Even with this reduced power of veto, the Lords could still disrupt the progress of Bills proposed in the last two years of a Parliamentary term, as they could seek to delay the legislation beyond the end of the Parliament. This was a particular problem in 1945 when the new Labour Government wanted to carry out a significant program of nationalisation against the wishes of the Lords. The Commons therefore had to invoke the 1911 Act to introduce the 1949 Parliament Act, which reduced the delaying power of the Lords to one year. Under the Parliament Acts, Bills must still be considered by both Houses, but if the Lords delay its approval for more than a year, the Bill can be enacted without their consent.
After the 1949 Parliament Act, the House of Lords were almost left powerless, the House was like a “watch dog of the constitution …but one which could only bark and not bite.”
During the late 1940’s it seemed as if the House of Lords would cease to exist in a few years as its powers were shrivelled away and the Lords would not be keen to sit in a House which was a mere puppet in the constitutional framework. Ian Loveland said: “it seems the Upper House would become a curious historic relic; a tourist attraction without any significant constitutional power, however things did not turn out like that.” The Life Peerage Act of 1958 single handedly revitalized the House of Lords by the introduction of new blood. The new members were men and women who reached prominence in public life and their peerage provided an increased resource of specialization and experience to the House which otherwise was dying out. The Salisbury Doctrine has been one major influence in keep the House alive, the Salisbury convention states that the House of Lords will not delay any legislation if it feels that the mandate of the electorate is with the Commons, therefore as a safeguard the House of Lords sits as a supervisory body to see that the government follows all the policies it had laid down in its manifesto.
The White Paper of 1968 outlined the functions of the reformed House of Lords which were interalia to primarily provide a form for debate on matter of public interest, to scrutinize and revise Bills from the Commons, to preside over the matter of delegated legislation, scrutinize the executive and most importantly serve as the highest court (of appeal) in the land.
The Wakeham Commission's report in 2001 proposed for reforms stating that the Upper House should consist of a mixture of both elected and nominated members of which 120 members should be elected and 400 should be appointed and advocated for the removal of the 92 hereditary peers remaining from the 1958 Peerage Act. The overall powers of the House were to remain largely unchanged. The labour government was in power with an extensive majority and it seemed as if the reforms that they had been hoping for would finally materialize but once again, things did not go according to plan. With hindsight we can see that the objections raised in 2002 were entirely predictable: they were no different from those that were expressed in 1968. In brief, the composition of the Lords - primarily nominated by the Government - provided no confidence that the new body would have real legitimacy and authority. Moreover, it was clear that very few people on either side of the debate were happy about the notion of a `hybrid' House - part selected, part elected and thus the momentum of the reforms miserably failed yet again. The Commons recently was unable to show majority support for any mixed model of selection. The feeling seems to be that any such system would simply be a compromise, not a balance.
The main reason for the problematic reforms is one simple question, “ how should we effectively select the members of the House of Lords”, if the members are elected by voting of the electorate then it would just be an extended version of the Commons serving for a much longer period and if indeed the members in the Lords and Commons belong to the same political party there would be no independence of scrutinizing and rejecting legislation due to party affiliation. This is in keeping with the general observation that the two chambers of a bicameral system ought to consist of people appointed in different ways, if they are to balance each other
The question also remains as to whether there is even a need for a House of Lords as it represents a paradox in the democratic setup of the United Kingdom, having a completely unelected and democratically unaccountable institution. Supporters of the Lords point out that most modern states have bicameral legislatures, in which the chambers have complementary responsibilities. For this to work, the two chambers have to be comprised of different kinds of member; otherwise there just might be a larger House of Commons. It has to be noted that not all democratic states have bicameral legislatures. Alternatively, we could give the courts the power to scrutinise legislation against some form of overarching constitution, as is permitted in the USA. Abolishing the Upper House would lead to a constitutional vacuum. The inherent system of checks and balances of the democratic setup would be wiped out as the government in power could easily pass any arbitrary legislation they wanted as they needed only the support of the Commons, who were of course their own party members, to approve any Bills..
Till today, major proposals for reforms have come and gone. Some have achieved due success while most have miserably failed, the structure and functions of the House of Lords remains a complex issue yet to be fully solved. The problem is not insurmountable but possesses hurdles. A written constitution and a constitutional court as in the USA would go a long way towards limiting the functioning of the Commons but then the UK’s unique feature is its unwritten constitution and the sovereignty of its Parliament; as a result no court of the land could question the validity of any legislation. Therefore, an internal system of checks and balances is essential to scrutinize the passing of any undesirable and arbitrary legislation. The second chamber as it stands today is merely a puppet; it needs thorough reforms in its composition and the extent of its powers. Of the various reforms that have been proposed for the upper chamber, all have been met with sufficient hindrance from either the Lords or the electorate and nothing concrete is yet to be envisaged as to the configuration of the duly awaited re-vamped version of the House of Lords. .
