military action would be used to support the overall diplomatic effort with Milosevic. However as GEN Clark states in his book several times that once the single diplomatic effort failed and force was applied then diplomacy simply stopped. Secretary Albright is recorded saying, “Yes,” she said, “but who’s going to carry the message in? Certainly not the Americans, and not our Allies.”5 (253) NATO’s efforts were focused on solving the humanitarian problems created by Serbian ethnic cleansing both internally and externally in the region.6 (435) Unfortunately slow commitment to a diplomatic course of action allowed Serbia to continue their actions without any fear of retribution by NATO.
“I had no doubts about what we had to do on the military side, but a number of us had begun to ask in private about the political goals of the campaign.”7 (108) GEN Clark wrote this after the military campaign had begun without major responses from the Serbian Air Force and air defense units. How does one claim a nested military action in diplomatic objectives after a statement of that magnitude by the military leader of NATO?
Military operations were limited to an air campaign by several governments, the US a major player, totally eliminating an option of a ground campaign in the beginning. I would assess that it was initially feasible to execute the air campaign to drive Milosevic back to the diplomatic negotiation table for further compromise, which was the initial objective. “The air campaign began with enough forces to punish the Serbs, but it lacked the mass and capabilities to halt the ethnic cleansing.”8 (424) NATO forces retained enough flexibility to adapt as the diplomatic environment changed although they were never capable of massed effects on deployed Serbian ground forces.
Governments were risk averse, especially the United States and it was this aversion that drove the offensive course of action. Militarily costs were kept relatively low with the refusal to accept any friendly casualties with minimal civilian casualties. With concern to a military action driving a diplomatic solution, I would assess that Allied Force was in fact an acceptable operation. The single downside was the length of the operation as initially envisioned by the civilian leadership. However as I mentioned earlier it was this extended time that in fact hardened countries to see it through to save their own political future as recounted in GEN Clark’s writing.
GEN Clark mentioned to Secretary Albright that the Serbs will initially win the race with actions on the ground against the civilian population before the military action as created can achieve its goal.9 (171) In short the campaign was not suitable as initially planned within the parameters of NATO, which initially focused on the human atrocities. “Publicly ruling out a ground effort at the outset took away the threat of decisive maneuver and offensive action…” wrote GEN Clark.10 (425) I believe that it was the will to complete the tasks and ultimate fear by politicians that NATO might fail that drove the military plan to a completion that some would argue was in fact a success.
The administration and NATO did not completely nest their diplomatic and military operations to achieve their goals in operation ALLIED FORCE against Kosovo. Objectives were not initially identified and clearly articulated before operations began. Diplomacy backed by force was the mantra of NATO, but diplomacy was all but forgotten. GEN Clark admits in his writing that they as the executors of the plan were not comfortable with the diplomatic process and unsure of the political endstate. The actions in Kosovo illustrate a strong case to define the political goals and objectives to drive military action with an endstate.
