The conflict may be classified as a strike for power between Taliban government and United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), each part representing different ethnic and linguistic groups, clans and several sects within Islam.

2. Parties and Time Period

The primary parties involved in this conflict are the Taliban government and the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA).

The Taliban government was proclaimed in September 1996 by Islamic extremist students under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar. It was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Republic. Initially, a large part of support for Taliban came from Afghanistan's Pashtun community as well as from ordinary Afghans, weary of the prevailing lawlessness in many parts of the country. The Taliban refusal to deal with the existing warlords whose rivalries had caused so much killing and destruction, stamping out corruption, restoring peace and allowing commerce to flourish again earned them respect. On the other hand, they soon imposed the strictest interpretations of Islamic law and custom. Criminals began to have their hands and/or feet amputated, women were forbidden to work, girls were excluded from schools, the wearing of the burqa was enforced, games, music and television were banned, punctilious attendance at the mosque was obligatory. 

The UIFSA, commonly known as the United Front or Northern Alliance, supports the government ousted by the Taliban, the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA). The UIFSA was led, until his assassination in September 2001, by Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud. The precise membership of the United Front has varied from time to time, but includes ethnically different Mujahidin groups.

The first significant secondary party is Pakistan. Afghanistan is one of the most important defining issues for Pakistan in terms of security, domestic politics, ideology, and political identity. Although, Pakistan denies any ties with Taliban, the major role in creating the student militia was played by its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and an extremist group Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam. There is strong evidence that Pakistan has assisted the Taliban forces by facilitating the recruitment of fighters, offering military training, and planning pivotal military operations. Former Pakistani military officers have provided specialized forms of assistance, particularly with respect to the maintenance and use of artillery, with a view to increasing the Taliban forces' efficiency.

Another secondary party is the so-called "Six-plus-Two" contact group comprising China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, USA and Uzbekistan. Much of the United Front's military support comes from these states, whose members have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Afghan combatants and to prevent the use of their territories for such purposes. The main culprits are Iran and Russia, with secondary roles played by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (at least until 1998), Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

The participation of the United States has been crucial for Afghanistan: during the Cold war the US government supported Mujahidin fighters against the Moscow-backed regime in Kabul in order to undermine the Soviet Union. Though, the Taliban government captured power in 1996 under a tacit US approval,  tensions between Washington and Kabul appeared since the Afghanistan-located organization al’Qaida committed terrorist attacks against US diplomatic missions in Africa in 1998. The US and UK attacks on October 7, 2001 determined the crash of Taliban regime and formation of transitional government by anti-Taliban coalition members.

3. Incompatibilities

The primary incompatibility between the belligerents is the control of power as well as ethnic and religious rivalries.

Initially, “the Taliban grew into a reformist force against the rape of Afghanistan by warlords and "corrupt and power-hungry" Mujahidin groups”. Then they proclaimed themselves as religious vigilantes, intent on righting the wrongs inflicted on ordinary people. They claimed to be clearing the way for a true Islamic administration and insisted that the movement, unlike the Mujahidin organizations, was not a political party and not out to form a government.

For the anti-Taliban alliance composed in majority of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara Mujahidin groups, the Taliban, predominantly ethnic Pushtuns, neglect their right to participate in the decision-making process. The Taliban rigid Islam with aspects of anti-Sufi and anti-Shia fundamentalism is in alien to the moderate Islam practiced by most Afghans, who make up more than half the population.

Another incompatibility is rather between the Taliban government and international community, particularly, the USA. The Taliban reportedly support their regime partly from profits in the opium trade by taxing domestic growers and raiders who traffic in the narcotics. Sharp increases in Afghan production have left Afghanistan lagging behind only Burma as the world's largest producer of opium, amounting to 4600 tons in 1999. The Taliban have angered the international community by sheltering Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden, who was blamed by the U.S. government to have bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998 and World Trade Center and Pentagon in September, 2001.

Also, there is an opinion that the primary non-party defined factor in determining the twists and turns of Washington’s orientation in Afghanistan has been how best to exploit the world’s largest untapped reserves of oil and gas in the newly formed Central Asian republics—Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

4. Symptoms

1. Attitudes

At the first time of the Taliban appearance they were praised as a group of heroes who had replaced violence and social chaos with peace and security in the areas under their domination. The enthusiastic support and allegiance given to Taliban by local people and leaders of entire provinces demonstrated a positive attitude towards Taliban and a negative position towards Mujahidin government.

2. Behavior

The inability of the Mujahidin government to agree upon any lasting political settlement and the Taliban’s refusal to hold any dialogue represented a major symptom of the conflict. A violent behavior of both sides as fierce fights for the territorial gains in August and September before the fall of Kabul caused hundreds deaths of government and Taliban fighters.

Mediation actions taken by the UN Mission to Afghanistan as peace talks organizations or cease-fire appeals were ignored by both sides. The UN set out in May 1991 an “international consensus” for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, but the plan was turned down flat. In January 1995, a plan to set an interim government failed as well.

5. Dynamics

In September 1996, Taliban gained control of the Afghan capital, Kabul. The Taliban final advance on Kabul came after a series of striking military gains in early September, which represented an escalation of the conflict between Taliban and Mujahidin groups. Ousting the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, the student religious militia formed a new government and moved swiftly to impose a strict Islamic regime. However, it was recognized only by Pakistan.

In October, the Taliban came under attack by opposition forces. Attempts at mediation by Pakistan proved futile and a truce between parties was reported to have collapsed. The violent tensions continued and in late December the Taliban were reported to have made their major military advance despite a UN attempt in November to broker a cease-fire.

The opposition forces were initially composed of 2 major Mujahidin groups: Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, where the most powerful figure was Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan under the command of Rashid Dostam. In May 1997, after intensified fightings, Dostam was forced to escape to Turkey. His flight led to the realignment and consolidation of anti-Taliban forces in June. Under Masud’s overall command, the new alliance was known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA). It included two new groups: forces loyal to former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Nekmatyar (leader of the Hezb-i-Islami faction) and followers of Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani of the Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami. Shi’ite and Ismaili Muslim militias which had fought previous anti-Taliban alliance were also members of the new coalition. In October, General Dostam returned to Afghanistan and was chosen military commander of the UIFSA

In december, a series of three meetings were brokered by the UN in New York city which brought together the “Six-Plus-Two” group countries in a move designed to staunch the flow of arms to the warring factions in Afghanistan. That was an external factor to create a military stalemate and to facilitate a peaceful settlement.

A respite in the conflict appeared on February 4, 1998 by reason of an earthquake measuring 6.1 on the Richter scale in the province of Takhtar. Military operations by both sides appeared to be restricted by severe weather conditions. Though the Taliban militia and the Alliance declared a unilateral three-day cease-fire, violent tensions were reported on February 7-8.

Some signs of a de-escalation of the conflict were seen on March 11, 1999 when peace talks between Taliban officials and the anti-Taliban coalition opened in Turkmenistan. Both sides agreed in principle to establish a broad-based government with a shared executive, legislature and judiciary. Nevertheless, in early April grave fights broke out in several provinces, they intensified in August and September. The peace negotiations were considered to have collapsed.

In mid-December 2000 Taliban and UIFSA held indirect peace talks in Turkmenistan, which were seen as a step to reconciliation. Yet, no tangible progress was made and fightings continued throughout February.

The conflict re-escalated in summer 2001, when clashes between belligerent sides intensified. Indeed, by the end of August, they appeared to have stalled and either side reported little military progress. 

On September 15 it was announced that Ahmad Shah Masoud had died from the wounds sustained in a bomb attack. The Economist reported that in an interview in late August, Masoud had admitted that his forces would never defeat the Taliban militarily.  His death could have led to the de-polarization of the anti-Taliban coalition, for the reason that he used to be the unifying authority of the Mujahidin groups.

Albeit, the balance of power has dramatically changed in Afghanistan since September. US officials accused the Saudi-born Afghan-based Islamic Militant Osama bin Laden of having organized terrorist attacks on the USA in September. U.S. and UK forces intervened on October 7 and Kabul fall to the anti-Taliban coalition in November. Since the Taliban regime had been wrecked, the conflict ended.

6. Power Relations

In terms of soldiers the belligerent forces were asymmetric: the Taliban were said to have from 25 to 30 thousand militia, while the UIFSA forces counted 15,000 troops. The former Afghan Army base of Rishikor, southwest of Kabul, was the main training center for Pakistani volunteers brought to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. The anti-Taliban alliance lacked the manpower, training and equipment to do much more than hold its own against the Taliban.

The armament equipment of the Taliban was more than 200 tanks and dozen aircraft, all captured from the Mujahidin groups. Pakistani private companies, often run by retired military officers, carried out significant procurement of munitions the Taliban. The UIFSA coalition has been widely helped by neighboring countries. Iran is known to have supplied at least the following weapons to the United Front: 100mm and 115mm tank ammunition for the T-55 and T-62 tanks; YM-II antitank mines; D-30 122mm towed howitzers and ammunition; 122mm rockets for the BM-21 and BM-21V "Grad" multiple-rocket launch systems. Russia has assisted UIFSA with rocket projectiles, cargo aircrafts, multiple-rocket launch systems, large-caliber rockets stacked, logistical support and maintenance services for United Front aircraft and helicopters.. Despite this military assistance, UIFSA military forces were not symmetric to the Taliban's: Ahmed Shah Masoud, visited Europe in early April 2000 and called on the international community to be more involved in the conflict by giving whether military or humanitarian aid.

In economic terms, both sides suffered from sanctions imposed by the USA in July 1999 and by the UN in November 1999 and December 2000. But the position of the Taliban government and Northern Alliance about that type of resources was rather asymmetric: the Taliban ”revenue” was more stable. It profited from opium production, taxing 10-20% on agricultural production and on transportation. The anti-Taliban alliance has had to rely only on its external sponsors.

Although, the Taliban regime was not recognized by international community and the UIFSA has been largely sympathized outside, the NMA psychologically was weaker. It lacked the internal organization and was subjected to frequent clashes between different factions. General Masoud's death might well have meant the collapse of the alliance. Only the bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon and US military action against Osama Bin Laden and his Taliban backers boosted the morale of the alliance.

Some analysts claim that there was no valid, organized and effective opposition to challenge the Taliban power. Indeed, the relationship between secondary parties involved in the conflict and their particular interests has completely changed this status quo. Despite the surrounding countries' involvement in the conflict, the USA had its last say: its intervention in Afghanistan put the Taliban rule out.

7. Settlement Proposals

Both sides of the conflict held numerous negotiations and agreed on peace proposals, but neither was respected and put in practice. For example, in November 1997 UIFSA unilaterally released more than 200 Taliban prisoners and called for cease-fire negotiations with the Taliban government. But later heavy fightings broke out and the initiative failed.

The UN played the role of a mediator organizing peace talks in November 1996 and calling for a cease-fire in January 1998. On March 11, 1999 peace talks between Taliban officials and the anti-Taliban coalition opened in Turkmenistan. But on April the peace negotiations collapsed as violent fights broke out in several provinces.

The secondary parties' contribution in facilitating the conflict resolution was arms limitation agreements. In December 1997 the “Six-Plus-Two” group met to agree to stop the flow of arms to the warring factions in Afghanistan. In July 1999 the group signed a declaration which banned the provision of military support to any Afghan party and outlawed the use of their territories by the Afghani militants. However, these measures were partly sufficient, as the parties did not respect the agreements.

The main action in ending the conflict was the US "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan. The collapse of the Taliban regime finished off the confrontation. Nonetheless, the end of the struggle could not mean that the incompatibilities were eliminated.

* * *

For decades, Afghanistan has served as an arena of competition among Pakistan, Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Their involvement in Afghani interior affaires and the pursue of their own interests led to the raise of ethnic groups confrontations and terror within the country. To escape this cycle of violence, the country's major religious and ethnic groups must cooperate to choose their own leadership, rather than have one imposed on them. They could do so through a mechanism of loya jirga, a council of tribal leaders, which will in turn, appoint a transitional multi-ethnic, broad-based government.

The first step towards this was made in December 2001 when Afghanistan's 30-member interim cabinet was agreed by four Afghan factions. Under the agreement, Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai serves as head of an interim power-sharing cabinet. The cabinet includes 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five from the Hazara population, three Uzbeks, with the rest drawn from other minorities. Two women serve on this administrative cabinet.

The cabinet will govern for six months until the former king convenes the loya jirga. The council will then ratify a transitional government, paving the way for elections within two years. This first step towards a stable, representative government “will allow the people of Afghanistan to take their country back."

---