Royal Commission chaired by Lord Wakeham was established in 1999, asked to consider the role, functions and composition of the second chamber whilst protecting the supremacy of the democratically elected House of Commons and to make recommendations. This report was having collected written submissions and oral evidence from public hearings. Finally, the Royal Commission report named ‘’ delivered to the government on 28 December 1999 and made to public in January 2000. The Royal Commission report became known as the Wakeham Report and contained 132 wide-ranging proposals. According to the report, the Commission had recommended that there should be no major extensions of the powers of the second chamber. The powers of the second chamber would remain as present with expansion of its scrutiny. Besides, it also recommended that there need not to alter the judicial function or the membership of the Law Lords and the House of Lords would continue to be the highest court of appeal in England and Wales. The report recommended that there be greater use of pre-legislative scrutiny Bills and would remove the power to defeat secondary legislation. However, Charter 88 criticised the report had completely failed to spot on the wider issue of strengthening the powers of the upper House to check and government.
In relation to composition, the Commission recommended that the second chamber, consisting around 550 members but no limit is set on the total number of members. It comprised by a majority of nominated members, who would be appointed by an independent Commission, and a minority of selected or elected members representing regional interests. Under the recommendation of Commission, the independent statutory Appointments Commission established in April 2000 to responsible for nominating all appointed members of the House including those from the political parties. The Commission consists of three from the main political parties, one nominated by cross benchers and four independents, one of whom would be chairman or woman. It would maintain the balance in the composition of House of Lords, thus it should ensure that at least 20 per cent of the members are not attached to one of the major parties. It should also ensure that at least 30 per cent of appointed members are women with the purpose of gender balance and with similar safeguards to ensure representation of ethnic minorities and appropriate representation for all religious faiths. The Commission recommended that the House would have fewer Church of England peers and allow more non-Christian representatives and other Christian denominations to be the members of the House, thus it would represent all major religions. The second chamber that came out of the second stage of reforms would have a fixed lifetime of 15 years.
On the other hand, the Commission had recommended three options for selecting the minority of regional members. Model A provides that sixty-five regional members selected by the results of general elections to calculate the proportion of the second chamber seats in each region that should be allocated to each party. One third of the regions would select regional members at each general election. Model B provides that eighty-seven regional members directly elected at the same time as the European Parliament elections under a system of proportional representation. This model is welcomed by a majority of Commission. Model C provides that 195 regional members directly elected at the same time as the European Parliament elections, the main difference From Model B being that the numbers would mean each regional constituency would elect one-third of its members each election. The commission did recommend, however, that the prime minister should lose the power to appoint peers, suggesting that the second chamber’s composition should be regularly adjusted in proportion to votes cast at the previous general election. The public will not accept a Second Chamber appointed by the Prime Minister or anyone else since only a fully democratic body will provide the accountability the public rightly demand. In addition, the Commission does not reach consensus on the issues of the number of selected or elected members and the method by selection. Besides, the vast majority of the public is against a second chamber, which dominated by appointees rather than directly elected representatives. This is because there would still have the problem of lack legitimacy without a direct election. However, in my opinion, the balance in composition could make the upper house become more representative and democracy and plays an effective role. Since the Commission would create an upper House which is ‘authoritative, confident, and broadly representative of the whole of British society’. Its members would have experience, skill and knowledge relevant to the assessment of constitutional matters.
In November 2001, the government published White Paper, The House of Lords – Completing the Reform. The White Paper it produced was basically along the lines with the visions of Wakeham Report. The Government will welcome responses to this White Paper by 31 January 2002. The White Paper stated that the new second chamber would act as constitutional checks and balances to the House of Commons and retain its current power. It would have no veto over government legislation but has the power to delay government legislation for three months. However, the functions of the reformed must also be renewed whilst maintain the higher status in the legislative process. In order to balance the power of the Executive, the second chamber should have the power of delay for one year. Therefore, the government still has time to reconsider about the effect of the enactment of such legislation or redress the defects or inadequate in that Bill. The Government proposes only one change to the formal powers of the House of Lords in relation to Secondary legislation. At present, the House of Lords only has the power to approve or reject a Statutory Instrument. This crude power is inconsistent with the Lords’ primary role as an advisory and revising chamber. Therefore it accepts the Royal Commission's recommendation that the House of Lords should be given a power to require the Commons to consider or reconsider Statutory Instruments.
The government proposal had suggested that the House should have a maximum of 600 members with the political balance adjusted to reflect share of the vote in the preceding general election and the final tally of 600 members would be fixed over ten years. Crucially, no party, including the governing party, will be able to have an overall majority. Government accepted that the House should be 80 per cent appointed where the Appointments Committee would be accountable to the Commons to appoint 20 per cent of non-party members of the House and the 60 per cent would appointed by the political parties in the Commons, where the number available to each political party is determined by the Appointments Commission. The rest 20 per cent of the upper chamber would be directly elected regional members. The government “agrees with the commission that this approach is best suited to securing a properly representative membership, able to fulfill the functions of the second chamber, while complementing and enhancing, not usurping, the House of Commons”. In relation to the three options of selecting regional members, the government is same idea with Commission but government had proposed 120 of elected members. They support Model B since it could produce a fair distribution of seats between the parties, at the meanwhile not greatly to distort the working of the House by giving too large a proportion to the elected members. Besides, the government agrees with the Commission the Church of England bishops would be reduced from twenty-six to sixteen, thus it would represent all major religions. The ninety-two hereditary peers also should be removed and the link between the peerage and membership of the Lords will be broken so that future members will not become peers, and will be titled Members of the Lords (ML).
However, the White Paper had received a great deal of criticism from public constitutional campaigners, opposition parties, some of the Lords and its own Members of Parliament. First, the criticism is that the consultation period is too short; the government has limited public debate on this vital issue by running a three month consultation. The shadow commons leader, Eric Forth, had described the proposals ‘a fudge’ and was ‘an insult and an absurdity’. Beside, the most critical matter that opposed by vast majority of public is the majority of appointed members in the House. One survey implemented by Labour backbenchers had founded that at least half the members of a new upper chamber should be elected but the government only proposes 20 percent, with 2/3 appointed through the party machinery. The government started the process of Lords reform aimed at democracy, but now it shows that they are reluctant to give up their powers of patronage. Thus, the Tony’s cronies which had been built in the present transitional chamber will be continuing. It is submitted that this situation is inconsistent with the proposal in White Paper, which said that no one political party is dominant in the House. Paul Tyler MP, Liberal Democrat shadow leader of the house, said: “If only one-fifth of members of the second chamber are to be elected this will remain a nagging sore in the British constitution. Clearly such unfinished business will lead to continuing instability.” The public also supported that the life peers should be selected by independent Appointment Commission rather than chosen by the parties leader. In addition, the public also thinks that the upper chamber should enjoy further powers to delay legislation.
The Public Administration Committee published a report in February 2002. It agrees with Government that no major change is required to the role or functions of the second chamber. However, they recommend that 60 per cent of its members should come by election and served for between two and five years, 20 per cent should be nominated by the political parties and 20 per cent should be independent, non-aligned members and appointed by the Appointments appointed, thus the second chamber would be predominantly elected.
Then, Joint Committee is set up to discuss the issues of the future composition and power of the House. It said that the reformed House must fulfill the qualities of legitimacy, representativeness, no domination by any one party, independence and expertise. It is submitted that the lack of representativeness of the House could be improved by a new appointment system or various methods of election. It recommends seven options of voting, they are fully appointed or fully elected, 80 per cent appointed to 20 per cent elected, 80 per cent elected and 20 per cent appointed, 60 per cent appointed to 40 per cent, 60 per cent elected to 40 per cent appointed elected and 50 per cent appointed to 50 per cent elected. There agree with an establishment of statutory Appointments Commission, but there should not exclude the possibility of nomination by the Prime Minister nor proposals by party leaders and members of the public. All these nominations would be scrutinised by the new Appointments Commission.
The Second Report of Joint Committee published April 2003 and embarked the issues where they think progress is possible and to contribute to the progress of the reform process by investigating and reporting on certain specific issues, which will have to be resolved as part of an overall reform. There include the status of the Appointments Commission and looking for direction from government and Parliament about where they should concentrate their future work.
The Government is thankful to the Joint Committee which has undertaken in considering the issues raised by further reform of the House of Lords. The Government agrees with the Committee’s view that the Parliamentary votes had showed that there is no consensus about introducing any elected element in the House of Lords. It supports that a consensus has now been established around the proper role, functions and powers of the House of Lords, and all proposals for further reform must respect that consensus. The Government has announced to establish a separate Supreme Court with removal of the Law Lords in further major reform of the House of Lords. The Government agrees that the appointments process must demonstrate ‘independence and integrity’ and must be ‘respected and viable’ and the Government should examine the present arrangements and find out which part need to strengthen.
Tony Blair announced on the intemtion to abolish the office of the lord chancellor and the Lord Chancellor's Department has been renamed the Department for Constitutional Affairs. The government’s objective is to to create a separate Supreme Court and a separate speaker of the House of Lords. Most of the resposibilities of the former Lord Chancellor’s Department would be incoparate into the new department. The Minister is sitting as a Judge or Speaker in the House of Lords, but could free from running the judicial selection process. The post of Lord Chancellor will be abolished when the Judicial Appointments Commission and new Supreme Court are established. However, this proposal was critic and had been rejected by the House of Lords with the vote of 240 to 208 during the committee stage of the controversial Constitutional Reform Bill. Critics said “the changes were ill-conceived and appeared to have been sketched out on the back of an envelope”. Besides, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, warned: “The lord chancellor should be in the cabinet, we get rid of that at our peril.” However, Charter 88 agreed with this proposal since this proposal will bring in a written constitution which the people rightly deserve. The government threatened to use the 1911 Parliament Act to force it into legislation. Their argument is that a 21st Century nation needs a 21st Century legal system and that reform is long overdue with regards to the Law Lords.
As conclusion, it is submitted that appointment the peers by prime minister or political party is arguable. Any prime minister is bound to be massively biased towards appointing peers who support his party, or who will be ineffective in supporting the opposition. Besides, people wanting to become peers will have a way of achieving this is corrupting the government. They should be appointed by the head of state, the monarch, and the monarch should be advised in this by an independent group of advisors, subject to scrutiny. Only a fully democratic body will provide the accountability the public rightly demand. However, an elected upper House may fight against the flaws of democracy. This cannot work if the upper house is elected as well as the lower. Additionally, the United States of America, where the upper house is elected, it showed that most of the people who get elected are the sons of former members of that same house, and near enough all of them are stinking rich, consequently the upper House may be biased. Therefore, the reform of House of Lords is too wide ranging and affected and related to many essential parts like House of Commons, role, power and function of upper House and others, the government must do it properly and efficiency, to achieve ‘centre of grativity’ around which a consensus may be built.
REFERENCE LIST
Barnett, H. (2000) Constitutional and Administration Law (Third Edition), Great Britain: Cavendish Publishing Limited. pp 670-675
A Department for Constitutional Affairs Consultation PaperConstitutional Reform:
Reforming the Office of the Lord Chancellor
September 2003
A Modern House of Lords
http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.htm
Britain to Abolish Lord Chancellor Post
by Reuters, London
Foreword by Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor
Foreword by the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor
History
House of Lords
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldbrief/ldreform.htm
House of Lords Act 1999
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1999/19990034.htm
House of Lords Act 1999
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en1999/1999en34.htm
House of Lords Reform
House of Lords Reform Promised
Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/joint_committee_on_house_of_lords_reform.cfm
Labour Manifesto 1997
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/labour_party.htm
Labour's Reform of the House of Lords
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jan1999/lord-j23.shtml
Modernising the House of Lords
Peers Reject Bid to Abolish Lord Chancellor
Peers Snub Commons by Refusing to Abolish Lord Chancellor’s Office
Planned Reforms to the House of Lords
http://w ww.historylearningsite.co.uk/Lords_reforms.htm
The House of Lords Completing the Reform
http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/holref/holreform.htm#part3
The Wakeham Report
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/wakeham_report.htm